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THE ANTIRACIST CONSTITUTION
BRANDON HASBROUCK*

ABSTRACT
Our Constitution, as it is and as it has been interpreted by our courts, serves
white supremacy. The twin projects of abolition and reconstruction remain
incomplete, derailed first by openly hostile institutions, then by the subtler lie
that a colorblind Constitution would bring about the end of racism. Yet, in its
debut in Supreme Court jurisprudence, colorblind constitutionalism promised
that facially discriminatory laws were unnecessary for the perpetuation of white
supremacy. That promise has been fulfilled across nearly every field of law as
modern white supremacists adopt insidious, facially neutral laws to ensure the
oppression of Black people and other vulnerable populations. However, it need
not be this way. The Reconstruction Congress gave us the tools in the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to apply color-conscious remedies to
historic inequities and build an abolition democracy.
Previous scholarship has typically focused on the failure to achieve this goal
within specific fields of law—criminal justice, education, employment
discrimination, and more. Rather than simply analyze the symptoms of racist
legal structures, this Article will demonstrate that the patterns across various
fields of law reveal the presence of the underlying disease of white supremacy.
Even those scholars willing to look to these patterns of oppression have tended
to take the pessimistic view that the Constitution is hopelessly infested with white
supremacist interpretations.
This Article will instead argue that Congress and the courts can, and should,
apply the Constitution as it was written and intended—to promote an antiracist
vision of America—and will explore what an antiracist Constitution would look
like in practice. The resulting framework demonstrates the doctrinal puissance
of abolition constitutionalism. Where progressive constitutionalism often
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struggles to justify the rights-affirming results of the Warren Court and Roe v.
Wade while excluding the possibility of a return to the Lochner era, abolition
constitutionalism provides a robust basis to support civil rights, including
reproductive rights, while rejecting the primacy of freedom of contract.
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The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And
so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power.
So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its
great heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty. But
in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no
superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens.
—Justice John Marshall Harlan1
You need to believe in things that aren’t true. How else can they become?
—Terry Pratchett2
INTRODUCTION
If we want to shape a better America—a country that lives up to its purported
ideals, rather than twisting them to cover for white supremacy—we must first
understand what America has been. HBO’s Watchmen explored both the horrors
that comfortable white Americans would rather believe are confined to the past
and what a world where government power served antiracist ends could look
like.3 In the show, the most powerful being in the universe, Doctor Manhattan,
chooses to experience life without all that power—becoming, in contrast, a
Black man in America.4 The character’s own history is explored in the original
comics through a series of vignettes, which illustrate his unusual ability to
perceive all of time without ordinary human limitations.5 America has a long
history of white supremacy: political compromises that sold out Black rights,
slavery, white backlash, suppressing advocates for justice by force of law,
twisting the interpretation of the Constitution and laws to excuse systemic
racism, and allowing the bigotry of years past to continue through ostensibly
neutral laws.6 The story is too big to take in all at once. So, let us instead imagine
1

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
TERRY PRATCHETT, HOGFATHER 337 (1996).
3
See generally Watchmen: It’s Summer and We’re Running Out of Ice (HBO television
broadcast Oct. 20, 2019) (depicting alternate reality in which Tulsa Race Massacre occurs and
one of modern-day police force’s highest priorities is to root out and defeat white supremacist
movement).
4
See generally Watchmen: An Almost Religious Awe (HBO television broadcast Dec. 1,
2019) (revealing Cal Abar as Doctor Manhattan’s assumed, human identity).
5
See generally 4 ALAN MOORE & DAVE GIBBONS, WATCHMEN (Len Wein ed., 1986)
(depicting Doctor Manhattan’s simultaneous perception of each moment of his life).
6
See generally, e.g., Mary Elliott & Jazmine Hughes, Four Hundred Years After Enslaved
Africans Were First Brought to Virginia, Most Americans Still Don’t Know the Full Story of
Slavery.,
N.Y.
TIMES
MAG.
(Aug.
19,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/19/magazine/history-slaverysmithsonian.html?mtrref=www.nytimes.com&assetType (exploring history and legacy of
2
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how that history would appear if, like Doctor Manhattan, we might see all of
time at once.
*****
It is June 28, 1776. The Continental Congress orders that Thomas Jefferson’s
draft of the Declaration of Independence “lie on the table.”7 The document will
be edited heavily, removing—to appease Georgia and South Carolina8—the
accusation that King George III forced slavery upon the colonies.9 Jefferson,
who enslaves hundreds of people,10 nonetheless includes an assertion that “all
men are created equal.”11
It is July 16, 1787. The Constitutional Convention has been debating how to
determine a state’s population when apportioning members of the House of
Representatives.12 After delegates from Southern states propose that their states
be allowed to include enslaved persons when calculating their population,13 the
Convention adopts a previously rejected proposal that enslaved persons should
count as three-fifths of a person.14 The Three-Fifths Compromise will entrench
disproportionate power for slaveholding states in Congress and in presidential
elections.
It is March 3, 1820. The Senate approves the admission of Maine as a free
state while simultaneously allowing the admission of Missouri as a slave state.15
The Missouri Compromise forbids slavery within western territories “north of
the thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes north latitude”16 while simultaneously
cementing the notion that the balance between states permitting and forbidding
slavery must be maintained to preserve the political power of slaveholding states
in the Senate.17 The territorial restriction feeds the anxiety of the enslavers,

slavery in United States).
7
Thomas Jefferson, Autobiography (Jan. 6, 1821), in 1 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
3, 28 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904).
8
See id. at 33.
9
See id. at 39-40.
10
The Practice of Slavery at Monticello, MONTICELLO, https://www.monticello.org
/thomas-jefferson/jefferson-slavery/the-practice-of-slavery-at-monticello/ [https://perma.cc
/PGC2-XHK5] (last visited Jan. 17, 2022).
11
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
12
See MICHAEL F. CONLIN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
88-89 (2019).
13
Id. at 88.
14
Id. at 88-89; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 2.
15
Senate Hist. Off., Missouri Compromise Ushers In New Era for the Senate, U.S.
SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Missouri_Compromise.htm
[https://perma.cc/RPR2-FRS4] (last visited Jan. 17, 2022).
16
Missouri Compromise, ch. 22, § 8, 3 Stat. 545, 548 (1820) (repealed 1854).
17
See Senate Hist. Off., supra note 15.
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inevitably driving their hunger for foreign territory and willingness to resort to
violence to uphold their system of oppression.
It is September 18, 1850. Congress passes the Fugitive Slave Act18 as part of
the Compromise of 1850 to settle a series of debates on California statehood and
the borders of Texas.19 The new law requires government officials to assist in
capturing persons accused of escaping slavery on nothing more than an
affidavit,20 allowing free Black people to be enslaved without any right to defend
themselves in court.
It is March 2, 1877. A divided Congress fiercely contests which electoral
certificates to count in the presidential election.21 After hours of gridlock, a
backroom deal allows Rutherford B. Hayes to be declared the winner in
exchange for removing federal troops from Southern states, effectively ending
Reconstruction.22 Openly white supremacist state governments will dominate
the region under one-party rule for nearly a century.23
It is March 3, 1913. The National American Woman Suffrage Association is
marching in Washington, D.C., to demand universal suffrage.24 To ensure the
participation of Southern women, Black marchers are instructed to form a
separate contingent at the back of the parade rather than march with their state
delegations.25 Ida B. Wells refuses to comply and joins the Illinois delegation as
it passes the crowd of spectators.26 Women will gain the right to vote through
the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920,27 but Black women will
largely remain disenfranchised until the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”)
effectively ends segregation at the ballot box.28
It is 1508. Juan Ponce de León has established a Spanish settlement in
Borikén—later known as Puerto Rico—where native Taíno people are
enslaved.29 As the Taíno dwindle in population from the ravages of colonialism,
18

Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462, 465 (repealed 1864).
See Ken Drexler, Compromise of 1850: Primary Documents in American History, LIBR.
OF CONG.: RSCH. GUIDES (Apr. 11, 2019), https://guides.loc.gov/compromise-1850
[https://perma.cc/QF5J-9KFZ].
20
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, § 9, 9 Stat. at 465.
21
See JILL LEPORE, THESE TRUTHS: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 329 (2018); ROY
MORRIS, JR., FRAUD OF THE CENTURY: RUTHERFORD B. HAYES, SAMUEL TILDEN, AND THE
STOLEN ELECTION OF 1876, at 327 (paperback ed. 2004).
22
See LEPORE, supra note 21, at 329-30.
23
See id. at 330.
24
See Paula J. Giddings, A Noble Endeavor: Ida B. Wells-Barnett and Suffrage, NAT’L
PARK SERV. (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.nps.gov/articles/000/a-noble-endeavor-ida-b-wellsbarnett-and-suffrage.htm [https://perma.cc/3EPA-JUHW].
25
See id.
26
Id.
27
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
28
See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.).
29
Russell Schimmer, Puerto Rico, YALE UNIV. GENOCIDE STUD. PROGRAM,
19
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the Spanish will begin to replace them with enslaved people kidnapped from
Africa.30
It is August 1619. British privateers have seized a Portuguese slave ship and
captured the enslaved people on board.31 They are brought to Virginia, where
they and other African people and their descendants will be subjugated in a racial
caste system.32
It is June 19, 1865. Major General Gordon Granger issues General Order No.
3 in Galveston, Texas, to enforce the emancipation of all enslaved people in
Texas.33 The order, believed to have been read aloud to the public,34 proclaims
“absolute equality of personal rights and rights of property between former
masters and slaves.”35 The formal end of slavery throughout the United States
will occur in six months when the Thirteenth Amendment is ratified.36
It is 1832. John Chavis, the first college-educated Black man in the United
States37 and a veteran of the Revolution,38 is forced out of his work as a teacher
and preacher.39 New laws have been passed to forbid these activities among
Black people, whether free or enslaved, in response to Nat Turner’s Rebellion.40
It is November 10, 1898. Following an openly white supremacist election
campaign to oust a biracial alliance that governed Wilmington, North Carolina,
a mob organized by prominent citizens attacks Black businesses and homes.41
https://gsp.yale.edu/case-studies/colonial-genocides-project/puerto-rico
[https://perma.cc/98TY-66Y8] (last visited Jan. 17, 2022).
30
See id.
31
See Nikole Hannah-Jones, Our Founding Ideals of Liberty and Equality Were False
When They Were Written. Black Americans Fought to Make Them True. Without This
Struggle, America Would Have No Democracy at All., N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 18, 2019, at
14, 16.
32
See id.
33
NCC Staff, Juneteenth: Understanding Its Origins, NAT’L CONST. CTR.: CONST. DAILY
(June 19, 2021), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/juneteenth-understanding-its-origins
[https://perma.cc/2459-24EB].
34
Id.
35
General Order No. 3, June 19, 1865, reprinted in General Orders, No. 3, HOUS. TRIWKLY. TEL., July 14, 1865, at 3, https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth232756/
[https://perma.cc/2HEG-QF79].
36
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
37
Working Grp. on Afr.-Am. Hist., African Americans at Washington and Lee: A
Timeline, WASH. & LEE UNIV., https://my.wlu.edu/working-group-on-african-americanhistory/timeline-of-african-americans-at-wandl [https://perma.cc/U4YY-BBEG] (last visited
Jan. 17, 2022).
38
See HELEN CHAVIS OTHOW, JOHN CHAVIS: AFRICAN AMERICAN PATRIOT, PREACHER,
TEACHER, AND MENTOR (1763-1838) 63 (2001).
39
See id. at 65-66, 68.
40
See id. at 66, 68.
41
See Timothy B. Tyson & David S. Cecelski, Introduction to DEMOCRACY BETRAYED:
THE WILMINGTON RACE RIOT OF 1898 AND ITS LEGACY 3, 4-5 (David S. Cecelski & Timothy
B. Tyson eds., 1998) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY BETRAYED].
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The mob begins by burning a prominent Black-owned newspaper.42 The mob’s
leaders force the mayor, board of aldermen, and police chief to resign at
gunpoint and then install a new city council, which elects the mob’s leader as
mayor.43 The instigators of the coup include several future governors, senators,
and a Secretary of the Navy.44
It is June 1, 1921. In the early hours of the morning, a white mob sets fire to
Black-owned businesses in Tulsa, Oklahoma’s Greenwood neighborhood.45
Greenwood—known as the “Black Wall Street”—is one of the wealthiest Black
neighborhoods in the country.46 As dawn breaks, the white mob will rush
Greenwood en masse, looting, shooting indiscriminately, and pulling Black
residents from their homes to round them up in detention centers.47 The sheer
size of the mob will overwhelm the Black residents defending their
neighborhood, many of whom will be forced to flee the city.48 As the morning
drags on, white attackers will destroy over one million dollars of property,49 and
their actions will leave eight to ten thousand people homeless.50
It is May 13, 1985. Philadelphia police resolve to bomb a rowhouse where
members of MOVE, an anarcho-primitivist Black separatist group, are engaged
in a shootout with police.51 A Philadelphia police lieutenant drops a satchel
bomb on the rowhouse,52 starting a fire that Police Commissioner Gregore J.
Sambore and Fire Commissioner William Richmond determine
“should . . . burn until it neutralize[s] the bunker.”53 The fire kills six adults and
five children inside before spreading and destroying dozens of nearby homes

42

See H. Leon Prather Sr., We Have Taken a City: A Centennial Essay, in DEMOCRACY
BETRAYED, supra note 41, at 15, 32.
43
See id. at 36-37.
44
Id. at 20-22; John Haley, Race, Rhetoric, and Revolution, in DEMOCRACY BETRAYED,
supra note 41, at 207, 220.
45
Scott Ellsworth, The Tulsa Race Riot, in OKLA. COMM’N TO STUDY THE TULSA RACE
RIOT OF 1921, TULSA RACE RIOT 37, 71-86 (2001).
46
Yuliya Parshina-Kottas, Anjali Singhvi, Audra D.S. Burch, Guilbert Gates, Troy Griggs,
Mika Gröndahl, Lingdong Huang, Eleanor Lutz, Tim Wallace, Jeremy White & Josh
Williams, What Was Lost in the Tulsa Race Massacre, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2021, at 21,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/05/24/us/tulsa-race-massacre.html.
47
Ellsworth, supra note 45, at 74.
48
Id. at 77.
49
Parshina-Kottas et al., supra note 46, at 21.
50
Id. at 24. Adjusted for inflation, the property loss amounts to twenty-seven million
dollars. Id. at 21.
51
Lindsey Norward, The Day Philadelphia Bombed Its Own People, VOX (Aug. 15, 2019,
9:03 AM), https://www.vox.com/the-highlight/2019/8/8/20747198/philadelphia-bombing1985-move; see Bobbi Booker, Thirty Years Later, MOVE Still Hurts, PHILA. MAG. (May 13,
2015, 12:46 PM), https://www.phillymag.com/news/2015/05/13/thirty-years-move-stillhurts/.
52
Norward, supra note 51.
53
Africa v. City of Philadelphia, 158 F.3d 711, 715 (3d Cir. 1998).
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and leaving more than two hundred people homeless.54 No city officials will face
criminal charges for the attack.55
It is May 29, 2020. Omar Jimenez and his CNN news crew report on the racial
justice protests following George Floyd’s murder in Minneapolis.56 While
Jimenez’s crew broadcasts live, police order them to move.57 Jimenez and his
crew agree to move and ask where they should go.58 Rather than answer, the
police officers arrest Jimenez and his crew live on national television.59 In the
course of violently suppressing protests during the following month, police
around the country will routinely attack journalists.60
It is December 1859. Alfred Iverson, a Senator from Georgia, is denouncing
his congressional opponents for their refusal to condemn a book, The Impending
Crisis of the South: How to Meet It.61 The book lays out the economic case
against slavery as an institution detrimental to both enslaved persons and white
farmers and laborers outside of the aristocracy.62 Senator Iverson calls for all
those who support or endorse the book to be hanged as accessories to John
Brown’s raid.63 In Southern states, abolitionists are prosecuted for merely
circulating a copy of the book.64
It is November 1964. Martin Luther King, Jr., is sent an anonymous letter
threatening to reveal his sexual affairs to the public if he does not commit suicide
before being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.65 Dr. King correctly believes that
54

Norward, supra note 51.
Id.
56
Jason Hanna & Amir Vera, CNN Crew Released from Police Custody After They Were
Arrested Live On Air in Minneapolis, CNN (May 29, 2020, 8:19 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/29/us/minneapolis-cnn-crew-arrested/index.html
[https://perma.cc/NW5K-9AP8].
57
Id.
58
See id.
59
Id.
60
See Courtney Douglas, Amid Black Lives Matter Protests, a Crushing Moment for
Journalists Facing Record Attacks, Arrests at the Hands of Law Enforcement, REPS. COMM.
FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (Sept. 4, 2020), https://www.rcfp.org/black-lives-matter-pressfreedom/ [https://perma.cc/Y9Y6-CKAA].
61
See Michael Kent Curtis, The 1859 Crisis over Hinton Helper’s Book, The Impending
Crisis: Free Speech, Slavery, and Some Light on the Meaning of the First Section of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1113, 1144-45 (1993).
62
See id. at 1141-42 (citing HINTON ROWAN HELPER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS OF THE
SOUTH: HOW TO MEET IT passim (George M. Fredrickson ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1968)
(1857)).
63
Id. at 1145 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1859) (statement of Sen.
Alfred Iverson)).
64
See, e.g., id. at 1159-67 (describing Reverend Daniel Worth’s prosecution in North
Carolina for circulating Helper’s book).
65
See Beverly Gage, I Have a [Redacted], N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 16, 2014, at 15, 15-16;
see also SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTEL.
ACTIVITIES, FINAL REPORT, S. REP. NO. 94-755, bk. 3, at 158-61 (1976) [hereinafter CHURCH
55
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the FBI sent him the letter.66 The FBI will conduct additional “COINTELPRO”
surveillance of civil rights activists for several years67 before these efforts are
exposed to the public.68
It is 1994. Dan Baum interviews John Ehrlichman, White House Counsel
under President Richard Nixon, who bluntly describes the impetus behind the
“War on Drugs.”69 Ehrlichman says that the public association of drugs with
“the antiwar left and [B]lack people,” followed by the heavy criminalization of
those drugs, was engineered to target leaders and break up communities that
President Nixon saw as his enemies.70 The War on Drugs is ruthlessly effective
at driving the mass incarceration of Black people.71
It is July 28, 1868. Secretary of State William Seward certifies that enough
states have ratified the Fourteenth Amendment for it to become law.72 The
Amendment’s drafters believe it to settle the question of whether the rights
enumerated in the Constitution apply against the states through its Privileges or
Immunities Clause.73 In only five years, the Supreme Court will effectively write
this Clause out of the Constitution in the Slaughter-House Cases.74
It is May 30, 1942. Fred Korematsu is arrested in San Leandro for remaining
there rather than reporting to an assembly center for removal to an internment
camp.75 He will challenge his conviction, arguing in part that it violates the

COMMITTEE REPORT]; KENNETH O’REILLY, “RACIAL MATTERS”: THE FBI’S SECRET FILE ON
BLACK AMERICA, 1960-1972, at 142-47 (1989).
66
See CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 65, at 158-59. See generally id. at 79-184
(providing case study of FBI’s systematic efforts to undermine Dr. King).
67
See id. at 179-80 (detailing FBI’s initiation of “Black Nationalist-Hate Groups
COINTELPRO” in late 1960s); O’REILLY, supra note 65, at 276-92, 300-24 (recounting
COINTELPRO operations targeting Black leaders); see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE
NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 53 (10th anniversary
ed. 2020) (describing “COINTELPRO,” FBI counterintelligence program).
68
See Betty Medsger & Ken W. Clawson, Stolen Documents Describe FBI Surveillance
Activities, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 1971, at A1.
69
Dan Baum, Legalize It All: How to Win the War on Drugs, HARPER’S MAG., Apr. 2016,
at 22, 22.
70
Id.
71
See ALEXANDER, supra note 67, at 224-25, 233-36.
72
14th Amendment Adopted, HISTORY.COM (July 27, 2020), https://www.history.com/thisday-in-history/14th-amendment-adopted [https://perma.cc/GA7S-5GC5].
73
See Michael Kent Curtis, Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life After Death: The
Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the United States, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1071, 1146-47
(2000) (arguing that ordinary contemporaneous understanding of “privileges or immunities”
encompassed protections included in Bill of Rights).
74
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 75 (1873) (“If, then, there is a difference between the privileges
and immunities belonging to a citizen of the United States as such, and those belonging to the
citizen of the State as such the latter . . . are not embraced by this paragraph of the
amendment.”).
75
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 220-22 (1944).
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implicit equality component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.76 In
upholding Korematsu’s conviction, the Court will articulate an exacting
standard for evaluating restrictions on the civil rights of a specific racial group
while maintaining that the exclusion of persons of Japanese descent satisfies it.77
It is September 24, 1957. President Dwight Eisenhower sends the Army’s
101st Airborne Division to enforce the desegregation of Little Rock Central
High,78 invoking the Insurrection Act of 1807.79 The Supreme Court’s rejection
of the principle of “separate but equal”80 and its command that desegregation of
the nation’s public schools proceeds with “all deliberate speed”81 has seen
widespread resistance across the South.82 Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus’s
plan to deploy the State’s National Guard to prevent enforcement of courtordered desegregation at the school is foiled when President Eisenhower
federalizes the entire Arkansas National Guard.83 Massive resistance campaigns
against school desegregation will continue for another decade.84
It is May 1988. Black homeowners in Atlanta have less access to mortgage
credit than their lower-paid, white counterparts.85 This systemic lack of faith in
Black borrowers’ ability to repay their loans traces back decades, to the Federal
Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (“HOLC”) and Federal Housing
Administration’s New Deal-era lending and underwriting practices.86 HOLC’s
practice of designating whole neighborhoods as good or poor credit risks based

76
Brief for Appellant at 48, Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214 (No. 22). The Court would not
recognize an equality principle in the Fifth Amendment for another decade. See Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498-500 (1954) (applying equal protection principle to federal
government action through Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause).
77
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223 (“To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without
reference to the real military dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue.
Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race.
He was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire . . . .”).
78
Anthony Lewis, Eisenhower On Air: Says School Defiance Has Gravely Harmed
Prestige of U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1957, at A1.
79
Exec. Order No. 10730, 3 C.F.R. 389-90 (1954-1958) (citing 10 U.S.C. §§ 332-334
(current version at 10 U.S.C. §§ 252-254)). See generally JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RSCH.
SERV., R42659, THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT AND RELATED MATTERS: THE USE OF THE
MILITARY TO EXECUTE CIVILIAN LAW 34-42 (2018) (providing historical overview of
President’s authority under Insurrection Acts).
80
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
81
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
82
See EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, SEGREGATION IN AMERICA 20-39 (2018) (describing
Southern “massive resistance” campaign in response to desegregation decisions).
83
See id. at 76.
84
See id. at 39.
85
See Bill Dedman, Atlanta Blacks Losing in Home Loans Scramble (pt. 1), ATLANTA J.CONST., May 1, 1988, at 1.
86
See RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 63-65 (2017).
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on their racial composition has become known as “redlining.”87 The prevalence
of redlining hinders Black homeownership, while homeownership becomes the
predominant means for white families to accumulate wealth.88
It is November 22, 1977. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., circulates a draft
opinion to his colleagues concluding that affirmative action programs for college
admissions must be subjected to the strict scrutiny applied to racially
discriminatory laws.89 He will ultimately cobble together opposing majorities
for his views, ruling that such a standard applies, and strike down race-based
quotas90 while enshrining the state’s interest in a diverse student body as
sufficient to meet the standard with less-restrictive methods.91 Allan Bakke, a
white applicant who was initially denied admission to U.C. Davis School of
Medicine,92 will force the school to admit him as a student.93
It is December 31, 2019. Judge Loretta Biggs issues an opinion blocking
North Carolina’s voter identification law as racially discriminatory.94 The ruling
is a rare victory for voting rights advocates, who have seen a host of such laws
passed and upheld around the country—but especially in the South.95 The wave
87

See id. at 64 (describing HOLC’s color-coded maps in which neighborhoods were
colored green to illustrate they were “safest” and neighborhoods with Black residents were
colored red to illustrate “riskiness” of Black borrowers regardless of income level); see also
Dedman, supra note 85, at 2 (describing practice of redlining).
88
See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 86, at 64; see also, e.g., ANA PATRICIA MUÑOZ, MARLENE
KIM, MARIKO CHANG, REGINE O. JACKSON, DARRICK HAMILTON & WILLIAM A. DARITY JR.,
FED. RSRV. BANK OF BOS. WITH DUKE UNIV. & THE NEW SCH., THE COLOR OF WEALTH IN
BOSTON 20 (2015) (“Racial differences in asset ownership, particularly homeownership,
contribute to vast racial disparities in net worth.”); id. at 20 tbl.9 (documenting median net
worth of $247,500 for white households and $8 for Black households in Boston area).
89
See Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., J., Sup. Ct. of the U.S., to Warren E.
Burger, William J. Brennan, Jr., Potter Stewart, Byron R. White, Thurgood Marshall, Harry
A. Blackmun, William H. Rehnquist & John Paul Stevens, JJ., Sup. Ct. of the U.S. 3-5 (Nov.
22, 1977), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?filename=32&article
=1113&context=casefiles&type=additional; see also BERNARD SCHWARTZ, BEHIND BAKKE:
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE SUPREME COURT 80-85 (1988).
90
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319-20 (1978) (opinion of Powell,
J.).
91
Id. at 320 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he courts below failed to recognize that the State has
a substantial interest that legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions
program involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin.”).
92
Id. at 276-77.
93
See id. at 320 (opinion of Powell, J.).
94
N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Cooper, 430 F. Supp. 3d 15, 23-24, 43, 53-54
(M.D.N.C. 2019) (“[The law’s] ID and ballot-challenge provisions have been enjoined,
and . . . no voter ID will be required in the upcoming election cycle . . . .”).
95
See, e.g., Max Garland, Alex Amico, Ali Schmitz, Phillip Jackson & Pam Ortega, New
Voting Laws in the South Could Affect Millions of African Americans, NBC NEWS (Aug. 29,
2016, 3:34 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/new-voting-laws-south-couldaffect-millions-african-americans-n639511
[https://perma.cc/S3B4-P4JV]
(detailing
Southern “wave” of efforts to restrict voting).
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of facially neutral voting restrictions burst through the floodgates opened by
Shelby County v. Holder,96 in which the Supreme Court severely limited
Congress’s remedial power under the Fifteenth Amendment by declaring that
the systemic inequalities the VRA sought to remedy were confined to the distant
past.97
It is 1981. Alexander Lamis interviews Lee Atwater,98 a Reagan
Administration official who will go on to run George H.W. Bush’s 1988
presidential campaign.99 Atwater lays bare his strategy of using ever more
abstract dog-whistles to reach racist white voters.100 By shifting from openly
attacking Black people to opposing actions taken for their benefit to promoting
policies that—in the aggregate—will disproportionately harm them, a politician
can appeal to racist white voters while maintaining a patina of respectability.
It is June 27, 2019. Chief Justice John Roberts issues an opinion ruling that
partisan gerrymandering is a nonjusticiable political question.101 While racial
gerrymanders may still be struck down under the VRA—ensuring districts in
which minority voters can elect the candidate of their choice—there is no
constitutional protection for the political parties those candidates align with.102
In this way, white supremacist legislatures are given free rein to draw favorable
districts for white supremacist political parties, so long as Black and Brown
voters have proportional electoral power.
It is July 1, 2021. Justice Samuel Alito issues an opinion ruling that a facially
neutral restriction on the time, place, or manner of voting that has a disparate
impact on the voting rights of minority voters—even when the impact is twice
what it is for white voters103—cannot be challenged under the VRA if the overall
burden is small and in line with traditional burdens of voting.104 Justice Alito
96

570 U.S. 529 (2013); see Garland et al., supra note 95 (describing impact of Shelby
County).
97
See Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 554 (“Regardless of how to look at the record, however,
no one can fairly say that it shows anything approaching the ‘pervasive,’ ‘flagrant,’
‘widespread,’ and ‘rampant’ discrimination that faced Congress in 1965, and that clearly
distinguished the covered jurisdictions from the rest of the Nation at that time.”).
98
Rick Perlstein, Exclusive: Lee Atwater’s Infamous 1981 Interview on the Southern
Strategy, NATION (Nov. 13, 2012), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/exclusive-leeatwaters-infamous-1981-interview-southern-strategy/.
99
Michael Oreskes, Lee Atwater, Master of Tactics for Bush and G.O.P., Dies at 40, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 30, 1991, at 1.
100
See Perlstein, supra note 98.
101
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2501, 2506-07 (2019) (finding partisan
gerrymandering nonjusticiable because “the Constitution supplies no objective measure for
assessing whether a districting map treats a political party fairly”).
102
See Sara Tofighbakhsh, Note, Racial Gerrymandering After Rucho v. Common Cause:
Untangling Race and Party, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1885, 1886, 1911 (2020).
103
Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2368 (2021) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
104
See id. at 2348 (majority opinion) (“As with the out-of-precinct policy, the modest
evidence of racially disparate burdens caused by HB 2023, in light of the State’s justifications,
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defends a strong state interest in combating the nearly nonexistent threat of voter
fraud.105 With the VRA’s preclearance and intent prongs previously
neutralized,106 little remains of one of the premier laws for protecting civil rights.
It is October 31, 1963. John Terry, Richard Chilton, and Carl Katz are stopped
on a Cleveland street by a police officer who finds their patterns of walking and
talking together suspicious.107 Terry and Chilton are Black, Katz is white—a fact
that Detective McFadden (also a white man108) will note in his testimony during
the initial suppression hearing but that the Supreme Court will pass by
silently.109 Terry’s challenge to his arrest for a handgun that Detective
McFadden finds in his pocket will lead to the birth of a doctrine granting officers
a broad exception from the requirement that searches require probable cause.110
This, in turn, will become a favorite tool of police to harass Black men on the
street.111
It is August 2014. Shaniz West returns to her Idaho home to find it surrounded
by police looking for her ex-boyfriend.112 Rather than use the key that West
provides them to get into the house, the police summon a SWAT team, which
breaks the home’s windows and ruins West’s belongings with tear gas
grenades.113 The officers will all be granted qualified immunity when the Ninth
Circuit determines that West’s right not to have her home and belongings
rendered unusable was insubstantial after she consented to a search of the
house.114
It is March 19, 2002. Brian Bartholomew, who became a police informant
after being charged with drug possession, enters Afton Callahan’s home to
purchase methamphetamine.115 On Bartholomew’s signal, police enter without

leads us to the conclusion that the law does not violate § 2 of the VRA.”).
105
See id. at 2339-40.
106
See id. at 2354-58 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
107
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1968).
108
Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment,
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 964 (1999).
109
Id. at 967.
110
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (“[T]here must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a
reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to
believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he
has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.”); Devon W. Carbado, From Stop and
Frisk to Shoot and Kill: Terry v. Ohio’s Pathway to Police Violence, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1508,
1516 (2017).
111
See Carbado, supra note 110, at 1537; Thompson, supra note 108, at 957-59.
112
West v. City of Caldwell, 931 F.3d 978, 980-81 (9th Cir. 2019).
113
See id. at 981-82.
114
See id. at 987-88 (“Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because, assuming
that their actions violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights, those rights were not clearly
established, at the appropriate level of specificity, in August 2014.”).
115
Callahan v. Millard County, 494 F.3d 891, 893 (10th Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Pearson
v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
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a warrant, arresting Callahan and searching the home.116 Callahan will attempt
to sue the officers for the warrantless search,117 which the county will argue was
justified by his previous consent to allow the police’s informant into the home.118
A unanimous Supreme Court will use the case to remove the procedural
requirement that courts first evaluate whether a constitutional right was violated
before determining whether that right was clearly established at the time of the
violation.119
It is March 6, 1857. Chief Justice Roger Taney rules that Dred Scott can have
no recourse to seek his freedom in federal court.120 The ruling turns on the idea
that Scott cannot satisfy the diversity of citizenship required to have a state law
claim heard in federal court because, as a Black man, he cannot be a citizen of
the United States.121 Chief Justice Taney cherry-picks his sources to conclude
that state laws at the time the Constitution was adopted did not treat Black people
as citizens.122 He carries the argument even further, though, and concludes that
the states lack any power to make a Black person a U.S. citizen.123 This line of
reasoning will be invalidated by the passage of the Thirteenth124 and Fourteenth
Amendments.125
*****
The Supreme Court has in its time produced something of a multidisc boxed
set of racist decision hits. Many of them feature in basic constitutional law and
criminal procedure casebooks—including, in addition to those I referenced
above, the Civil Rights Cases,126 McCleskey v. Kemp,127 Village of Arlington
116

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 228.
See id. at 227.
118
See id. at 229.
119
See id. at 236, 242 (abandoning procedural requirement and opining that lower “courts
should have the discretion to decide whether th[e] procedure is worthwhile in particular
cases”).
120
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 393, 427 (1857) (enslaved party)
(“Dred Scott was not a citizen of Missouri within the meaning of the Constitution of the
United States, and not entitled as such to sue in its courts . . . .”), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
121
Id. at 426-27. Chief Justice Taney also contended that even if Black persons were
legally capable of citizenship, enslaved persons were not. Id. at 427.
122
See id. at 407-21.
123
Id. at 405-06 (“Each State may still confer [rights and privileges] upon an alien, or any
one it thinks proper, or upon any class or description of persons; yet he would not be a citizen
in the sense in which that word is used in the Constitution of the United States, nor entitled to
sue as such in one of its courts, nor to the privileges and immunities of a citizen in the other
States.”).
124
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
125
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
126
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
127
481 U.S. 279 (1987).
117
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Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,128 Milliken v. Bradley,129
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,130 Gratz v. Bollinger,131 United States v.
Armstrong,132 Whren v. United States,133 California v. Hodari D.,134 and many
more.135 Many of these decisions date to the past century—and the ones featured

128

429 U.S. 252 (1977).
433 U.S. 267 (1977).
130
488 U.S. 469 (1989).
131
539 U.S. 244 (2003).
132
517 U.S. 456 (1996).
133
517 U.S. 806 (1996).
134
499 U.S. 621 (1991).
135
See, e.g., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381-84 (2010) (concluding that silence
during police interrogation does not constitute invocation of Miranda rights and that
uncoerced, post-Miranda-warning statements constitute implied waiver of those rights);
Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 191, 204 (2008) (plurality opinion)
(applying “balancing” test to uphold state voter identification law against equal protection
claim); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720-22
(2007) (applying strict scrutiny to invalidate city’s attempt to prevent de facto segregation in
schools and implying that racial diversity is not compelling state interest outside of higher
education context); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 89-91 (1998) (denying Fourth
Amendment protection to non-overnight visitors in homes); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,
349-51 (1996) (narrowing prisoners’ right to meaningful access to courts); Bd. of Educ. v.
Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249-50 (1991) (concluding that desegregation orders may be dissolved
when district has “complied in good faith” for sufficient time period and “the vestiges of past
[de jure] discrimination ha[ve] been eliminated to the extent practicable” (emphasis added));
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990) (declaring that Fourth Amendment’s
exclusionary rule does not apply where police “reasonably (though erroneously) believe that
the person who consented to their entry is a resident of the premises”); Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288, 292-96 (1989) (reiterating limited retroactivity of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986), and rejecting Black defendant’s challenge to prosecutor’s use of all ten peremptory
challenges to ensure all-white jury); Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988)
(concluding that due process only requires states to preserve evidence in “cases in which the
police themselves by their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a basis for
exonerating the defendant”); Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 290-91, 296-97 (1988)
(narrowing Sixth Amendment right to counsel protections by requiring postindictment
defendants to affirmatively invoke right and lowering standard for waiver); United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) (creating “good faith” exception to Fourth Amendment’s
exclusionary rule); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984) (creating “public
safety” exception to compulsory self-incrimination protections required under Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 689 (1984)
(adopting “highly deferential” scrutiny of counsel’s performance in ineffective assistance of
counsel claims); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65 (1980) (plurality opinion)
(requiring showing of discriminatory intent to prevail on both Fifteenth Amendment and
Fourteenth Amendment claims); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 80 (1979) (upholding New
York’s citizenship requirement for eligible public school teachers under Foley v. Connelie,
435 U.S. 291 (1978)); Foley, 435 U.S. at 295-97 (announcing that citizen classifications
related to self-government need only satisfy rational basis review rather than strict scrutiny);
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-26 (1971) (rejecting equal protection claim, despite
evidence of racist intent, where city equally impacted all residents by closing municipal pool
129
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in casebooks certainly follow this trend, as most students have more of a need
to learn what the law is than what it once was.
In recent years, some of the most egregiously racist cases have involved the
Court resting on constitutional colorblindness to establish why it will not attempt
to deal in reasoning or remedies focused on race.136 To advocates of this sort of
colorblindness, an ideal society would make no distinction whatsoever on the
basis of race, and we should endeavor to reach such a state.137 At their most
extreme, such advocates seek to eliminate racism in society by eliminating racial
distinctions in law immediately and entirely.138 Or perhaps I should say that they
claim to seek this—my thesis is less charitable as to their goals.
While some form of colorblindness in American discourse predates
Reconstruction,139 the rhetorical weaponization of colorblindness against
remedial consideration of race arose as a theme in the late twentieth century.140
This modern use of colorblind constitutionalism is not so much a corruption of
its legacy in the Supreme Court but a reclamation. As Randall Kennedy
observed, Justice Harlan’s initial introduction of the concept to Supreme Court
jurisprudence affirms white supremacy and squares with the historical Justice
Harlan: “After all, he was a former slave owner, initially opposed the Thirteenth
Amendment, and tolerated various forms of segregation, notwithstanding his
Plessy dissent.”141 Despite colorblindness’s association with antiracist
movements,142 its life as a constitutional doctrine is inextricably bound up with
its white supremacist introduction to Supreme Court jurisprudence.143

rather than desegregating it); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963)
(establishing fruit-of-the-poisonous tree doctrine but determining that days-long gap between
illegal search and suspect’s voluntary confession dissipates taint of illegality).
136
See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418 (2018) (“Plaintiffs argue that this
President’s words strike at fundamental standards of respect and tolerance, in violation of our
constitutional tradition. But the issue before us is not whether to denounce the statements. It
is instead the significance of those statements in reviewing a Presidential directive, neutral on
its face, addressing a matter within the core of executive responsibility.”); see also Cedric
Merlin Powell, Blinded by Color: The New Equal Protection, the Second Deconstruction, and
Affirmative Inaction, 51 U. MIA. L. REV. 191, 219 (1997) (“In essence, colorblindness is held
together by a conglomeration of baseless contradictions which are illuminated with increasing
intensity the more we try to ignore race.”).
137
See Randall Kennedy, Colorblind Constitutionalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 2 (2013).
138
See id.; see also Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748 (plurality opinion) (“The way to
stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”).
139
See Kennedy, supra note 137, at 3 (discussing colorblindness’s role in nineteenthcentury Massachusetts politics).
140
See id. at 5-6 (discussing constitutional colorblindness’s application against affirmative
action and business set-aside programs in Supreme Court opinions).
141
Id. at 5.
142
See id. at 6-7.
143
See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Our
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”).
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Plenty of attention has been focused on the constitutional failings of
jurisprudence in various fields of law. Angela Onwuachi-Willig admirably
tackles the gap that Brown v. Board of Education144 left by failing to discuss the
reasons schools were segregated in the first place, as well as how white
supremacist reasoning has charged into that gap to challenge affirmative action
in education.145 Devon Carbado delves into how ostensibly neutral criminal
procedure decisions allow police violence to escalate unaccountably.146 Henry
Chambers examines the history of racial disenfranchisement and the
ineffectiveness of current constitutional protections to prevent it.147 Alison
Brown and Angus Erskine have laid bare courts’ hesitancy to consider
circumstantial evidence of employment discrimination.148 Law reviews around
the country are full of such analyses highlighting instances of racism in our
courts.
And yet, the possibility that these disparate fields of law converge on
anti-Black jurisprudence because the Court itself is anti-Black often evades
scholarly review. An ancient parable from the Indian subcontinent tells the story
of a group of blind men seeking to understand what an elephant is by feeling
it.149 Each touches a part of the elephant—its trunk, its ear, its leg—and
compares the elephant to some other object.150 The blind men disagree as to the
nature of an elephant because all of them lack the context to observe the whole
creature.151 The parable is meant to counsel against claiming a monopoly on
144

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Reconceptualizing the Harms of Discrimination: How
Brown v. Board of Education Helped to Further White Supremacy, 105 VA. L. REV. 343, 363
(2019) (“Sixty-five years later, our legal discourse has still not caught up with the reality of
race that was excluded in Brown. Nowhere is this gap in our lives and doctrine clearer than in
the affirmative action cases . . . .”).
146
See Carbado, supra note 110, at 1514 fig.1 (demonstrating how over-policing of Black
and Brown communities escalates into cycle of violence through easy justification of police
encounters and unaccountability for use of force).
147
See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Colorblindness, Race Neutrality, and Voting Rights, 51
EMORY L.J. 1397, 1466 (2002) (“From the earliest days of this country until the recent past,
racial minorities in general and [B]lack Americans in particular have often been excluded
from choosing their representatives at all levels of government both explicitly through
restrictions on voting and implicitly through voting structures erected to minimize their voting
impact. That is, their votes have been non-existent, ignored, or diluted.” (footnote omitted)).
148
See Alison Brown & Angus Erskine, A Qualitative Study of Judgments in Race
Discrimination Employment Cases, 31 LAW & POL’Y 142, 142 (2009) (“Courts tend to be
skeptical of claims of race plaintiffs, and are hesitant to draw inferences of racial
discrimination based on circumstantial evidence, even though courts have long recognized
that race discrimination is generally subtle in form.”).
149
E.g., UDĀNA: EXCLAMATIONS 95-97 (Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu trans., 2012); JALĀL AL-DĪN
RŪMĪ, THE MASNAVI bk. III, at verses 1260-1362 (Jawid Mojaddedi trans., Oxford Univ. Press
2013) (c. 1262); see also ED YOUNG, SEVEN BLIND MICE (1992) (substituting blind mice for
blind men).
150
See RŪMĪ, supra note 149, at verses 1263-66.
151
Id. at verses 1267-68.
145
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truth, instead teaching to remain open to other perspectives so as to gain a more
complete understanding.
In the context of legal academia, we all too often specialize; I have had the
pleasure of meeting and learning from experts in a variety of specialties.152 All
of them challenge unjust legal institutions and doctrines in their scholarship, and
each of these challenges is important and necessary. I do not think for a moment
that any of them believes that the law is fundamentally just, with only a handful
of problems in need of redress.
This Article will take a different approach.153 Rather than focusing on the
details of a single issue, I aim to explore their connections through their common
patterns. The law once tolerated overt racial discrimination but later rejected the

152

For a sample of such experts and their important works, see SHERRILYN A. IFILL, ON
THE COURTHOUSE LAWN: CONFRONTING THE LEGACY OF LYNCHING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY (Tenth-anniversary ed. 2018); Amna A. Akbar, An Abolitionist Horizon for (Police)
Reform, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1781 (2020); Nikolas Bowie, The Constitutional Right of SelfGovernment, 130 YALE L.J. 1652 (2021); Paul Butler, Mississippi Goddamn: Flowers v
Mississippi’s Cheap Racial Justice, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 73; Frank Rudy Cooper, Cop
Fragility and Blue Lives Matter, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. 621; D. Wendy Greene, Title VII:
What’s Hair (and Other Race-Based Characteristics) Got to Do with It?, 79 U. COLO. L. REV.
1355 (2008); Daniel S. Harawa, How Much Is Too Much? A Test to Protect Against Excessive
Fines, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 65 (2020); Alexis Hoag, An Unbroken Thread: African American
Exclusion from Jury Service, Past and Present, 81 LA. L. REV. 55 (2020); Jamelia N. Morgan,
Reflections on Representing Incarcerated People with Disabilities: Ableism in Prison Reform
Litigation, 96 DENV. L. REV. 973 (2019); Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 145; Shaun OsseiOwusu, The Sixth Amendment Façade: The Racial Evolution of the Right to Counsel, 167 U.
PA. L. REV. 1161 (2019); Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585 (2017);
Catherine E. Smith, Equal Protection for Children of Same-Sex Parents, 90 WASH. U. L. REV.
1589 (2013); Fred O. Smith, Jr., Formalism, Ferguson, and the Future of Qualified Immunity,
93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2093 (2018); I. India Thusi, On Beauty and Policing, 114 NW. U. L.
REV. 1335 (2020).
153
I am not the only scholar whose work has proceeded in this direction. In a forthcoming
piece, Ruth Colker argues that white supremacy has become so entrenched in the Constitution
as to turn it to antidemocratic ends to ensure white supremacy’s perpetuation. See Ruth
Colker, The White Supremacist Constitution, 2022 UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2022)
(manuscript at 5) (“The U.S. has never been willing to allow democracy to flourish because
democracy might be a tool to challenge some aspects of white supremacy.”). Colker calls for
the revival of the debate between William Lloyd Garrison and Frederick Douglass over
whether the Constitution is capable of serving as a vehicle for reform. See id. (manuscript at
6). Colker essentially takes the side of Garrison: even after the ratification of the
Reconstruction Amendments, the Constitution is fundamentally a pro-slavery document. See
id. (manuscript at 13). While she leaves a caveat for the potential for a radical reinterpretation
along the lines of Justice Thurgood Marshall’s jurisprudence and calls for the elevation of
Black voices, see id. (manuscript at 57), she does not explore what such a jurisprudence would
entail and does little to highlight the very voices she says must be elevated. I have great respect
for Colker’s analysis of the white supremacy running through constitutional jurisprudence,
but I must take up Douglass’s cause in this debate. To that end, this Article will attempt to
elevate Black voices and provide a radical vision of the Constitution as an exploration of its
abolitionist potential.
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appearances of bigotry.154 In their place, (slightly) subtler systems emerged,
relying on facial neutrality and procedural barriers to enforce white supremacy
instead.155 As Justice Harlan said, white supremacy need do little more than rely
on established constitutional principles to perpetuate itself.156 Justice Harlan’s
vision of white supremacy—that white people could retain their position of
privilege, wealth, and authority indefinitely without the intervention of law157—
is not the white supremacy of the snarling, tiki-torch fascist.158 Instead, it relies
on claims of colorblindness and meritocracy, hoping to avoid scrutiny of the
question of just who determines what constitutes merit.159 White people’s
cultural dominance, established by centuries of physical and economic violence,
ensures that they retain the power to define what abilities and traits are
considered meritorious.160 So long as that remains true, purportedly neutral,
colorblind constitutional principles will ensure white people’s continued
success.
Our constitutional history need not be our fate. While established principles
sufficiently maintain the status quo, they are not the only principles possible.
Many of the drafters of the Reconstruction Amendments believed that the new
order they created must necessarily account for race.161 Black public
understandings of the new amendments were inclined to see them as an effort to
154
See infra Part I (explaining Court’s shift from promoting explicit anti-Blackness to
implicitly accepting it under guise of colorblindness).
155
See infra Section II.B (explaining procedural mechanisms of oppression in “colorblind”
system).
156
See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
157
See id.
158
See Stefan Becket, Torch-Wielding White Nationalists March Through University of
Virginia
Campus,
CBS
NEWS
(Aug.
12,
2017,
11:05
AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/torch-carrying-white-nationalists-march-throughuniversity-of-virginia-ahead-of-rally/ [https://perma.cc/U9DD-XRR6].
159
See Jonathan P. Feingold, Equal Protection Design Defects, 91 TEMP. L. REV. 513, 529
(2019) (“[D]ecades of research on implicit bias and stereotype threat reveals that common
measures of merit, although facially neutral, fail to produce racially neutral results.” (footnote
omitted)); see also Daphne Martschenko, The IQ Test Wars: Why Screening for Intelligence
Is Still So Controversial, CONVERSATION (Feb. 1, 2018, 9:32 AM),
https://theconversation.com/the-iq-test-wars-why-screening-for-intelligence-is-still-socontroversial-81428 [https://perma.cc/NX3B-57E5] (“According to some researchers, the
‘cultural specificity’ of intelligence makes IQ tests biased towards the environments in which
they were developed – namely white, Western society.”).
160
For example, the concentration of wealth in white families is remarkably persistent,
even without government-sanctioned discrimination. See ANGELA HANKS, DANYELLE
SOLOMON & CHRISTIAN E. WELLER, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, SYSTEMIC INEQUALITY: HOW
AMERICA’S STRUCTURAL RACISM HELPED CREATE THE BLACK-WHITE WEALTH GAP 29 (2018)
(“Maintaining the status quo translates into another 200 years before African Americans have
the same level of wealth as their white counterparts.”); MUÑOZ ET AL., supra note 88, at 20
(highlighting dramatic wealth disparities between racial groups in Boston area).
161
See infra Section III.A.2 (exploring legislative history of Reconstruction
Amendments).
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remake the American social order as an antiracist one.162 The only thing stopping
the Supreme Court from adopting such an understanding is the Court’s own
engrained white supremacy. Our Constitution contains tools sufficient to
accomplish a sweeping, antiracist reimagining of the law but requires a Court
that believes in that possibility.
Part I will address the Court’s history of anti-Black jurisprudence. I will begin
with an examination of the Court’s openly anti-Black decisions, with a focus on
the nineteenth century. This basal layer of anti-Black decisions can inform our
understanding of what follows. Beginning with Plessy v. Ferguson,163 I will then
explore the Court’s use of constitutional colorblindness, particularly in its
modern incarnation, as a bludgeon against remedial measures. In this, at least,
the Court’s modern advocates for a colorblind Constitution are fitting inheritors
of Justice Harlan’s legacy. In constructing a Constitution that is purportedly
colorblind, the Court has essentially rendered the Constitution an anti-Black
document.
Next, Part II will examine the consequences of an anti-Black interpretation of
the Constitution. As Justice Harlan predicted, simply by purporting to remove
race as a factor in constitutional decision-making, white supremacy can be
perpetuated where it already exists.164 The myriad consequences are often the
result of the Court’s fondness for erecting procedural barriers to the success of
any challenge to systemic racism.165 Blackness, by essentially colonial
mechanisms, is criminalized; police become an occupying force.166 Public
discrimination is allowed to persist through the adoption of ostensibly neutral
standards that lack regard for the history of oppression that created racial
disparities along the lines of those same criteria.167 Private discrimination is
tolerated so long as it can be done without outward displays of bigotry.168
Purposefully antiracist legislation is limited in its scope, often through the very
162

See infra Section III.A.3 (describing original public meaning of Reconstruction
Amendments from perspective of Black Americans).
163
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
164
See id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (predicting that white supremacy will flourish
even without Constitution’s endorsement).
165
See sources cited supra notes 126-35.
166
See Robert Staples, White Racism, Black Crime, and American Justice: An Application
of the Colonial Model to Explain Crime and Race, 36 PHYLON 14, 17 (1975) (“It is not only
that the police force is composed mostly of members of the colonizers’ group, but they also
represent the more authoritarian and racist members of that sector.”).
167
See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 137, at 6-7 (discussing use of “colorblind” standard to
invalidate state actions designed to protect minorities); Laura Reiley, Judge Halts Debt-Relief
Plan for Black Farmers, WASH. POST, June 25, 2021, at A19 (describing injunction against
Biden Administration’s efforts to direct certain federal aid to farmers of color to address past
discrimination).
168
Cf. Kenneth L. Karst, Private Discrimination and Public Responsibility: Patterson in
Context, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 15 (“So long as the state maintains [a] formally neutral posture,
the substantive inequalities imposed by private discrimination are, from the Constitution’s
standpoint, not the state’s responsibility.”).
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constitutional tools meant to authorize it.169 The long years of slavery and Jim
Crow laws ensured that—without remedial measures to reshape society—Black
people would continue to face an uneven playing field in this country. To
achieve any measure of success, we would have to be twice as good as our white
counterparts. Constitutional colorblindness ignores this history and modern
social realities with catastrophically anti-Black consequences.
Finally, Part III will present the alternative: the antiracist potential of a colorconscious Constitution. While the benefits of an antiracist society should be
obvious, the Constitution’s potential as a tool for achieving that goal has invited
some skepticism.170 To that end, Part III will begin with a Section addressing
historical antiracist understandings of the Constitution. I will primarily compare
the legislative histories of the Reconstruction Amendments and their radical
heritage to contemporaneous Black reactions to the Amendments and early
legislation under them. These understandings form a critical—and too often
disregarded—component of the Amendments’ original public meaning.
The other two Sections of Part III will deal with the potential scope of the
Reconstruction Amendments’ application. This Article advances a novel
structural understanding of the Reconstruction Amendments, illuminating their
abolitionist potential as a system unto themselves.171 First, I will explore the
unrealized potential of the Thirteenth Amendment for further liberation from the
badges and incidents of slavery. While I have previously explored the
Amendment’s potential use as a tool of police abolition,172 the conceivable scope
of the Amendment is substantially broader. Our entire carceral system has been
bent to replicate many of the abuses of slavery, despite the supposed end of
convict leasing during the New Deal era.173 Modern legislation to restrict
reproductive choices—which disproportionately impacts Black women174—
recalls the use of forced reproduction at the hands of enslavers.175 If we were to
169

See, e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 556-57 (2013) (invaliding VRA
coverage formula enacted under Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment enforcement powers).
170
See Louis Michael Seidman, The Secret History of American Constitutional
Skepticism: A Recovery and Preliminary Evaluation, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 91-92 (2014)
(listing various left-leaning scholars’ constitutional skepticism).
171
But see generally ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1994) (exploring parts of this system by interrogating content
of Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses). West’s work is an
important precursor to this project but is incomplete in its exploration of the Reconstruction
Amendments.
172
Brandon Hasbrouck, Abolishing Racist Policing with the Thirteenth Amendment, 67
UCLA L. REV. 1108 (2020).
173
See Stian Rice, How Anti-immigration Policies Are Leading Prisons to Lease Convicts
as Field Laborers, PAC. STANDARD (June 7, 2019), https://psmag.com/social-justice/antiimmigrant-policies-are-returning-prisoners-to-the-fields [https://perma.cc/X3GW-NBVZ].
174
See IF/WHEN/HOW, WOMEN OF COLOR AND THE STRUGGLE FOR REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE
3 (2016).
175
See generally MARIE JENKINS SCHWARTZ, BIRTHING A SLAVE: MOTHERHOOD AND
MEDICINE IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (2006) (exploring enslavers’ coordination with doctors
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finish the work of abolition, we would do well to remember the Thirteenth
Amendment’s potential as a foundation for that work.
The final Section of Part III will address the various tools of the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments for building an abolition democracy. While most of
these tools have seen at least limited use from Congress or the Court to support
race-conscious remedies, their potential is much greater. I will explore each of
these tools as a possible vehicle for such remedies. The Constitution, interpreted
to truly entitle Black people to the equal protection of the law, due process, the
privileges and immunities of citizenship, and equal voting rights, would be
radically different than it is today—all without changing a word. This radical
interpretation, though, is wholly consistent with contemporaneous
understandings of the Reconstruction Amendments. The Court—its role in
systemic racism shielded by its fundamentally antidemocratic nature—has
chosen a different interpretation so far. But if we want to live to see the last stains
of white supremacy scrubbed from our constitutional system, we must first
envision a better framework.
I.

FROM OVERT ANTI-BLACKNESS TO COLORBLINDNESS

Both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were thus made
innocuous so far as the Negro was concerned, and the Fourteenth
Amendment in particular became the chief refuge and bulwark of
corporations. It was thus that finance and the power of wealth
accomplished through the Supreme Court what it had not been able to do
successfully through Congress.
—W.E.B. Du Bois176
The Supreme Court has a long history of anti-Black decisions in its
interpretation of the Constitution. The antebellum Court upheld the Fugitive
Slave Act177 and denied the possibility that a Black person could ever be a citizen
entitled to bring suits in federal courts.178 Even when the Reconstruction
Amendments directly contradicted the Court’s prior decisions, the Court

to assume control over enslaved women’s reproductive choices). Women of color’s
reproductive freedom has often been targeted in unique ways not strongly emphasized by
middle-class white women at the face of the movement. See ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE
& CLASS 202-21 (Vintage Books 1983) (1981); Michele Goodwin, The Racist History of
Abortion and Midwifery Bans, ACLU (July 1, 2020), https://www.aclu.org/news/racialjustice/the-racist-history-of-abortion-and-midwifery-bans/ [https://perma.cc/6GQU-26YC].
176
W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA: TOWARD A HISTORY OF THE
PART WHICH BLACK FOLK PLAYED IN THE ATTEMPT TO RECONSTRUCT DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA, 1860-1880, at 618 (Routledge 2017) (1935).
177
See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 622 (1842).
178
See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 427 (1857) (enslaved party),
superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

110

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102:87

adopted a series of interpretations to drastically reduce their power.179 These
decisions, culminating in the adoption of the principle of “separate but equal” in
Plessy v. Ferguson,180 were openly anti-Black.
In his dissent to Plessy, Justice Harlan introduced a theory of colorblind
constitutionalism to the Court’s jurisprudence.181 Justice Harlan made no
pretense of hiding his white supremacy but acknowledged the
unconstitutionality of de jure discrimination—and its utter superfluousness for
the maintenance of white supremacy.182 Justice Harlan’s dissent went virtually
unnoticed for the better part of a century, only making a strong resurgence when
the Court’s conservative wing sought authority for its efforts to turn the Equal
Protection Clause against race-conscious remedies.183 This Part will briefly
explore this history, not as an anomaly, but as a through line of Supreme Court
jurisprudence.
A.

The Court’s Overtly Anti-Black Jurisprudence

The Court’s early anti-Black decisions focused on the issue of slavery itself,
forcing the presumptions and procedures of the law in slave states upon states
that had abolished the institution.184 Even after the adoption of the
Reconstruction Amendments, the Court responded with anti-Black decisions
limiting the application of those Amendments.
While some cases, such as United States v. The Amistad,185 resulted in antislavery decisions,186 they seldom did so with anti-slavery reasoning. Justice
Story’s opinion may have returned the kidnapped Africans to their homes, but
he made it clear that he would have been entirely willing to return them to Cuba

179

See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78-80 (1873) (interpreting
Privileges or Immunities Clause to protect only limited “privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States”); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24-25 (1883) (concluding that
Congress lacks power to prohibit private discrimination because “[i]t would be running the
slavery argument into the ground to make it apply to every act of discrimination which a
person may see fit to make”).
180
See 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896).
181
See id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
182
See id.
183
See Kennedy, supra note 137, at 5 (“The Harlan declaration becomes an oft-used
rhetorical weapon only later, when it was deployed against affirmative action policies. Justice
Potter Stewart inaugurated the practice in 1980, when he began a dissent to the Court’s
validation of a federal minority business set-aside program by quoting Harlan.”).
184
See Paul Finkelman, John McLean: Moderate Abolitionist and Supreme Court
Politician, 62 VAND. L. REV. 519, 544 (2009) (“Surely if a master had a right to a slave without
a judicial hearing, as Story claimed, then the amount of violence or force used to exercise this
right should not matter, and this rationale, McLean knew, meant that the majority opinion
would bring the law of slavery into the North.”).
185
40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518 (1841).
186
See id. at 596.
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had they not been illegally taken from Africa.187 In a more typical case, Prigg v.
Pennsylvania,188 the Court addressed the conflict between Pennsylvania’s 1826
Personal Liberty Law and the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.189 Justice Story, now
able to use pro-slavery reasoning to reach a pro-slavery result, determined that
the right of an enslaver to self-help in returning an escaped enslaved person to
captivity was constitutionally protected.190 Justice Story’s invention of a
constitutional right to self-help for enslavers essentially nullified what little due
process the Fugitive Slave Act required.191
Where Prigg effectively eliminated due process for Black people claimed as
property by enslavers, Dred Scott v. Sandford192 cut off even their theoretical
right of access to the courts. Rather than simply affirm the lower court’s decision
that Scott was not free because the court was bound by the common law of
Missouri,193 Chief Justice Taney issued a sweeping decision limiting
congressional authority and denying that Black people could ever be citizens.194
187

See id. at 593 (“If these negroes were, at the time, lawfully held as slaves under the
laws of Spain, and recognised by those laws as property capable of being lawfully bought and
sold; we see no reason why they may not justly be deemed within the intent of the treaty, to
be included under the denomination of merchandise, and, as such, ought to be restored to the
claimants: for, upon that point, the laws of Spain would seem to furnish the proper rule of
interpretation.”).
188
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
189
See id. at 609-10.
190
See id. at 613 (“We have said that the clause contains a positive and unqualified
recognition of the right of the owner in the slave, unaffected by any state law or regulation
whatsoever, because there is no qualification or restriction of it to be found therein; and we
have no right to insert any which is not expressed, and cannot be fairly implied; especially are
we estopped from so doing, when the clause puts the right to the service or labour upon the
same ground and to the same extent in every other state as in the state from which the slave
escaped, and in which he was held to the service or labour. If this be so, then all the incidents
to that right attach also; the owner must, therefore, have the right to seize and repossess the
slave, which the local laws of his own state confer upon him as property; and we all know
that this right of seizure and recaption is universally acknowledged in all the slaveholding
states.”).
191
See id. at 667 (McLean, J., dissenting) (“Both the Constitution and the act of 1793,
require the fugitive from labour to be delivered up on claim being made, by the party or his
agent, to whom the service is due. Not that a suit should be regularly instituted. The
proceeding authorized by the law is summary and informal. The fugitive is seized by the
claimant, and taken before a judge or magistrate within the state, and on proof, parol or
written, that he owes labour to the claimant, it is made the duty of the judge or magistrate to
give the certificate, which authorizes the removal of the fugitive to the state from whence he
absconded.”).
192
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (enslaved party), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
193
See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE 279 (1978).
194
See Stephen J. Safranek, Race and the Law, or How the Courts and the Law Have Been
Warped by Racial Injustice, 48 WAYNE L. REV. 1025, 1035 n.55 (2002) (“The basic holding
of Dred Scott was: ‘[F]irst, that no Negro could be a United States citizen or even a state
citizen “within the meaning of the Constitution[’;] and second, that Congress had no power
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Chief Justice Taney attempted to frame his opinion as capturing the true and
original meaning of the Constitution, all while ignoring significant evidence to
the contrary.195 The opinion represents the nadir of the legal status of Black
people under the Constitution.
Following the adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments, the Court was
quick to beat back any signs of progress for Black Americans. First, in the
Slaughter-House Cases, the Court significantly narrowed the range of possible
interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment.196 While Justice Miller’s dicta left
open the possibility that the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporated the
Bill of Rights against the states,197 the Court has declined to hold this.198 The
Court then proceeded to further restrict what was left of the Fourteenth
Amendment in the Civil Rights Cases by ruling that the Amendment could apply
only to state action.199 The decision struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875,
which had attempted to require the protection of Black travelers’ right of access
to public accommodations200—a protection that would be perversely

to exclude slavery from the federal territories, and that accordingly the Missouri Compromise,
together with all other legislation embodying such exclusion, was unconstitutional.” (first
alteration in original) (quoting FEHRENBACHER, supra note 193, at 2)).
195
See Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 23 n.51 (2009)
(noting that many scholars believe Chief Justice Taney “plainly overreached in asserting that
free [B]lacks had not been recognized as citizens in any states at any time”).
196
See 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74 (1873); David S. Bogen, Slaughter-House Five: Views of
the Case, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 333, 341 (2003) (discussing Justice Miller’s opinion that
Fourteenth Amendment did not contain clear statement of intent to change relationship
between state and federal governments, and therefore could not have meant to protect all
fundamental rights of state citizens against state governments through Privileges or
Immunities Clause).
197
See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 78-79 (“[W]e may hold ourselves
excused from defining the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States which
no State can abridge, until some case involving those privileges may make it necessary to do
so.”).
198
See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 527-28 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[I]t
comes as quite a surprise that the majority relies on the Privileges or Immunities Clause at all
in this case. That is because . . . the Slaughter-House Cases sapped the Clause of any
meaning. Although the majority appears to breathe new life into the Clause today, it fails to
address the historical underpinnings or its place in our constitutional
jurisprudence. . . . Before invoking the Clause, however, we should endeavor to understand
what the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment thought that it meant. We should also
consider whether the Clause should displace, rather than augment, portions of our equal
protection and substantive due process jurisprudence.”).
199
See 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883) (“[U]ntil some State law has been passed, or some State
action through its officers or agents has been taken, adverse to the rights of citizens sought to
be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, no legislation of the United States under said
amendment, nor any proceeding under such legislation, can be called into activity: for the
prohibitions of the amendment are against State laws and acts done under State authority.”).
200
See id. at 10.
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accomplished through the Commerce Clause nearly a century later.201 The
anti-Black jurisprudence of the early cases on the Fourteenth Amendment dealt
the Reconstruction project a mighty blow.
But it was not until Plessy v. Ferguson that the Court restored the bulk of the
Constitution’s antebellum white supremacy. The decision permitting segregated
cars on railways constitutionalized the principle of “separate but equal”—a
phrase only appearing in the dissent.202 The case has descended into the
“anticanon” of Supreme Court jurisprudence and is rightly criticized for the
Court’s willful ignorance of the discriminatory intent of the Louisiana statute.203
The Court found—and not for the first time204—room within the Fourteenth
Amendment to allow enforced distinctions and separation between people of
different races.205
B.

The White Supremacy at the Core of Constitutional Colorblindness

It is little surprise that the Plessy Court, faced with a constitutional provision
diametrically opposed to racial discrimination, could find a way to subvert the
provision’s abolitionist roots and apply it in the service of white supremacy.
Rather, the surprise is that the dissent is in large part a disagreement with the
majority over how best to put white supremacy into practice.206 Justice Harlan’s
observation that white supremacy, if left alone, would persist and his adoption
of colorblindness are of a piece with the Court’s later decisions weaponizing
colorblind constitutionalism against race-conscious remedies.207
Prior to his declaration that the Constitution is colorblind, Justice Harlan
engaged in a review of the history of the Reconstruction Amendments and their
201

See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 247 (1964) (noting that
under Civil Rights Act of 1964, hotels and inns affect interstate commerce per se).
202
See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“By the
Louisiana statute, the validity of which is here involved, all railway companies (other than
street railroad companies) carrying passengers in that State are required to have separate but
equal accommodations for white and colored persons, ‘by providing two or more passenger
coaches for each passenger train, or by dividing the passenger coaches by a partition so as to
secure separate accommodations.’” (quoting Act of July 10, 1890, No. 111, § 1, 1890 La. Acts
152, 153 (emphasis added))). The statute at issue required “equal but separate
accommodations.” Act of July 10, 1890, § 1, 1890 La. Acts at 153.
203
See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 414 (2011) (“The third
common critique of Plessy, then, follows Justice Harlan’s lead: the majority’s error was
willfully remaining blind to the social meaning of segregation, that [B]lacks are and should
remain a permanent underclass.”).
204
See Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 585 (1883) (upholding criminal statute prescribing
greater penalty for crime of fornication when parties were of different races because penalty
was same for each offender).
205
See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550-51.
206
See id. at 552-64 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
207
See id. at 559; cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298-99 (1987) (rejecting
challenge to Georgia’s capital punishment system because of failure to show discriminatory
purpose behind significant racial disparities).
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application against discriminatory laws.208 He then rejected the argument that a
law prohibiting members of either race from occupying a railroad car occupied
by the other has equal application.209 The Louisiana legislature’s intent was
clearly to exclude Black passengers from cars occupied by white passengers,
and the corresponding prohibition was merely incidental to this goal.210 In this
reasoning, Justice Harlan’s dissent is largely consistent with modern Equal
Protection Clause jurisprudence.211
But Justice Harlan, despite this sound reasoning, was no antiracist. As stated
above, he “was a former slave owner, initially opposed the Thirteenth
Amendment, and tolerated various forms of segregation.”212 Justice Harlan’s
declaration of the superiority of the white race, given this background, is entirely
unsurprising. The proclamation of the colorblind Constitution reads as less an
acknowledgment of the Constitution’s abolitionist roots and potential and more
a statement of disappointment that white legislators thought so little of their own
superiority as to believe it needed the explicit oppression of Black people for its
perpetuation.213 Justice Harlan goes on to claim that granting legal sanction to
race hatred would be to the detriment of both races.214 And yet, Justice Harlan’s
dissent abruptly pauses to put his own racial animosity on full display: “There
is a race so different from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to
become citizens of the United States. Persons belonging to it are, with few
exceptions, absolutely excluded from our country. I allude to the Chinese
race.”215
Justice Harlan’s dissent includes a fair measure of valuable legal reasoning
regarding the Reconstruction Amendments and their role in rejecting laws
passed with racist intent. His proclamation of constitutional colorblindness, by
contrast, is inextricably linked to his musings on white superiority and his
personal history as an enslaver and opponent of abolition. Its use by later jurists

208

See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 555-56 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See id. at 556-59.
210
See id. at 557.
211
See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 26566 (1977) (“When there is proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in
[a legislative or administrative] decision, . . . judicial deference is no longer justified.
Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a
sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence as may be available.” (footnote
omitted)).
212
Kennedy, supra note 137, at 5.
213
See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Sixty millions of whites are in no
danger from the presence here of eight millions of [B]lacks.”); Kennedy, supra note 137, at 5
(“What Harlan seems to be saying is that to remain ascendant, the dominant race need not
resort to ruses like equal but separate, precisely because it is dominant and will continue to be
for all time, if it observes the principles of constitutional liberty.”).
214
See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
215
Id. at 561.
209
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as a weapon against racially conscious remedies is a fitting continuation of this
legacy.
The dissent was little used in Supreme Court jurisprudence until opponents of
affirmative action latched onto it as a bludgeon against race-conscious
remedies.216 Beginning in dissents and concurrences, conservative justices
signaled their allegiance to colorblind constitutionalism as a means of protecting
the access of mediocre white candidates to schools and jobs.217 In Gratz v.
Bollinger, the Court applied strict scrutiny to the University of Michigan’s
consideration of race in its admissions—a virtual guarantee that the program
would be struck down.218 In Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action,
Integration and Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equality by Any Means Necessary
(BAMN),219 the Court determined that the Equal Protection Clause sanctioned
state mandates of colorblindness in school admissions.220 The Court’s adoption
of colorblind constitutionalism effectively undermines state and congressional
efforts to redress racial inequities while enabling systems that preserve white
supremacy by inertia.
Justice Harlan’s prediction that the white race would remain dominant
without explicit de jure discrimination continues to hold true.221 The
combination of centuries of slavery and segregation ensures that, today and for
the foreseeable future. The Supreme Court’s colorblind constitutionalism is
merely another incarnation of the anti-Blackness it previously realized through
its protection of the slave power and separate but equal regimes.
216

See Kennedy, supra note 137, at 5.
See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 414-18 (1978) (Stevens,
J., concurring in judgment) (interpreting Civil Rights Act of 1964 to require entirely
colorblind administration of school admissions programs); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448, 522-23 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice Harlan’s dissent from Plessy in
opposition to minority business set-aside program); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 520 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (“The difficulty of overcoming the
effects of past discrimination is as nothing compared with the difficulty of eradicating from
our society the source of those effects, which is the tendency—fatal to a Nation such as ours—
to classify and judge men and women on the basis of their country of origin or the color of
their skin.”).
218
See 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003) (“We conclude, therefore, that because the University’s
use of race in its current freshman admissions policy is not narrowly tailored to achieve
respondents’ asserted compelling interest in diversity, the admissions policy violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
219
572 U.S. 291 (2014).
220
See id. at 311 (finding that Michigan constitutional amendment banning affirmative
action in university admissions was “basic exercise of [voters’] democratic power” that did
not violate Fourteenth Amendment). The mandatory colorblindness also applies to public
employment and public contracting, but the Schuette Court did not address these aspects of
the amendment. See id. at 299.
221
See, e.g., EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RACISM
AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 1-4 (6th ed. 2021) (recounting how
racial inequality, perpetuated by colorblind racism, continues to pervade “virtually every area
of social life” in America).
217
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THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ANTI-BLACK CONSTITUTION

If you stick a knife in my back nine inches and pull it out six inches, there’s
no progress. If you pull it all the way out, that’s not progress.
—Malcolm X222
The Supreme Court’s anti-Blackness has very real consequences for litigants
alleging racial discrimination. Without a veritable smoking gun demonstrating
discriminatory intent, claims of discrimination are routinely rejected.223 The
Court has adopted increasingly obtuse means of ignoring obvious racism, but its
commitment to colorblind jurisprudence has usually required it to couch these
denials in procedural mechanisms. While the individual mechanisms have often
been decried for their role in perpetuating white supremacy, the pattern of their
adoption and application reveals a much larger problem: the Court is decidedly
anti-Black. This Part explores that anti-Blackness through the procedural
barriers the Court has erected for both criminal and civil litigants.
A.

The Criminalization of Blackness

In the wake of emancipation, Southern state legislatures frantically grasped
for new means to compel the labor of newly freed Black Americans.224 The
Black Codes225—their most obvious efforts to criminalize Blackness and
thereby fit within the exception granted by the Thirteenth Amendment—were
roundly rejected during Reconstruction.226 Yet other facially neutral statutes
were allowed to stand, including laws criminalizing vagrancy and trespassing—
both of which were racially motivated in passage and application.227 With the

222

Finifinito, MALCOLM X – If You Stick a Knife in My Back, YOUTUBE, at 00:10 (Nov.
5, 2011), https://youtu.be/XiSiHRNQlQo.
223
See generally Aziz Z. Huq, What Is Discriminatory Intent?, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1211,
1265-84 (2018) (cataloging Court’s “erratic and uneven response to various kinds of
evidence” of discriminatory intent).
224
See Michele Goodwin, The Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery, Capitalism, and
Mass Incarceration, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 933 (2019).
225
See id. at 935-41 (“The Black Codes were exhaustive, covering all manner of freedoms
associated with housing, family, sex, farming, associations, possessing paperwork to farm and
sell goods, and more.”).
226
See Jelani Jefferson Exum, Reconstruction Sentencing: Reimagining Drug Sentencing
in the Aftermath of the War on Drugs, 58 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1685, 1688 (2021) (“The
Southern states’ deliberate circumvention of Black people’s emancipation prompted the later
Radical Reconstruction period that resulted in the United States’ adopting the Fourteenth
Amendment—extending due process and equal protection rights—and the Fifteenth
Amendment—protecting against race-based disenfranchisement.”).
227
See Brian Sawers, Property Law as Labor Control in the Postbellum South, 33 LAW &
HIST. REV. 351, 361 (2015) (noting that several Southern state legislatures enacted vagrancy
and trespassing statutes in response to emancipation); see also Taja-Nia Y. Henderson &
Jamila Jefferson-Jones, #LivingWhileBlack: Blackness as Nuisance, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 863,
879 (2020) (“In tandem with the racialized crime of ‘vagrancy,’ criminal trespass was the
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rise of the Jim Crow regime, the combined effects of restricted movement, daily
indignities, and racist policing were sufficient to ensure cheap access to Black
labor.228
With the end of Jim Crow, new tactics were necessary for the maintenance of
white control over Black labor. The War on Drugs provided an ideal means to
drive mass incarceration.229 While the War on Drugs itself has racist roots, its
implementation has also involved large shifts in the authority of police and
prosecutors.230 The Supreme Court has constitutionalized this authority231 while
erecting significant barriers to litigants who seek to mount challenges to its racist
application.
Consider, for instance, the Court’s rejection of statistical evidence of the racist
application of the death penalty in McCleskey v. Kemp.232 The Court had already
required a criminal defendant to bear the burden of proving not just purposeful
discrimination but also “a discriminatory effect.”233 The McCleskey Court
insisted that the individualized nature of capital sentencing eliminated the
probative value of statistical evidence regarding disparities in death penalty
application.234 Yet McCleskey had produced evidence that demonstrated it was
“more likely than not” that the race of the victim determined the application of
the death penalty.235 Despite an apparently conclusive demonstration of the role
predicate for the arrest and imprisonment of thousands of young people across the South
during Freedom Summer [in 1964].” (footnotes omitted)).
228
See Goodwin, supra note 224, at 933-50 (recounting decades of efforts to control Black
labor after ratification of Thirteenth Amendment); see also James Gray Pope, Mass
Incarceration, Convict Leasing, and the Thirteenth Amendment: A Revisionist Account, 94
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1465, 1511-13 (2019) (“The Thirteenth Amendment had transformed [B]lack
slaves into free trespassers on the real property of their former owners. Homeless and without
means of production, they were forced to choose between accepting whatever terms were
offered by white employers or committing one or more of the many crimes that were shaped
and selectively enforced to target their behaviors.”).
229
See ALEXANDER, supra note 67, at 224-25, 233-36 (analyzing how policies and
practices of War on Drugs have driven mass incarceration crisis).
230
See Jessica M. Eaglin, The Drug Court Paradigm, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 595, 600-01
(2016) (explaining that War on Drugs “transformed justice systems” by incentivizing drug
arrests and prosecutions and limiting judicial discretion in sentencing drug offenders);
Benjamin Levin, Guns and Drugs, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2173, 2184-91 (2016) (discussing
“metastasizing of police and prosecutorial power” as result of War on Drugs).
231
See Ian F. Haney López, Is the “Post” in Post-racial the “Blind” in Colorblind?, 32
CARDOZO L. REV. 807, 815 (2011) (arguing that Supreme Court’s colorblind approach shields
law enforcement).
232
481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987).
233
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985).
234
See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 294 (“Each jury is unique in its composition, and the
Constitution requires that its decision rest on consideration of innumerable factors that vary
according to the characteristics of the individual defendant and the facts of the particular
capital offense.”).
235
See id. at 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[F]rankness would compel the disclosure that
it was more likely than not that the race of McCleskey’s victim would determine whether he
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of race in capital sentencing, the Court erected a procedural barrier in its
requirement that McCleskey prove individualized discrimination.236
A similar difficulty arises in challenges to pretextual stops and selective
prosecutions. “Given that only direct proof of an individual officer’s racist
animus can serve as the basis for constitutional relief, the evidentiary burden on
a plaintiff is high.”237 Here, a plaintiff faces an insurmountable Catch-22: if the
plaintiff wishes to compel the government to produce the sort of evidence that
could prove racial discrimination in an executive officer’s discretionary actions,
the plaintiff must first demonstrate the differential treatment of similarly situated
persons of other races.238 In United States v. Armstrong, the barrier was set so
high as to remove the matter of examining racial disparities in the choice to
prosecute under federal law—with its punitive mandatory-minimum
sentences—or state law from the trial judge’s discretion altogether if the
evidentiary burden was not met.239 Defendants faced with such discriminatory
abuses of discretion have virtually no recourse short of police and prosecutors
admitting their discriminatory intent.
Even when the Court considers the evidence sufficient to discern racial
discrimination, it often does so in narrow decisions of limited consequence. Paul
Butler described the Court’s decision in Flowers v. Mississippi240 as “so limited,
even on its own terms, that it will not help other victims of discrimination.”241
Like many of the Court’s decisions on racial discrimination, Flowers reads like
less of a condemnation of the practice than a guide to not getting caught
engaging in it.242 Indeed, the Court has approved peremptory challenges that

received a death sentence: 6 of every 11 defendants convicted of killing a white person would
not have received the death penalty if their victims had been [B]lack, while, among defendants
with aggravating and mitigating factors comparable to McCleskey’s, 20 of every 34 would
not have been sentenced to die if their victims had been [B]lack.” (citations omitted)).
236
See id. at 292-93 (majority opinion) (“[T]o prevail under the Equal Protection Clause,
McCleskey must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose.
He offers no evidence specific to his own case that would support an inference that racial
considerations played a part in his sentence. Instead, he relies solely on the Baldus study.”).
237
Ekow N. Yankah, Pretext and Justification: Republicanism, Policing, and Race, 40
CARDOZO L. REV. 1543, 1600 (2019).
238
See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 458 (1996) (concluding that plaintiffs
pursuing race-based selective prosecution claim must “show that the Government declined to
prosecute similarly situated suspects of other races” to access discovery).
239
See id. at 480 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting, in contrast to majority’s conclusion, that
inquiry into racial disparities in choice of prosecutorial forum was well within trial judge’s
discretion).
240
139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019).
241
Butler, supra note 152, at 83.
242
See id. at 88 (“The lesson of Strauder[ v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880)], like the
lessons of Batson[ v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)] and Flowers, was that discrimination
against African American jurors should not be blatant. If bias can be disguised as a nonracial
‘qualification’ or ‘race neutral’ explanation it is permissible.”); see also Flowers, 139 S. Ct.
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only narrowly provide any justification at all beyond race.243 The bar is set low,
and the prosecution is playing with house money.
The difficulties of obtaining relief from racially biased prosecutions are
mirrored in the Court’s qualified immunity decisions.244 A qualified immunity
defense requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant violated the plaintiff’s
constitutional right and that the right was clearly established at the time of the
violation.245 The doctrine presents two interrelated challenges. First, the details
of a plaintiff’s alleged violation must be sufficiently close to those already
deemed a violation of the law to survive a qualified immunity defense.246
Second, and perhaps more perniciously, the Court, since Pearson v. Callahan,247
has allowed lower courts to review the elements of the defense in either order,248
effectively allowing them to frustrate any exploration of whether the conduct
alleged does, in fact, violate the law.249 With a cooperative judiciary, police can
freely violate the rights of Black and Brown people so long as these violations
do not fall within established prohibitions.
Michelle Alexander summed up the results of the procedural protection of
racism in the criminal justice system:
The fact that more than half of the young [B]lack men in many large
American cities are currently under the control of the criminal justice
system (or saddled with criminal records) is not—as many argue—just a
symptom of poverty or poor choices, but rather evidence of a new racial
caste system at work.250
The Supreme Court cannot be counted on to protect Black and Brown
Americans against racially motivated searches, seizures, arrests, prosecutions,

at 2235 (reversing conviction after Mississippi prosecutor’s actions during jury selection were
egregiously racist).
243
See, e.g., Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 363-64 (1991) (explaining that
prosecutor’s exclusion of jurors “related to their ability to speak and understand Spanish” was
not necessarily an exclusion because of their race).
244
This trend has continued in the Court’s recent per curiam opinions granting officers
qualified immunity largely on the “clearly established law” prong of the test. See RivasVillegas v. Cortesluna, 142 S. Ct. 4, 8 (2021) (per curiam); City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 142
S. Ct. 9, 11-12 (2021) (per curiam).
245
See Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1, 11 (2015).
246
See Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L. REV.
583, 620 (1998) (“It is not enough, in other words, that the broadly defined right to be free
from unreasonable searches or cruel and unusual punishment is clear; the right allegedly
violated must be described at a particularized level in factually analogous case law that would
have provided more concrete guidance for the official’s conduct.”).
247
555 U.S. 223 (2009).
248
See id. at 236.
249
See Geoffrey J. Derrick, Qualified Immunity and the First Amendment Right to Record
Police, 22 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 247 (2013).
250
ALEXANDER, supra note 67, at 19.
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or sentences. Even if Congress chooses to do so, the Court may limit their
remedies to “race-neutral” rules, greatly increasing the difficulty of enacting
significant changes.251 Until the Court’s approach or the Constitution changes—
or state and local governments take up the abolitionist project—the
criminalization of Blackness will persist.
B.

The Procedural Protection of “Race-Neutral” Discrimination

The Court’s procedural barriers for challenging purportedly colorblind
government action have a significant impact on nearly every aspect of American
civil and political life. No American can vote, attend school, travel, buy
property, or even breathe without feeling the effects of laws that disparately
impact people of color. The Court’s anti-Blackness subverts democratic ideals
both directly and indirectly, typically by erecting procedural barriers.
The Court’s voting rights jurisprudence is particularly pernicious. Two
decisions in the past decade have sapped the VRA’s power to prevent
discriminatory voting regimes. In Shelby County v. Holder, the Court struck
down the VRA’s coverage formula, which subjected covered jurisdictions to the
Act’s preclearance requirement.252 The Court relied on the pretense that the
covered jurisdictions lacked a current record of voter suppression sufficient to
justify a disparate burden upon them.253 Unsurprisingly, the states no longer
bound by the VRA’s preclearance requirement rushed a wave of voter
suppression laws into effect.254 Despite these new, more sophisticated voter
suppression tactics, the Court determined in Brnovich v. Democratic National
Committee255 that evidence of statistically significant disparities would not be
sufficient to show a VRA violation.256 Without an outright admission of
discriminatory intent, such as in North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP
251
See Feingold, supra note 159, at 518 (“[C]ontemporary equal protection doctrine has
rendered the Fourteenth Amendment more hostile to race-conscious remedies designed to
promote integration and racial equality than to facially neutral state action that perpetuates the
United States’ legacy of segregation and racial inequality.”).
252
570 U.S. 529, 556-57 (2013) (declaring VRA coverage formula unconstitutional).
253
See id. at 554 (“[A] more fundamental problem remains: Congress did not use the
[current] record it compiled to shape a coverage formula grounded in current conditions. It
instead reenacted a formula based on 40-year-old facts having no logical relation to the present
day.”).
254
See Travis Crum, Reconstructing Racially Polarized Voting, 70 DUKE L.J. 261, 317
n.349 (2020) (providing examples of cases striking down such laws or actions in Arizona,
North Carolina, and California, in part under section 2 of VRA).
255
141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021).
256
See id. at 2343 (dismissing dissent’s argument that “any ‘statistically significant’
disparity—wherever that is in the statute—may be enough to take down even facially neutral
voting rules with long pedigrees that reasonably pursue important state interests” (quoting id.
at 2358 n.4, 2360-61, 2367-68 (Kagan, J., dissenting))); id. at 2368 (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(pointing out that statistical evidence majority dismissed demonstrated that ballots cast by
Black, Latinx, and Indigenous voters were twice as likely to be discarded as those cast by
white voters).
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v. McCrory,257 the Court’s farcical equal protection jurisprudence—and its close
cousins, equal openness and equal opportunity inquiries under the VRA258—
erect insurmountable procedural barriers for voting rights plaintiffs.
While the Court’s anti-Black decisions on affirmative action in education are
explored above,259 the need for such programs is predicated on a web of other
procedural barriers to equality in education. Students are assigned to schools
based on the geography of school districts whose boundaries often follow the
racial divides of communities.260 School funding is typically based in part on
property taxes, which are driven by property values—which also follow the
racial divides of communities.261 Even once a student reaches school, student
discipline—increasingly at the hands of uniformed police officers262—falls

257
See 831 F.3d 204, 214 (4th Cir. 2016) (“[O]n the day after the Supreme Court issued
Shelby County v. Holder, eliminating preclearance obligations, a leader of the party that newly
dominated the legislature (and the party that rarely enjoyed African American support)
announced an intention to enact what he characterized as an ‘omnibus’ election law. Before
enacting that law, the legislature requested data on the use, by race, of a number of voting
practices. Upon receipt of the race data, the General Assembly enacted legislation that
restricted voting and registration in five different ways, all of which disproportionately
affected African Americans.” (citation omitted)); id. at 226 (“As ‘evidence of justifications’
for the changes to early voting, the State offered purported inconsistencies in voting hours
across counties, including the fact that only some counties had decided to offer Sunday voting.
The State then elaborated on its justification, explaining that ‘[c]ounties with Sunday voting
in 2014 were disproportionately [B]lack’ and ‘disproportionately Democratic.’ In response,
[the legislation] did away with one of the two days of Sunday voting. Thus, in what comes as
close to a smoking gun as we are likely to see in modern times, the State’s very justification
for a challenged statute hinges explicitly on race—specifically, its concerns that African
Americans, who had overwhelmingly voted for Democrats, had too much access to the
franchise.” (first alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
258
See Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2337-38, 2343 n.17.
259
See supra notes 216-20 and accompanying text (discussing Court’s harmful application
of colorblindness to affirmative action programs).
260
See Laura Meckler & Kate Rabinowitz, School District Boundaries Get In the Way,
WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2019, at A1 (“Boundaries between districts enabled white flight from
the cities to the suburbs after courts began enforcing desegregation orders.”).
261
See Wilbur C. Rich, Putting Black Kids into a Trick Bag: Anatomizing the Inner-City
Public School Reform, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 159, 184 (2002) (“We know that the muchmaligned property tax, the major source revenue for schools, has had a disparate impact on
poor school districts.”); see also Sarah Mervosh, How Much Wealthier Are White School
Districts Than Nonwhite Ones? $23 Billion, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/27/education/school-districts-funding-whiteminorities.html (reporting that predominantly nonwhite school districts receive less funding
because “poorer districts are unable to generate the same revenue” from property taxes as
wealthier districts).
262
Benjamin W. Fisher & Emily A. Hennessy, School Resource Officers and Exclusionary
Discipline in U.S. High Schools: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 1 ADOLESCENT
RSCH. REV. 217, 218 (2016) (“Although [school resource officers] were implemented to
address physical threats to school safety, they have become increasingly involved in matters
internal to the school, particularly adolescent problem behaviors.”).
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disproportionately on Black students.263 And if a student can run this gauntlet
and wishes to pursue higher education, college admissions depend upon
standardized tests with known racial disparities.264 Challenges to parts of this
system are stunted by the typical procedural barriers of challenges to racist
practices with disparate impacts: the plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent,
and statistical evidence will be disregarded if it is not overwhelming.265
While the Civil Rights Act of 1964 formally ended segregation in interstate
travel,266 people of color still find themselves subjected to unequal indignities in
travel. Various systems for excluding travelers from airline flights in the years
since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, such as the No Fly List, have consistently had a
disparate impact on people of color.267 Some federal courts have only recently
recognized their own authority to hear challenges to a person’s inclusion on the

263
Brence D. Pernell, The Thirteenth Amendment and Equal Educational Opportunity, 39
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 420, 426-27 (2021) (“Because of this racially warped approach to
school discipline, Black American students are significantly more likely to become entrapped
in what has been dubbed the ‘school-to-prison pipeline,’ whereby discipline policies funnel
students from schools to the criminal justice system.” (footnote omitted)).
264
See William C. Kidder & Jay Rosner, How the SAT Creates “Built-in-Headwinds”: An
Educational and Legal Analysis of Disparate Impact, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 131, 133
(2002) (“Although this process may appear facially-neutral and non-discriminatory, the SAT
unfairly exacerbates the test’s already significant disparate impact on African Americans and
Chicano test-takers.”).
265
See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18, 54-55 (1973)
(declining to find that education is fundamental right and consequently declining to apply
heightened scrutiny to disparate impacts of property tax-based funding regime for public
schools); see also Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Designing the Legal Architecture to Protect
Education as a Civil Right, 96 IND. L.J. 51, 69 (2020) (“Given the great difficulty of proving
intentional discrimination and the decrease in overt discrimination, a claim for disparate
impact discrimination provides the only potential avenue for those injured by discrimination
to find relief from an array of harmful educational practices . . . . However, the Court held in
Alexander v. Sandoval[, 532 U.S. 275 (2001)] that only federal agencies can enforce
regulations [that prohibit direct impact as] promulgated under section 602.”).
266
See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964).
267
See Ben Norton, Victory over Racial Profiling: Federal Court Rules Americans Can
Challenge
No
Fly
List,
SALON
(Oct.
26,
2015,
7:42
PM),
https://www.salon.com/2015/10/26/victory_over_racial_profiling_federal_court_rules_amer
icans_can_challenge_no_fly_list/ [https://perma.cc/532G-D4FF] (“The people on the list are
disproportionately Arab and from Muslim-majority countries, leading critics to describe it as
a state-sanctioned policy of racial profiling and religious discrimination.”); Press Release,
Barry Steinhardt, Dir., Tech. & Liberty Program, ACLU, Problems with No-Fly List Show
Problems with CAPPS II Airline Profiling System, https://www.aclu.org/other/problems-nofly-list-show-problems-capps-ii-airline-profiling-system
[https://perma.cc/CPR7-MAJ7]
(last visited Jan. 17, 2022) (“The no-fly list and [TSA’s computer-assisted passenger
prescreening system] both impose sanctions (interference with [passengers’] constitutional
right to travel) without any meaningful due process, making abuses - whether through
discrimination or pure sloppiness - inevitable.”).
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No Fly List.268 The Trump Administration carried this a full step further with its
“Muslim ban.”269 While the first two iterations of the ban were struck down for
their obvious discriminatory intent,270 the Supreme Court rejected a
constitutional challenge to the third iteration due to the Executive Branch’s
broad authority on national security matters.271 The procedural sleight of hand
the Court perfected in permitting discrimination against Black Americans has
proven well suited to allowing discrimination against Muslims too.
Discrimination—both past and present—continues to harm people of color in
the institution at the root of most American wealth: real property ownership.272
“Unfortunately, [discriminatory housing and lending] practices remain with us
and are continued not only through intentional acts of discrimination, but
through non-intentional institutional practices which reflect our learned history.
The discriminatory practices are particularly problematic for African
Americans.”273 While the Fair Housing Act and Equal Credit Opportunity Act
prohibit discrimination in housing and mortgage lending, the evidentiary
burdens of proving discriminatory practices fall on plaintiffs.274 Federal law
prohibits discriminatory advertising, but real estate agents persist in racially
coding the subtext of their listings.275 Brokers and real estate agents typically
268
See Mokdad v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 807, 815 (6th Cir. 2015) (reversing district court’s
judgment that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s challenge to inclusion on
No Fly List).
269
See Adam Liptak & Michael D. Shear, Justices Back Travel Ban, Yielding to Trump,
N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2018, at A1 (“In a 5-to-4 vote, the court’s conservatives said that the
president’s power to secure the country’s borders, delegated by Congress over decades of
immigration lawmaking, was not undermined by Mr. Trump’s history of incendiary
statements about the dangers he said Muslims pose to the United States.”); id. (“[But] Chief
Justice Roberts acknowledged that Mr. Trump had made many statements concerning his
desire to impose a ‘Muslim ban.’”).
270
See id.
271
See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420-22 (2018) (rejecting plaintiffs’
Establishment Clause claims because policy was “facially legitimate and bona fide” and
because, applying rational basis review, Court should not substitute its judgment for
Executive Branch’s on complex national security matters). The Court also rejected plaintiffs’
argument that the President exceeded the authority delegated to him under several provisions
of the Immigration and Nationality Act. See id. at 2414-15.
272
See Allyson E. Gold, Redliking: When Redlining Goes Online, 62 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1841, 1844 (2021) (“In 2016, the average [w]hite family’s wealth was more than ten
times that of the average Black family. This racial wealth gap is explained in part by access
to capital in the form of real property.” (footnote omitted)).
273
Phyliss Craig-Taylor, To Be Free: Liberty, Citizenship, Property, and Race, 14 HARV.
BLACKLETTER L.J. 45, 46 (1998).
274
See id. at 66-68 (“In essence, the Act requires a very sophisticated consumer to assess
the actions of the mortgage provider and to determine discrimination on a prohibited basis.
Even if the consumer suspects discrimination, the burden of proof poses a significant
challenge.”).
275
See Reginald Leamon Robinson, White Cultural Matrix and the Language of
Nonverbal Advertising in Housing Segregation: Toward an Aggregate Theory of Liability, 25
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present people of color seeking housing with fewer options than their white
counterparts.276 And when they lose their property in a forced sale, people of
color may suffer not only the discounted price of the forced sale but an additional
market discount due to their race.277 Of course, many issues of property are
matters of state law resolved in state courts. The high procedural barriers at play
in cases alleging discrimination likely keep many potential litigants from ever
even considering filing in federal court. Even when Congress seeks to remedy
centuries of discrimination in real property, the Court’s anti-Black jurisprudence
perversely applies constitutional colorblindness as a barrier.278
The consequences of the Constitution’s anti-Black interpretation reach as far
as Black people’s physical environment itself. Despite a Clinton-era executive
order directing federal agencies to “make achieving environmental justice part
of [their] mission[s]”279 and an accompanying memorandum emphasizing that
agencies’ initial National Environmental Policy Act review of projects should
include consideration of “effects on minority communities and low-income
communities,”280 permits for pollution-generating industries tend to cluster near
communities of color.281 For instance, a recent study of the location of oil and

CAP. U. L. REV. 101, 113-14 (1996) (“Today . . . many real estate advertisers have begun to
use graphic art, pictorial, or surreal images in order to sell or rent their housing stock. These
images rely exclusively on the ad’s emotional impact, and with the image’s emotional impact,
the targeted market potentially gets many subtextual messages, one of which suggests to
whites that they will be comfortable and one of which suggests to African Americans that
they will be unwanted.” (footnotes omitted)).
276
See Thomas W. Mitchell, Stephen Malpezzi & Richard K. Green, Forced Sale Risk:
Class, Race, and the “Double Discount,” 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 589, 650-51 (2010)
(summarizing three studies published between 1979 and 2002 in American real estate markets
using white, Black, and later Latinx, Asian, and Indigenous buyers).
277
See id. at 658 (“[W]e raise the possibility for the first time that racial price
discrimination may exist in the context of forced sales of real property. If minorities are either
more at risk of having their property sold at a forced sale as a result of owning property under
more unstable conditions than white property owners or if minorities suffer a ‘double
discount’ when their property is sold at a forced sale, then it would be necessary to address
these issues as part of a comprehensive and concerted campaign to close the racial wealth
gap.”).
278
See, e.g., Reiley, supra note 167, at A19 (describing injunction blocking—as
discriminatory—measure meant to redress inequitable distribution of previous COVID-19
debt relief to farmers and decades of discrimination by earmarking some federal aid for
farmers of color).
279
Exec. Order No. 12898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995).
280
Memorandum on Environmental Justice, 1 PUB. PAPERS 241, 242 (Feb. 11, 1994).
281
See, e.g., LESLEY FLEISCHMAN, CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE; MARCUS FRANKLIN, NAACP,
FUMES ACROSS THE FENCE-LINE: THE HEALTH IMPACTS OF AIR POLLUTION FROM OIL & GAS
FACILITIES ON AFRICAN AMERICAN COMMUNITIES 6 (2017) (“It is not a coincidence that so
many African Americans live near oil gas development. Historically, polluting facilities have
often been sited in or near African American communities. Companies take advantage of
communities that have low levels of political power. In these communities, companies may
face lower transaction costs associated with getting needed permits, and they have more of an
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gas pipeline infrastructure found that the concentration of this infrastructure was
significantly greater for the most vulnerable communities.282 People of color are
routinely exposed to more polluted air.283 Their water is more likely to be
unsafe.284 Those affected can file citizen suits under the various federal
environmental statutes,285 but without evidence of discriminatory intent, they
need to overcome a comparable procedural barrier: challenges to agency
rulemaking typically need to demonstrate that the action was “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”286
Justice Harlan was likely correct that, absent any legal intervention,
colorblind constitutionalism serves to perpetuate white supremacy. White
people in the late nineteenth century enjoyed considerable advantages in social,
economic, and political power, all of which largely persist into the present.287
The doctrine of “separate but equal” segregation likely contributed to that but
was hardly essential to either establishing or maintaining white dominance in
American society. And yet, white supremacy is plagued by feelings of
ability to influence local government in their favor.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Amy
Patronella & Saharra Griffin, Communities of Color Bear the Brunt of Trump’s AntiEnvironmental
Agenda,
CTR.
FOR
AM.
PROGRESS
(Feb.
27,
2020),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2020/02/27/480820/communitiescolor-bear-brunt-trumps-anti-environmental-agenda/ [https://perma.cc/4NZF-W8J7] (“Due
to a history of systemic racism and segregation, low-income communities and people of color
have been burdened with higher levels of pollution in their backyards.” (citations omitted)).
282
See Ryan E. Emanuel, Martina A. Caretta, Louie Rivers III & Pavithra Vasudevan,
Natural Gas Gathering and Transmission Pipelines and Social Vulnerability in the United
States, GEOHEALTH, May 2021, at 3-5 (finding density of natural gas gathering and
transmission pipelines “significantly greater” in “counties with the most vulnerable
populations”).
283
See Hiroko Tabuchi & Nadja Popovich, A Stark Inequality More Harmful with Each
Breath, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2021, at A12 (“Black Americans are exposed to more [air]
pollution from every type of source, including industry, agriculture, all manner of vehicles,
construction, residential sources and even emissions from restaurants.”).
284
See KRISTI PULLEN FEDNICK, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL; STEVE TAYLOR, COMING CLEAN;
MICHELE ROBERTS, ENV’T JUST. HEALTH ALL., WATERED DOWN JUSTICE 18 (2019) (“[W]e
found that the rate of drinking water violations was greater in counties with greater
percentages of their populations with high racial, ethnic, and language vulnerability; crowded
housing and limited transportation access; and low economic status. Racial, ethnic, and
language vulnerability, and housing and transportation quality, had the strongest
relationships. Our analysis also revealed that of all the sociodemographic characteristics
analyzed, racial, ethnic, and language vulnerability had the strongest relationship to slow and
inadequate enforcement.” (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted)).
285
See Clay F. Kulesza, Note, The Devil in NEPA’s Details: Amending NEPA to Prevent
State Interference with Environmental Reviews, 62 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1041, 1060-62
(2021) (discussing provisions of Clean Air and Clean Water Acts that enable citizen suits
against violators).
286
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D).
287
See generally, e.g., Gold, supra note 272 (discussing historical policies and practices
that created racial wealth gap and highlighting Airbnb and similar platforms as modern-day
perpetuators of these practices).
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vulnerability.288 The electoral strategy of exploiting these feelings benefits from
maintaining and erecting barriers against people of color and pointing out any
resulting struggle for justice as an existential threat to the America white people
know.289 In its time, “separate but equal” served this role well; its institution
provided a security blanket, and its fall precipitated a flurry of white political
violence.290 The procedural barriers, too, are likely unnecessary to the
perpetuation of white supremacy, absent an abolitionist intervention, but provide
a security blanket. The wave of protests in response to the murders of George
Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and Ahmaud Arbery drew fresh attention to the
procedural tools of white supremacy but also served as the catalyst for more of
its backlash.291 The cycle will likely repeat itself absent an abolitionist
constitutional movement sufficient to complete the work of Reconstruction. As
we work toward that, we must not forget that white supremacy’s “race-neutral”
procedural barriers constitute an oppressive pattern in the public lives of people
of color.

288
See Jonathan M. Metzl, The Politics of White Anxiety, BOS. REV. (Oct. 23, 2020),
http://bostonreview.net/race/jonathan-m-metzl-politics-white-anxiety
[https://perma.cc/7BDN-QP95] (describing white anxiety as “an internal, ego-dystonic sense
of unease. A weltschmerz. A disjunct between the manifest world and the world as one wishes
it were. Psychic pain on the inside, which renders helping other people ever more difficult on
the outside”).
289
See id.
290
See Lawrence Glickman, How White Backlash Controls American Progress, ATLANTIC
(May 22, 2020, 10:41 AM), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/05/whitebacklash-nothing-new/611914/ (“These individual backlashes are all instances of a
reactionary tradition, one that is deeply woven into American political culture and that extends
back to the era of Reconstruction, at least.”).
291
See, e.g., Emily Cureton, In Rural Oregon, Threats and Backlash Follow Racial Justice
Protests, NPR (Sept. 3, 2020, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/09/03/906809148/inrural-oregon-threats-and-backlash-follow-racial-justice-protests [https://perma.cc/8KMA8RD6] (describing counterprotests and online harassment stemming from racial justice
demonstrations in one Oregon community). Even those white persons who initially supported
calls for racial justice have not generally remained engaged. See Joseph P. Williams, A Year
After George Floyd’s Killing, White Allyship Fades, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 25,
2021, 12:13 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2021-05-25/a-yearafter-george-floyds-killing-white-support-for-black-lives-matter-fades.
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III. THE ANTIRACIST CONSTITUTION
While good laws will always be found where good practice prevails, the
reverse does not always hold true. Far from it. The very opposite is often
the case. What then? Shall we condemn the righteous law because wicked
men twist it to the support of wickedness? Is that the way to deal with good
and evil? Shall we blot out all distinction between them, and hand over to
slavery all that slavery may claim on the score of long practice?
—Frederick Douglass292
Our Constitution begins with the democracy-affirming notion that it is “We
the People” who established the federal government for the purposes of
promoting freedom, peace, justice, and the common good.293 The operative text
of the Constitution undercuts this notion,294 but structurally, the government
authorized under the Constitution draws much of its authority from the states.295
The ultimate source of that power becomes apparent when one looks to the state
constitutions: all but New York maintain that their authority derives, ultimately,
from the people.296 While the Constitution arguably excluded a great many
people—especially Black people—from its concept of “the People” in 1789, the
Reconstruction Amendments inarguably changed who “the People” were for
both the Federal and State Constitutions.297
Governments, meanwhile, were still composed of men. In a great many places
across time, those men have not had any intention of recognizing the new
constitutional order.298 We would do ourselves a disservice, though, if we
292

Frederick Douglass, The Constitution of the United States: Is It Pro-Slavery or AntiSlavery? (Mar. 26, 1860), https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/1860-frederickdouglass-constitution-united-states-it-pro-slavery-or-anti-slavery/ [https://perma.cc/LP7ZJW9Z].
293
See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common
defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and
our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”).
294
See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Miriam Seifter, The Democracy Principle in State
Constitutions, 119 MICH. L. REV. 859, 895 (2021) (interpreting Constitution as “wary of
unmediated popular sovereignty, majority rule, and political equality”).
295
See Douglas G. Smith, An Analysis of Two Federal Structures: The Articles of
Confederation and the Constitution, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 249, 285 (1997) (“The political
authority of the general government under the Constitution was derived from both the states
and the people, unlike the political authority of the general government under the Articles,
which was derived from the states alone.”).
296
See Bulman-Pozen & Seifter, supra note 294, at 869.
297
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside.”).
298
See, e.g., Goodwin, supra note 224, at 936 (“Black Codes provided an urgent legal
solution to the demand for low- or no-wage labor after the ratification of the Thirteenth
Amendment. Rather than individual planters illegally exerting control over their former slaves
by forcing them to labor for no compensation in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment’s
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surrendered to those men the very interpretation of the Constitution. To pursue
the completion of abolition, we must claim—as Frederick Douglass did—the
Constitution as an instrument of abolition.299 Furthermore, the Reconstruction
Amendments explicitly worked to transform the Constitution into an abolitionist
document.300 In a very real sense, the culmination of the abolitionist project in
the Reconstruction Amendments after decades of publicizing their meanings
through litigation and organizing is the original playbook for movement law.
Several passages of the Amendments hardwired fundamental protections against
racial discrimination and oppression into the Constitution, and while the
Supreme Court has all too often looked to its own past interpretations of those
provisions rather than their own text and origins,301 this trend can and should be
interrupted.
Doing so requires acknowledging and affirming the Constitution’s potential
to support color-conscious remedies. The language and tactics of white
supremacy have shifted since Reconstruction, but the textual opposition of the
Reconstruction Amendments to white supremacy has not. The Reconstruction
Congress’s members differed in their understanding of how broad a grant of
power the Thirteenth Amendment gave them but generally understood it to
support sweeping civil rights legislation.302 To quell any fears that Congress had
abolition clause, a legislative solution could provide the mechanism to acquire
noncompensated laborers through exercise of the Punishment Clause.”); see also EQUAL JUST.
INITIATIVE, supra note 82, at 20-39 (recounting “massive resistance” campaigns in Southern
states in response to desegregation decisions); Elie Mystal, Bigots Have Finally Accomplished
Their Goal of Gutting the Voting Rights Act, NATION (July 2, 2021),
https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/voting-rights-arizona-court/ (“Yesterday, in a
Supreme Court case called Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee, Justice Samuel Alito
told conservatives how to defeat the Voting Rights Act, once and for all. White supremacists
don’t have to storm the Capitol to hoard political power anymore. They just have to follow
Alito’s instructions.”).
299
See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Supreme Court 2018 Term—Foreword: Abolition
Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 59 (2019).
300
See id. at 63 (“The language of the Fourteenth Amendment can be traced to specific
speeches and writings of leading antislavery advocates who developed an abolition
constitutionalism in the preceding decades.”).
301
See supra Part I (examining Supreme Court’s cabining of Reconstruction
Amendments).
302
See Larry J. Pittman, Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Dark Ward: The Intersection of
the Thirteenth Amendment and Health Care Treatments Having Disproportionate Impacts on
Disfavored Groups, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 774, 821-25 (1998) (noting that both supporters
and opponents of Thirteenth Amendment in Reconstruction Congress recognized it to “grant
former slaves ‘equality before the law, protection in life and person, opportunity to live, work
and move about’” (quoting Jacobus tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States: Consummation to Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39
CALIF. L. REV. 171, 176 (1951))); see also Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801, 1821 (2010) (“Thus, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was both within
Congress’s power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment and its power to enforce the
Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). But see Kurt T. Lash, Enforcing the
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exceeded its authority, the Fourteenth Amendment contained expansive and
explicit language drawn from the language of antebellum abolitionism.303 The
Reconstruction Congress did not simply assume that future generations would
respect its abolitionist goals; it doubled down on embedding abolitionist
principles in the Constitution itself.304 By refusing to disclaim the power of these
principles, modern abolition and liberation movements can reshape the
landscape of constitutional interpretation.
The Reconstruction Amendments were—apart from the Fifteenth
Amendment—intended as broad solutions to broad problems. Even the Fifteenth
Amendment’s flaws were largely addressed later through the Nineteenth,305
Twenty-Fourth,306 and Twenty-Sixth Amendments.307 A historically accurate
understanding of the Reconstruction Amendments is both color-conscious and
broad enough to account for more than just racial discrimination. The
Reconstruction Amendments can (and should) form the backbone of the ongoing
abolitionist project and are potent remedies in the struggle to dismantle racism,
sexism, ableism, xenophobia, homophobia, and more. Movement lawyers today
should follow the example of nineteenth-century abolitionists, applying pressure
both through constitutional challenges and political organizing until their
constitutional vision prevails.
This Part will proceed in its first Section to review the oft-ignored original
public meanings of the Reconstruction Amendments. These meanings can be
gleaned from the antebellum arguments of abolitionists, the congressional
remarks of the Amendments’ supporters, and the writings of contemporaneous
Black Americans. All these sources contain support for the radical abolitionist
interpretation of the Reconstruction Amendments. With these original public
meanings in mind, the second Section of this Part will specifically examine the
Thirteenth Amendment’s potential for redressing badges and incidents of
slavery, from the abuses of the carceral state to the restriction of reproductive
choice. This Part’s final Section will explore the various tools of the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments for building an abolition democracy. These
Amendments provide several clauses to affirm democracy and liberty that must
be core parts of any abolitionist understanding of the Constitution.

Rights of Due Process: The Original Relationship Between the Fourteenth Amendment and
the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 106 GEO. L.J. 1389, 1406 (2018) (“Most of all, opponents [of
Freedmen’s Bureau Bill] denied that the Thirteenth Amendment authorized enforcement of
the civil rights covered by either the Freedmen’s Bill or the Civil Rights Act.”).
303
See Roberts, supra note 299, at 54 (“The abolition struggle profoundly shaped not only
the specific language of the Reconstruction Amendments but also the very meaning of those
constitutional principles.”).
304
See id.
305
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (addressing sex-based voting discrimination).
306
Id. amend. XXIV (addressing wealth-based voting discrimination).
307
Id. amend. XXVI (addressing age-based voting discrimination).
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Original Public Meanings of the Reconstruction Amendments

In exploring what a constitutional provision meant to the public that ratified
it, we will almost invariably encounter a range of constructions its
contemporaries gave it.308 The Reconstruction Amendments are no different
from any other provisions in this regard. We can be certain of the broad topics
that they covered—the end of chattel slavery,309 the meaning of citizenship for
formerly enslaved Black citizens,310 the exclusion of Confederates from
positions of power,311 and the guarantee of voting rights to Black citizens.312 We
can be reasonably certain of the semantic content of their text. But the range of
public meanings—in the sense of legal consequences attributed to the
Reconstruction Amendments—cannot be so neatly summed up. Still, there is
value in exploring how various contemporaneous interpretations—especially
those of the Amendments’ drafters and intended beneficiaries—dealt with the
potential effects of the new constitutional text. In particular, this Section will
examine the constitutional understandings of the abolitionist movement, the
Radical contingent of the Reconstruction Congress, and Black Americans.
1.

The Origins of the Reconstruction Amendments in Abolitionist
Advocacy

First, we should consider the language and values of the antebellum
movement to abolish slavery. The Citizenship Clause’s conceptual
underpinnings descend directly from abolitionist legal arguments regarding laws
restricting the status of free Black persons, particularly in Northern states.313
And—as the profoundly influential Lysander Spooner argued—if a state could
make Black people citizens merely by abolishing slavery, they must already
have been citizens of the United States, for the power to grant that citizenship
could not reasonably vest in the states.314 These citizenship arguments were
central to many of the abolitionists’ other contentions.
308

See Jack M. Balkin, The Construction of Original Public Meaning, 31 CONST.
COMMENT. 71, 93 (2016) (“[B]y scaling down our ambitions, we can have far greater hope
that history will converge on a relatively small range of original public meanings. If we ask
for more, by contrast, we are far more likely to encounter divergence and disagreement. These
issues are best left to constitutional construction.”).
309
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
310
See id. amend. XIV, § 1.
311
See id. amend. XIV, § 3.
312
See id. amend. XV, § 1.
313
See Randy E. Barnett, Whence Comes Section One? The Abolitionist Origins of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 165, 174-76 (2011) (discussing Ohio AntiSlavery Convention’s argument that Ohio Constitution’s guarantee of inalienable rights to all
combined with Federal Privileges and Immunities Clause to render Ohio statutes
discriminating against free Black emigrants from other states unconstitutional).
314
See LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY 93 (Boston, Bela
Marsh, enlarged ed. 1860); Barnett, supra note 313, at 207-08 (describing Spooner’s
argument).
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Principal among these was the argument that the Constitution’s Privileges and
Immunities Clause applied to Black Americans because they were citizens.315
While the typical thrust of these arguments was that states could not restrict the
privileges and immunities of citizens of other states, some, notably Joel Tiffany,
argued that the Clause was strong enough to prevent states from restricting the
rights of their own citizens.316 Benjamin Shaw took a similar line of argument,
relying on the Privileges and Immunities Clause to support his contention that
Southern states’ imprisoning Black travelers and punishing abolitionists for their
speech violated the Constitution.317 To the abolitionists, the concept of the
privileges and immunities of citizenship was capacious enough to support
national standards of fundamental rights under the Constitution.
On the other hand, due process of law was a particularly contentious topic
among abolitionists. Some, such as Salmon P. Chase, took the stance that
because the enslavement of human beings was contrary to natural rights, it
required positive legislation, but that Congress could not constitutionally
authorize slavery318 because it amounted to “the government depriving each
person enslaved of all liberty and all property, and all that life makes dear,
without imputation of crime or any legal process whatsoever” in violation of the
Due Process Clause.319 While this looks somewhat similar to the concept of
substantive due process by which fundamental rights are protected, it has an
element of legislative jurisdiction, too.320 If a person cannot be deprived of life,
315

See Barnett, supra note 313, at 224-25.
See id. at 225 (contrasting Tiffany’s position with that of most other abolitionists, who
instead “offered a conventional reading of Article IV as protecting the fundamental rights of
free citizens of one state when traveling into another”); see also JOEL TIFFANY, A TREATISE
ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 95-97 (Cleveland, J. Calyer c. 1849)
(“A state law, therefore, which would conflict with the rights of citizenship, is necessarily
unconstitutional and void. If making a man a slave, withholds from him citizenship, or is
inconsistent with his privileges, and immunities as a citizen, then it is unlawful to make a man
a slave, in the United States. But if the slave is a citizen (and that he is we have no doubt) then
he is entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizenship, which are guaranteed in the
Federal Constitution for personal security, personal liberty, and private property.”).
317
See BENJAMIN SHAW, ILLEGALITY OF SLAVERY 9 (n.p. c. 1846),
https://archive.org/details/illegalityofslav00shaw/page/12/mode/2up (arguing that Congress
could “compel each State to grant to the citizens of each State, all the privileges and
immunities of the citizens in the several States” and that “[t]his principle of the constitution
is [u]nheeded in the South”); see also Barnett, supra note 313, at 219 (describing Shaw’s
argument).
318
See Salmon P. Chase, The Address of the Southern and Western Liberty Convention,
Held at Cincinnati, June 11 and 12, 1845, to the People of the United States (June 1845), in
ANTI-SLAVERY ADDRESSES OF 1844 AND 1845, at 75, 101 (Charles Dexter Cleveland ed.,
London, Sampson Low, Son & Marston; Philadelphia, J.A. Bancroft & Co. 1867); see also
Barnett, supra note 313, at 215 (describing Chase’s argument).
319
See Chase, supra note 318, at 87 (describing government as “real enslaver”).
320
See Barnett, supra note 313, at 177 (arguing that one conception of due process
encompasses inquiry into “whether the substance of a statute was within the jurisdiction or
power of the legislature to enact”).
316
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liberty, or property without due process of law, then a process—such as
slavery—that lacked the fundamental power of law could not be due process of
law.321 Others argued that slavery, as a deprivation of liberty, required the full
due process of an indictment, trial, and judgment entered upon the verdict of a
jury.322 Even without going this far, abolitionists frequently looked to the Due
Process Clause as a tool for Congress to eliminate slavery throughout the entire
country, particularly in response to Prigg v. Pennsylvania.323 Thus, abolitionists
believed that due process included procedural rights, substantive rights, and
limits on legislative authority, while also contending that Congress already
possessed the authority to enforce those procedural and substantive rights.
The concept of equal protection, meanwhile, arose from the notion that the
duty of loyalty that citizens owed their country conferred upon the government
a corresponding duty to protect the life, liberty, and property of those citizens.324
Theodore Dwight Weld advanced this idea, emphasizing how this right was
“first and foremost, about rendering protection.”325 Spooner, too, focused on
protection, emphasizing an equal entitlement in all citizens to the protection of
the laws.326 James Birney considered this protection to be fundamental to the
government’s exercise of authority over individuals; those it refused to protect,
it could not punish.327 To the abolitionists, then, equal protection meant not just
that the government had a duty to apply the law equally, but that the law must
protect those subject to it.
These abolitionist notions of how the Constitution provided and ought to
provide protection to Black Americans informed the understanding of the
Reconstruction Congress when it drafted the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments.328 The need for enforcement clauses, beginning with
321

See id. at 184.
See id. at 185, 197.
323
See id. at 188, 214-15.
324
See id. at 255 (“[T]he idea that there exists a fundamental duty of government to extend
its protection to all from whom obedience is expected, and a corresponding right to that
protection, was repeatedly asserted. This duty of protection included protecting the equal
natural rights to life, liberty, and property of every person, an equality of rights that was
inconsistent with the recognition of any ‘caste, such as white, or [B]lack, male or
female[ ]. . . .’” (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 985 (1859) (statement of Rep.
John Bingham))).
325
Id. at 182; see Theodore Dwight Weld, The Power of Congress over the District of
Columbia, N.Y. EVENING POST, reprinted in THEODORE DWIGHT WELD, THE POWER OF
CONGRESS OVER THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 43-44 (New York, John F. Trow 1838).
326
See SPOONER, supra note 314, at 247; see also Barnett, supra note 313, at 209.
327
See James G. Birney, Can Congress, Under the Constitution Abolish Slavery in the
States?, ALBANY PATRIOT, May 1847, reprinted in JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW
app. c at 317-19 (Collier Books rev. ed. 1969) (1951); see also Barnett, supra note 313, at
220-21 (“[A]llegiance and protection are inseparable.” (quoting Birney, supra, at 317
(emphasis omitted))).
328
See Rebecca E. Zietlow, The Ideological Origins of the Thirteenth Amendment, 49
HOUS. L. REV. 393, 397-98, 410 (2012) (discussing abolition constitutionalism’s influence on
322
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section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, grew from the desire to realize the
ideology of the Revolution as expressed in the Declaration of Independence and
the Constitution’s Preamble.329 The language of the guarantees embedded in the
Reconstruction Amendments borrows heavily from the antebellum arguments
of abolitionists, many of whom served in Congress in the 1860s.330 The
abolitionist understanding of the Constitution would no longer be merely
theoretical; its precepts were explicitly inserted into the Constitution’s text, and
Congress would have the authority to enforce them.
2. Congressional Understandings of the Reconstruction Amendments
To open the final arguments in favor of the Thirteenth Amendment’s passage,
Representative James Ashley predicted that in addition to abolishing slavery, the
Amendment would guarantee a “system of free labor” as well as a “Government
[that would] protect the rights of all, and secure the liberty and equality of its
people.”331 Senator Henry Wilson, arguing for the Amendment’s passage,
declared that it would “obliterate the last lingering vestiges of the slave system;
its chattelizing, degrading, and bloody codes; its dark, malignant, barbarizing
spirit; all it was and is, everything connected with it or pertaining to it.”332 Full
equality of civil rights would see statutory implementation under the Thirteenth
Amendment in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.333 Thus, the Reconstruction
Congress initially construed its authority under the Thirteenth Amendment in
broad abolitionist terms. Modern interpretations of the Amendment as narrowly
abolishing slavery simply do not comport with the intent or context of its passage
and ratification.
Even moderates in Congress understood abolition to entail more than simply
the end of chattel slavery itself.334 Congress reacted fiercely to attempts to take
James Ashley, John Bingham, and Lyman Trumbull in Reconstruction Congress).
329
See Alexander Tsesis, A Civil Rights Approach: Achieving Revolutionary Abolitionism
Through the Thirteenth Amendment, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1773, 1804 (2006) (“The
Declaration could only provide an inspirational token for abolitionists and Reconstructionists
since it did not end slavery and the Constitution lacked any clear recognition of its principles.
The Thirteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause became the constitutional vehicle for
ending any vestiges of slavery and involuntary servitude.” (footnote omitted)).
330
See SENATE HIST. OFF., U.S. SENATE, THE SENATE’S CIVIL WAR, S. PUB. 112-7, at 17,
27, 29 (2011) (recounting work of Radical Republicans in Senate in early 1860s).
331
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 141 (1865) (statement of Rep. James Ashley); see
Zietlow, supra note 328, at 409.
332
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1324 (1864) (statement of Sen. Henry Wilson);
see id. at 1199, 1319, 1321 (statements of Sen. Henry Wilson).
333
See Zietlow, supra note 328, at 410 (recounting Representative Ashley’s failure to
achieve this end in Reconstruction bill, only to see it ultimately passed as part of Civil Rights
Act of 1866).
334
See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE BURDEN OF SOUTHERN HISTORY 76-77 (updated 3d ed.
2008) (“Debates over the question in the Senate . . . and in the House of
Representatives . . . contain evidence that the framers aimed at equality as well as
emancipation. Both objectives were assumed by the opponents as well as the sponsors of the
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advantage of the Amendment’s exception allowing forced labor as a criminal
punishment to force large numbers of Black Americans back into servitude.335
The notion that the Thirteenth Amendment also abolished what the Court would
later refer to as the “badges and incidents of slavery”336 was widely held—
though a comprehensive list of these markers of caste was not provided.337 For
Senator James Harlan, the list included—in addition to compelled labor—
restraints on marriage, family relations, speech, property, education, and status
within the legal system.338 Senator Trumbull used the term generally to refer to
laws denying people civil rights on the basis of race.339 While there is some
reason to doubt that Congress generally meant to provide itself with the ability
not just to remedy the commonly understood badges and incidents but to name
new ones, it clearly did exert some sort of discretion in choosing which to target
with the Civil Rights Act of 1866.340 The Thirteenth Amendment’s supporters
in Congress meant for its scope to be greater than the simple decree of
abolition.341
The Reconstruction Congress understood the enforcement clauses of all three
Reconstruction Amendments to grant Congress power subject to the relatively
lax test of McCulloch v. Maryland.342 The test would allow appropriate
legislation to achieve legitimate ends, so long as the means were plainly adapted
to the ends and otherwise consistent with the limits of the Constitution.343 The

amendment during the debate.”).
335
See Pope, supra note 228, at 1510 (“Republican members of Congress also held that
the Amendment prohibited the infliction of servitude as punishment for offenses so minor as
to make it improbable that servitude had actually been imposed to punish the particular ‘crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIII)).
336
See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). Though the Court used this term to
describe Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment powers, id., “[t]he concepts of a ‘badge of
slavery’ and ‘incident of slavery’ both predate the Thirteenth Amendment.” Jennifer Mason
McAward, Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 561, 570
(2012); see id. at 570-82.
337
See Pope, supra note 228, at 1472.
338
See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1439 (1864) (statement of Sen. James Harlan)
(listing “[s]ome of the incidents of slavery”).
339
See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (statement of Sen. Lyman
Trumbull).
340
See Jennifer Mason McAward, The Scope of Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment
Enforcement Power After City of Boerne v. Flores, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 77, 136 (2010).
341
See id. at 103-06.
342
See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) (“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional.”); Balkin, supra note 302, at 1810 (“The framers of the Reconstruction
Amendments assumed that the McCulloch test would apply to Congress’s new Reconstruction
Powers, and the use of the term ‘appropriate’ in the text of all three enforcement clauses
reflects this assumption.”).
343
See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 420-21; Balkin, supra note 302, at 1810.
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three enforcement clauses use parallel language and should be presumed to be
subject to parallel interpretations.344
The question of the limits of Congress’s enforcement powers under the
Thirteenth Amendment provided part of the impetus for the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment.345 While Congress understood the scope of its
Thirteenth Amendment powers broadly, the Fourteenth Amendment textualized
many of the rights Congress sought to guarantee.346 Chief among the legislation
whose constitutionality was assumed under the Thirteenth Amendment, but
explicit under the Fourteenth, were the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Second
Freedmen’s Bureau Bill.347 This latter bill reveals an even greater scope of
congressional power: while the Civil Rights Act concerned itself with
continuing access to societal benefits free from discrimination,348 the Second
Freedmen’s Bureau Bill was remedial, focusing on creating the material
conditions necessary to aid in the transition from slavery to citizenship.349 While
the provision of such goods and services could be justified as legislation
necessary and proper to redress the badges and incidents of slavery, it also recalls
the abolitionist concept of equal protection: that the law has a duty to ensure the

344

See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 822-23 (1999).
See Mark A. Graber, Subtraction by Addition?: The Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1501, 1528 (2012) (“The Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified in large part because of political and legal developments that were inhibiting
congressional implementation of the Thirteenth Amendment.”); Stephen M. Griffin,
Optimistic Originalism and the Reconstruction Amendments, 95 TUL. L. REV. 281, 327 (2021)
(“[S]ome members of Congress believed that the Thirteenth Amendment not only abolished
slavery but also guaranteed that the freed people were now the equals of white citizens under
the law in all respects. To be sure, this view was not universally shared, and the
constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was contested by some, one of the reasons
for the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (footnote omitted)).
346
See Robert J. Kaczorowski, Congress’s Power to Enforce Fourteenth Amendment
Rights: Lessons from Federal Remedies the Framers Enacted, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 187, 205
(2005) (“[T]he framers of the Fourteenth Amendment asserted that the Thirteenth
Amendment determined that the status of all Americans, not only that of the former slaves, is
that of freemen, which they equated with the status of United States citizenship. The framers
of that Amendment also asserted that the Amendment delegated to Congress the power to
protect the rights to which Americans are entitled as freemen, that is, the power to define and
enforce the rights of United States citizenship.” (footnote omitted)).
347
See Mark A. Graber, The Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill’s Constitution, 94 TEX. L.
REV. 1361, 1362 (2016) (“Both measures were central to the Reconstruction effort. Both
implemented the Thirteenth Amendment. Both were vigorously objected to by Democrats on
constitutional grounds. The power to pass both was confirmed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
348
Id.
349
See id. at 1363 (“Legislation was necessary to provide former slaves with various goods
and services, the precise provision of which depended on local circumstances and changing
conditions. Given the need for a high degree of nimbleness in the managing of that transition,
Congress, rather than the judiciary, had to play the lead role in removing all badges and
incidents of slavery in American constitutional life.”).
345
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protection of citizens.350 This concept was broad enough to support the closest
effort Congress has made in the direction of reparations for slavery.351
The Citizenship Clause had a similarly broad meaning to the Reconstruction
Congress and the public.352 “The idea that American citizenship necessarily
implied equal citizenship was commonplace in American political and legal
writing of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.”353 Yet Southern
states had refused to treat newly freed Black Americans as equal citizens—or
even citizens at all.354 In enacting the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress
resolved any potential counterarguments to the abolitionist concept of birthright
citizenship under the Constitution. Meanwhile, the Privileges or Immunities
Clause gave effect to what that citizenship would mean. The Clause used
contemporary language understood to reference a set of rights that included
those found in the Bill of Rights.355 It is textually the broadest of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s protective clauses, consistent with a clause meant to protect the
rights of citizens rather than those of all persons.356 While Congress was often
vague on the distinctions between the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
350
See id. at 1385-86 (“During the debate over [certain provisions of the bill,] Republicans
placed special emphasis on how government assistance would increase the capacity of former
slaves to escape enforced dependency and develop the capacities necessary to exercise the
rights of full and equal citizens.”); WEST, supra note 171, at 25-26 (discussing consensus
among historians and legal theorists that chief evil to be redressed by Equal Protection Clause
was private violence and violation).
351
See Tuneen E. Chisolm, Comment, Sweep Around Your Own Front Door: Examining
the Argument for Legislative African American Reparations, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 677, 686
(1999) (discussing broad scope of Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill but noting that “[s]ince the
Freedmen’s Bureau Acts, there has been no consistent measure of reparations for African
Americans”). But see Tobias Barrington Wolff, The Thirteenth Amendment and Slavery in the
Global Economy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 1030 (2002) (“Congress established an anemic
Freedmen’s Bureau and made no provisions for reparations. An exploitative sharecropping
system and arrangements of outright peonage arose as a matter of course.” (footnote omitted)).
352
See Michael D. Ramsey, Originalism and Birthright Citizenship, 109 GEO. L.J. 405,
408 (2020) (“[T]he [Fourteenth] Amendment’s text, given its public meaning at the time of
enactment, directed a relatively broad scope for constitutional birthright citizenship as to both
places and persons. At the time of enactment, places subject to permanent U.S. sovereign
authority were considered ‘in’ the United States without regard to whether they were
territorially contiguous or culturally integrated into the U.S. political system.”).
353
Ryan C. Williams, Originalism and the Other Desegregation Decision, 99 VA. L. REV.
493, 504 (2013).
354
See id. at 528 (describing Southern states’ efforts to undermine national concept of
citizenship through enactment of Black Codes after ratification of Thirteenth Amendment).
355
See Curtis, supra note 73, at 1089 (“[I]n the thirty-five years or so before the 1868
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, common usage often referred to Bill of Rights
liberties as ‘privileges,’ ‘immunities,’ or ‘rights’ of Americans or of citizens of the United
States.”).
356
See Bret Boyce, Originalism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
909, 968 (1998) (“Only the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which places a limitation on the
states’ power to ‘make . . . law,’ reads textually as a limitation on legislation.” (alteration in
original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1)).
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protective clauses, the text of the Amendment itself and the prevailing
abolitionist discourse indicate that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was
meant to be the strongest tool in the constitutional kit for protecting the rights
and liberties of newly freed Black Americans.
That is not to say that only the Privileges or Immunities Clause was meant to
be broad. At least some of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly
intended it to include both procedural and substantive due process rights.357
Teasing out precisely which trial rights the Reconstruction Congress intended to
include in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is complicated by
the inconsistent language used in debates around its implementation.358 The Due
Process Clause could certainly extend to the guarantees of the Bill of Rights,
even if the Reconstruction Congress’s understanding of those guarantees and
their relationship to the Amendment is debatable.359 The case is strongest,
however, for choosing to give well-understood rights their contemporaneous
judicial constructions, as these were the interpretations of those rights with
which the Reconstruction Congress was most familiar.360 While the exact details
of those rights are beyond the scope of this Article, the method of assessing due
process rights through examining judicial precedents available in 1868 should
reveal Congress’s understanding of the meaning of the Due Process Clause.
Congress also intended for the Equal Protection Clause to be broad in its
application. Its framers meant the Clause not just to guarantee that whatever
protection state and federal governments offered be applied equally but also to
impose a positive duty on them to protect all people within their borders.361

357
See Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE
L.J. 408, 477-80 (2010) (“[T]he orthodox view of due process rights [when the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 was being debated] in 1866, as evidenced by judicial decisions at both the state
and federal level, would almost certainly have included at least the vested rights version of
substantive due process and most likely the general law reading as well.”).
358
See id. at 481-82; see also, e.g., Jonathan Bressler, Reconstruction and the
Transformation of Jury Nullification, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1133, 1171-76 (2011) (offering
contrasting historical evidence to respond to modern scholars’ arguments that jury
nullification is constitutionally protected).
359
See Peter J. Smith, Originalism and Level of Generality, 51 GA. L. REV. 485, 527 (2017)
(advancing—against trend of traditional originalists—claim that Fourteenth Amendment
framers clearly intended it to protect both rights explicitly guaranteed in first eight
amendments and those natural law rights guaranteed by Article IV’s Privileges and
Immunities Clause).
360
See David Skeels, Judicial Review and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Forgotten
History, 51 U. TOL. L. REV. 281, 306 (2020) (arguing that because Reconstruction Congress’s
debates were public, “[t]he public knew that by using the expression ‘appropriate’ with all of
the new amendments, Congress thought it was giving itself discretionary power to enforce
these amendments, and it knew that expressions like ‘due process of law,’ which were already
in the Constitution, were meant to have their previous judicial interpretation”).
361
See Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507, 546 (1991) (“The debates in the Thirty-Ninth
Congress over the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 confirm that the
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“States could not turn a blind eye to criminal acts or private violations of rights
committed against people of color or other disfavored groups.”362 Congress
rejected proposed language that would have simply forbidden laws that were
racially discriminatory on their face.363 Instead, the focus remained on the
central abolitionist concept of protection: While that protection was most
obviously needed in that historical moment to remedy laws discriminating on
the basis of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, the rejection of
language directly addressing those characteristics indicates that Congress was
significantly more concerned with constitutionalizing the fundamental duty of
protection.364
The Fifteenth Amendment does not deal in abolitionist terms of art and broad
grants of rights. Rather, it narrowly focuses on ensuring voting rights as a means
of promoting Black freedom and political participation.365 The meaning of the
Fifteenth Amendment is clarified in the debates around provisions that were
specifically excluded from its final form. Breaking from the broad, universal
sweep of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, the framers of the
Fifteenth Amendment rejected proposals for universal suffrage.366 The
Reconstruction Congress declined to take advantage of the mood for
constitutional change to enact women’s suffrage despite the prominent role of
women in the abolitionist movement.367 Conversely, the exclusion of an explicit
right to hold office was meant to affirm that right.368 The right to vote implied a
constitutional right to protection was understood to include protection against private
violence.” (footnote omitted)).
362
David H. Gans, “We Do Not Want to Be Hunted”: The Right to Be Secure and Our
Constitutional Story of Race and Policing, 11 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 239, 292 (2021).
363
See Kennedy, supra note 137, at 3-4 (describing abolitionist Wendell Phillips’s failed
proposal for Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit states from enacting racially discriminatory
statutes).
364
Cf. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 95 n.1 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“In my view the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement of ‘equal protection of the laws,’
combined with the Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of the institution of [B]lack slavery,
leaves no room for doubt that laws treating people differently because of their race are
invalid.”).
365
See U.S. CONST. amend. XV; see also Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political
Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 203, 227 (1995) (describing Fifteenth
Amendment as protecting political rights to complement Fourteenth Amendment’s protection
of civil rights).
366
See Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality,
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 969-70 n.59 (2002) (discussing rejected
proposals of Senators Fowler and Pomeroy to include universal franchise in text of Fifteenth
Amendment).
367
See id. at 968-70. See generally DAVIS, supra note 175, at 30-45 (providing overview
of women’s early involvement in anti-slavery movement).
368
See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1426 (1869) (statement of Rep. Benjamin
Butler) (“I had supposed if there was anything which was inherent as a principle in the
American system and theory of government, of equality of all men before the law, and the
right of all men to a share in the Government, it was this: that the right to elect to office carries
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right to be voted for—a fact that even opponents of the Fifteenth Amendment
acknowledged.369 By contrast to the implication that the Fifteenth Amendment
guaranteed a right to be elected, neither its supporters nor its opponents argued
that it would create universal suffrage. Still, the acknowledgment of Black
citizens’ right to hold office reveals that the Fifteenth Amendment was
understood to expand Black political participation in meaningful ways rather
than as a mere formality.
3.

Contemporaneous Black Understandings of the Reconstruction
Amendments

Perhaps the most overlooked understanding of the Constitution’s abolitionist
meaning is that of Black Americans themselves.370 Frederick Douglass, while
initially a Garrisonian skeptical of the Constitution’s value to the cause of
abolition, came to argue for a novel, abolitionist interpretation by 1851.371
Douglass presented the choice as one between slavery and democracy—
America could not have both.372 Douglass’s understanding of the tension
between the two institutions presaged the agenda of Black Reconstruction: the
replacement of the fallen slave power with a democratic society.
The public meaning of the Reconstruction Amendments within contemporary
Black communities must be understood in the context of how they understood

with it the inalienable and indissoluble and indefeasible right to be elected to office.
Therefore, I am myself almost persuaded not to vote for the [Fifteenth A]mendment. As [the
Amendment] comes to us from the Senate it provides that no man, on account of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude, shall be deprived of the right to hold office. That seems to
give color to the conclusion that there are other classes which may be deprived of the right to
hold office . . . .”). But see id. at 1641 (statement of Sen. Joseph S. Fowler) (“I simply wish
to say before the vote is taken that my understanding of the proposition as it now stands is
that it decides by an amendment to the Constitution that the Constitution does not guaranty to
all citizens of the United States the right to hold office.”).
369
See id. at 1630 (statement of Sen. Garrett Davis) (“[T]he power to vote in my judgment
implies the power to hold office; that is to say, it does not necessarily do so under the provision
of this amendment, but a class of people who are entitled to vote and to whom by principles
of right and good policy the right to vote ought to be conceded ought to have at the same time
the concession of the right to hold office. If it was my principle that the negro was a proper
depositary of the right of suffrage I would unhesitatingly vote in favor of extending the
proposition and giving him the right to hold office, which I deem to be a right of less force
and efficiency than the right to vote. But . . . I deny that the negro has the proper capacity to
exercise this right . . . .”); see also Amar, supra note 365, at 229, 234 (discussing
acknowledgments during ratification debates in Georgia and California that Fifteenth
Amendment would grant rights to vote and hold office).
370
See Roberts, supra note 299, at 57 (“Even more neglected in constitutional history than
these white abolitionists are [B]lack Americans who theorized and defended claims to equal
citizenship.”).
371
See id. at 58-59 (chronicling evolution of Douglass’s abolition constitutionalism as
radical departure from accepted interpretations).
372
See id. at 60-61.
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Reconstruction itself. Jeffery M. Brown described the Black vision of
Reconstruction as both an economic and societal project:
Reconstruction both envisioned a more pluralistic economic order than had
ever existed in the post-war South and saw [B]lacks as autonomous free
agents in this larger milieu.
Such developments suggested a profound reordering of the prevailing
economic order, not just in the South, but nationally as well. In this
historical context, then, [B]lack rehabilitation could be thought of as
echoing not only notions of redistributive justice, but also larger southern,
and even national, economic and social developmental considerations. By
the same token, the concept of “[B]lack rehabilitation” or reparations at this
time embraced the idea of an American polity defined by political and
economic pluralism for [B]lacks and poor whites (i.e., non-land owning
whites). Indeed, Black Reconstruction saw [B]lack rehabilitation as a
necessary component of continued southern and also national economic
and political progress.373
The Reconstruction Amendments were crucial to this vision, providing the
constitutional foundation upon which such a radically new order could be built.
“The goal was not just to reunite the states, but to recreate the polity so that
citizenship would, first, be universal, and second, encompass the liberties that
slavery had denied.”374 Both the membership and the concept of citizenship were
to be expanded.
This expansion was accomplished in part through the direct action of Black
people. The Union’s victory in the Civil War was accelerated by the refusal of
Black people to remain enslaved and their abandonment of the plantations for
work in service of the Union army.375 Dorothy Roberts explores the ways Black
people set about creating new lives for themselves in the war’s aftermath:
After 1867, four million formerly enslaved people grabbed the opportunity
Emancipation afforded them to create their own economic, social, and
political lives independent of white domination. They gathered their family
members, established farms and businesses, and ran for public office.
Black Americans elected to southern legislatures helped to install
egalitarian state constitutions, enact civil rights legislation, and establish
373
Jeffery M. Brown, Deconstructing Babel: Toward a Theory of Structural Reparations,
56 RUTGERS L. REV. 463, 479 (2004) (footnotes omitted).
374
Peggy Cooper Davis, Neglected Stories and Civic Space, 7 WASH. & LEE RACE &
ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 45, 48 (2001).
375
See Tim Schermerhorn, Review: “Lincoln” Somehow Missed the General Strike, LAB.
NOTES
(Mar.
14,
2013),
https://www.labornotes.org/blogs/2013/03/review%E2%80%9Clincoln%E2%80%9D-somehow-missed-general-strike
[https://perma.cc/QZY4-WYUU] (“The general strike accelerated the South’s defeat in the
Civil War and compelled Northern forces—Democrat and Republican—to even have the
discussion about ending slavery. The 13th Amendment represented the first legal battle of a
new democratic movement that would push for much more.”).
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public education. . . . Thus, by resisting white domination and acting like
citizens, [B]lack people have secured greater freedom apart from official
recognition of their rights, thereby changing the Constitution’s meaning to
encompass their freedom.376
To Black Americans, the Reconstruction Amendments guaranteed their right
to establish and protect this new society.377 A proper understanding of the
Reconstruction Amendments’ original public meaning must be consistent with
that project.
*****

To summarize: these various sources of original public meaning combine to
form a coherent vision of the new constitutional order of the Reconstruction
Amendments. The Thirteenth Amendment not only ended chattel slavery but
forbade its essential badges and incidents. The Citizenship Clause eliminated the
ability of state governments to mount challenges to the citizenship of Black
Americans by creating a broad system of birthright citizenship. The Privileges
or Immunities Clause applied the Bill of Rights and the traditional understanding
of citizenship against the states. The Due Process Clause ensured that—both
procedurally and substantively—the actions of legislatures, executive officials,
and judges would not violate those rights through either facially or subtly
discriminatory means. The Equal Protection Clause extended a duty to
governments to extend the force of their protection to all their citizens. The
Fifteenth Amendment ensured the ability of Black Americans to participate in
representative government to aid in the protection of their own freedom. And all
these goals were entrusted to congressional application through their
enforcement clauses, armed with language clarifying the permissive standard of
review to be applied under them. The remainder of this Article is devoted to an
exploration of the consequences of this historical understanding, which reach so
far as to provide a fresh and complete justification for the corpus of progressive
constitutional case law through abolition constitutionalism.378
376

Roberts, supra note 299, at 64 (footnotes omitted).
See id.
378
See, e.g., William P. Marshall, Progressive Constitutionalism, Originalism, and the
Significance of Landmark Decisions in Evaluating Constitutional Theory, 72 OHIO ST. L.J.
1251, 1257-70 (2011) (exploring objections to progressive constitutional decision-making in
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); and Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)). The remainder of the text will more fully analyze the power of
abolition constitutionalism, but briefly, the cases Marshall highlights as examples of
progressive constitutionalism can be justified under abolition constitutionalism as follows:
Barnette would rest on the Equal Protection Clause’s requirement that the law protect the
rights of individuals against compelled speech contrary to their conscience. Cf. id. at 1261
(justifying Barnette as protecting religious minorities and recognizing evolving free speech
principles based on societal developments). Brown would rest on the Thirteenth
Amendment’s protection against the badges and incidents of slavery. Cf. id. at 1263-64
377
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Redressing the Badges and Incidents of Slavery

As there was disagreement within the Reconstruction Congress as to just what
constituted badges and incidents of slavery, I will take a somewhat moderate
route in this Section, addressing only practices that were essential to the
preservation of slavery or would be necessary to its resumption. My exploration
will reach the modern consequences of these practices and the potential
application of the Thirteenth Amendment to them. Several of these were
explicitly addressed in the congressional debates over the Thirteenth
Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
1.

Police Abolition

I have previously addressed the potential of the Thirteenth Amendment for
eliminating racist police practices through congressional action.379 While
Congress—by analyzing the history of policing in this country and including its
findings in support of an appropriate bill—would be well within its Thirteenth
Amendment powers in that field, the courts would be too. If we look to the test
of a practice’s historical use to perpetuate slavery and its potential future use to
resume the system of chattel slavery, policing certainly fits the mold.
Policing originated in this country as a means of enforcing slavery.380 Even
when it was adopted in places that had abolished slavery, the practice still lent
itself to maintaining a racial caste system, including allowing its co-option by
the slave power to forcibly return persons who managed to escape to their
enslavers.381 The same police agencies that had served as slave patrols were
tasked with enforcing Black Codes and Jim Crow following abolition.382 Police
today routinely target Black and Brown neighborhoods as “high-crime areas”—
a self-fulfilling prophecy.383 Policing is a driving force of the disproportionate
impact of mass incarceration—a system rife with compelled labor but narrowly
exempted from the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition384—on Black
(justifying Brown as protecting racial minorities and exemplifying evolving constitutional
meanings). Gideon would also rest on the Equal Protection Clause. Cf. id. at 1265-66
(justifying Gideon as protecting a discrete and insular minority and demonstrating evolving
notions of fairness). Reynolds would rest on the Fifteenth Amendment and the Equal
Protection Clause. Cf. id. at 1268-69 (justifying Reynolds as addressing majoritarian
entrenchment and need for expanded understanding of voting equality).
379
See generally Hasbrouck, supra note 172 (calling for Congress to abolish policing
through its Thirteenth Amendment power to eliminate badges and incidents of slavery).
380
See id. at 1114-18.
381
See id. at 1116-17.
382
See Aya Gruber, Commentary, Policing and “Bluelining,” 58 HOUS. L. REV. 867, 876
(2021) (“[V]agrancy laws [contained in Black Codes] were facially neutral—indeed, some
lawmakers characterized them as intended to protect the emancipated—but when enforced by
the newly formed Southern police, they were indistinguishable from the prewar slave patrol
regime.”).
383
See Carbado, supra note 110, at 1543-44.
384
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (abolishing slavery “except as a punishment for crime”).
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people.385 Policing was an essential tool during chattel slavery and has been a
key factor in its approximate returns through convict leasing and mass
incarceration.386 It is nearly a textbook example of the badges and incidents of
slavery.
Therefore, in light of a proper understanding of what the Thirteenth
Amendment itself proscribes,387 the courts would be within their inherent
powers to eliminate or curtail any policing practice that they found fits these
patterns. While some of these practices could survive under current standards of
review,388 they would not pass muster under a standard calculated to eliminate
the badges and incidents of slavery. Such a color-conscious standard would
account for the understanding that the Reconstruction Congress meant to reach
further than simply the text of laws to achieve a radical adoption of racial
equality in American society.389 Any system or practice prone to the sort of
discretion involved in policing would need to be closely scrutinized to ensure
that its application did not in fact become infested with racism the way policing
has.390
Policing’s susceptibility to systemic racism stems in part from its emphasis
on enforcing order and protecting property rather than promoting public safety.
The recent prominence of the “Karen” meme highlights this effectively.391
White people feel comfortable invoking the power of the police—and the state
violence they bring with them—at the slightest sign that a person of color is not
behaving in a sufficiently subservient manner.392 When the police arrive, any

385
See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 67 (providing comprehensive account of how
law enforcement and drug policy result in mass incarceration of Black men).
386
See Hasbrouck, supra note 172, at 1114-21 (chronicling progression of police practices
under slavery, Jim Crow, and mass incarceration regimes).
387
See supra text accompanying notes 331-41 (describing Reconstruction Congress’s
broad view of practices directly prohibited by Thirteenth Amendment).
388
See supra Section II.B (analyzing anti-Black consequences of Court’s emphasis on
neutrality).
389
See supra text accompanying notes 331-41 (recounting original interpretations of
Thirteenth Amendment’s meaning).
390
Cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987) (“McCleskey challenges decisions
at the heart of the State’s criminal justice system. . . . Implementation of these laws
necessarily requires discretionary judgments. Because discretion is essential to the criminal
justice process, we would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the
discretion has been abused. The unique nature of the decisions at issue in this case also
counsels against adopting such an inference from the disparities indicated by the Baldus study.
Accordingly, we hold that the Baldus study is clearly insufficient to support an inference that
any of the decisionmakers in McCleskey’s case acted with discriminatory purpose.”).
391
See Cady Lang, How the ‘Karen Meme’ Confronts the Violent History of White
Womanhood, TIME (July 6, 2020, 4:11 PM), https://time.com/5857023/karen-meme-historymeaning/.
392
See Chan Tov McNamarah, White Caller Crime: Racialized Police Communication
and Existing While Black, 24 MICH. J. RACE & L. 335, 337-41 (2019) (“The summer of 2018
saw a legion of [w]hite persons calling the police on Black persons engaged in mundane
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perceived failure by the person of color to comport with the police’s desired
level of subservience can turn the encounter fatal.393 This modern trend simply
removes steps from the old pattern where a Black man would be accused of
raping a white woman as justification for lynching him394—often with the
participation or condonation of police.395 When police exist to enforce social
order, and that order itself is racist, policing will inherently remain a tool of the
racial caste system.
A judicial standard aimed at eliminating the badges and incidents of slavery
would be capable of piecing together these trends. Given the difficulty of
locating racist trends in the facts of single encounters or the text of any statute
or regulation, such a standard would necessarily be capable of considering
statistical evidence. Current jurisprudence, of course, obscures systemic patterns
through evidentiary bars to the admission of statistical evidence.396 Considering
the treasure trove of criminal justice data that prosecutors have been forced to
release under North Carolina’s Racial Justice Act,397 it stands to reason that a
standard open to challenging police practices using statistical evidence could
yield similar tools for pursuing substantive justice. With adequate data on the
activities. Black people had the authorities summoned for sitting in Starbucks; playing golf;
eating at Waffle House; sleeping in university common rooms; eating in university class
rooms; making purchases; returning purchases; smoking cigarettes; moving into apartments;
leaving apartments; going for walks; doing their jobs; eating in restaurants; barbecuing; going
to the gym; attending funerals; using too many or the wrong coupons; swimming in pools;
playing basketball; canvassing for political reelection; doing community service; mowing the
lawn; sheltering from the rain; getting into their cars; sitting in their cars; not listening to a
neighbor’s problems; walking their dogs; wearing costumes; wearing a bandana; and selling
bottled water on a hot summer’s day.” (footnotes omitted)).
393
See German Lopez, Black Parents Describe “The Talk” They Give to Their Children
About Police, VOX (Aug. 8, 2016, 11:40 AM), https://www.vox.com/2016
/8/8/12401792/police-black-parents-the-talk (“For [B]lack parents, that means a typical
police stop turning into a violent encounter is a very real, terrifying possibility.”); see also
McNamarah, supra note 392, at 343-44 (describing violent arrest of Black father simply
picking up daughter from friend’s house in white neighborhood).
394
See Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Creating a Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Lynching,
21 LAW & INEQ. 263, 276 (2003) (“While historical reports suggest that most lynchings were
motivated by white mob anger against [B]lack men accused (often falsely) of raping or
assaulting a white woman, lynchings were in fact a tool used to regulate and restrict all aspects
of [B]lack advancement, independence, and citizenship. Most lynchings were not related to
the familiar interracial sex taboo.” (footnote omitted)).
395
See id. at 300 (“[I]n far too many instances, officers offered token resistance, or did not
interfere with lynchers. . . . Other police officers actively assisted lynchers or were part of the
mob. Local law enforcement routinely failed to participate in efforts to identify and try
lynchers for their crimes.” (footnotes omitted)).
396
See supra text accompanying notes 232-49 (describing Court’s resistance to statistical
evidence of racial discrimination).
397
See Laura Leslie, Judge Orders State to Provide Decades of Data on Death Penalty
Trials in NC to Attorneys Seeking to Overturn Sentences, WRAL.COM (May 20, 2021, 7:45
PM),
https://www.wral.com/judge-orders-state-to-provide-decades-of-data-on-deathpenalty-trials-in-nc-to-attorneys-seeking-to-overturn-sentences/19688573/.
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racist application of policing and a Thirteenth Amendment standard with
sufficient scope to reach the badges and incidents of slavery, courts could realize
a society where existing in public while Black would be safe.
2.

Carceral Abolition

Just as policing’s role in mass incarceration subjects it to scrutiny as a badge
or incident of slavery, so too does our carceral system itself merit scrutiny. Mass
incarceration is a direct replacement for the system of vagrancy laws and
excessive punishments implemented in the wake of Reconstruction.398 The
Thirteenth Amendment can certainly reach slavery itself, whichever name it
goes by. The Punishment Clause, however, would seem to exempt prison
sentences from Thirteenth Amendment scrutiny.399 While the Punishment
Clause undoubtedly allows for the imposition of compelled labor as punishment
for a crime, it still does not permit the badges and incidents of slavery.400
Requiring persons convicted of crimes to labor for the state or its licensees may
not be prohibited, but the brutality inherent in our prison system is.
Furthermore, the collateral consequences of a conviction would also fall
outside the scope of the Punishment Clause’s exception. As William M. Carter
argues, the “racialized policies giving rise to mass incarceration result in a
permanent caste distinction of such magnitude and impermeability as to
arguably amount to a badge or incident of slavery.”401 While some collateral
consequences likely fall beyond scrutiny, the network of potential consequences
is now so vast as to essentially reinstitute the old punishment of civil death.402
These persistent restrictions strip the convicted person of fundamental privileges
and immunities of citizenship, including restrictions on speech, family relations,

398

See Pope, supra note 228, at 1528-29 (“No sooner had the Supreme Court at long last
struck down traditional vagrancy laws, than they were replaced with a host of new statutory
crimes, harsh sentences, and enforcement policies targeted at behaviors, conditions, and
locations associated with poverty and racial disadvantage.” (footnote omitted)).
399
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (prohibiting slavery “except as a punishment for
crime”).
400
See Pope, supra note 228, at 1551-52, 1552 n.476 (noting that prison system
dehumanizes incarcerated persons and subjects them to officially tolerated rape and assault).
401
William M. Carter, Jr., Class as Caste: The Thirteenth Amendment’s Applicability to
Class-Based Subordination, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 813, 825 (2016).
402
See Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass
Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1790 (2012) (“[Civil death] no longer exists under that
name, but effectively a new civil death is meted out to persons convicted of crimes in the form
of a substantial and permanent change in legal status, operationalized by a network of
collateral consequences. A person convicted of a crime, whether misdemeanor or felony, may
be subject to disenfranchisement (or deportation if a noncitizen), criminal registration and
community notification requirements, and the ineligibility to live, work, or be present in a
particular location. Some are not allowed to live outside of civil confinement at all. In
addition, the person may be subject to occupational debarment or ineligibility to establish or
maintain family relations.” (footnotes omitted)).
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and legal status—all of which are textbook examples of badges and incidents of
slavery.403
The conditions and collateral effects of carceral punishment certainly merit
Thirteenth Amendment scrutiny, but what of incarceration itself? While
compelled labor as punishment for a crime was permissible under the
Punishment Clause, the resumption of chattel slavery by other means was not.
The Reconstruction Congress considered even race-neutral convict leasing to
fall within the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition when it was used to
effectively re-enslave Black Americans.404 Our current system of mass
incarceration does just that. One in three Black men in America will spend time
in prison, with one in twelve Black men in their thirties incarcerated at any given
time; only one in seventeen white men will experience incarceration in their
lives.405 Black and Latinx Americans account for fifty-six percent of the
incarcerated population, despite representing only thirty-two percent of the U.S.
population.406 The increase in prison populations spurred under mass
incarceration is comparable to that under the Black Codes.407 Mass incarceration
quacks like the proverbial duck.
It is somewhat unclear whether the Reconstruction Congress intended to
empower the courts to deal directly with a system of slavery by another name.
Congress certainly considered itself to have this authority, as it applied its power
first against facially discriminatory vagrancy laws and later worked toward
doing so with the facially neutral ones.408 The courts during Reconstruction
could not be relied upon to enforce a self-enforcing prohibition in the
Constitution along abolitionist lines—it was the Chase Court that decided the

403
See supra text accompanying notes 331-41 (describing original, broad views of what
Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on slavery encompassed); see also Carter, supra note 401, at
825-27 (concluding that mass incarceration “create[s] a large, racialized, near-permanent
underclass unable to overcome its alienation from civil society,” which is tantamount to badge
or incident of slavery).
404
See Pope, supra note 228, at 1485-89. Legislation targeting race-neutral convict leasing
stalled in the Senate after passing the House of Representatives. Id. at 1488-89 (describing
contents of bill criminalizing convict leasing and its passage in House).
405
Criminal Justice Facts, SENT’G PROJECT, https://www.sentencingproject.org/criminaljustice-facts/ [https://perma.cc/6J95-XKS6] (last visited Jan. 17, 2022) (estimating lifetime
incarceration rates for Americans born in 2001).
406
Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, NAACP, https://naacp.org/resources/criminal-justicefact-sheet [https://perma.cc/TU6J-TEWS] (last visited Jan. 17, 2022).
407
Compare Criminal Justice Facts, supra note 405 (“There are 2 million people in the
nation’s prisons and jails—a 500% increase over the last 40 years.”), with Mississippi History
Timeline:
1876,
MISS.
DEP’T
OF
ARCHIVES
&
HIST.,
https://www.mdah.ms.gov/timeline/zone/1876/ [https://perma.cc/V34B-A4A9] (last visited
Jan. 3, 2022) (“[In 1876, t]he law defining the theft of any property over $10 as grand larceny
quadrupled the prison population.”).
408
See Pope, supra note 228, at 1485-89.
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Slaughter-House Cases.409 Given the belt-and-suspenders structure of the
Reconstruction Amendments, it would likely be fair to say that Congress did not
reserve exclusive authority to enforce the prohibition against slavery and find
that modern practices such as mass incarceration violate its spirit. As with
policing, either Congress or the courts has the power to defend abolition against
such an obvious attempt to reinstitute slavery.
The dehumanization at the core of slavery was also so great as to excuse the
private killing of an enslaved person for some transgressions.410 Enslaved
persons were subject to execution for offenses specific to their condition.411 This
level of control was essential to the maintenance of the institution of slavery.
Modern capital punishment is little changed—Black defendants make up a
disproportionate share of executions,412 with the race of the victim providing an
even stronger predictor of who will be executed.413 In opposing passage of the
Racial Justice Act in North Carolina, legislators essentially admitted that capital
punishment would be all but eliminated if racial disparities could be used to
vacate a death sentence.414 There are significant reasons to doubt that courts—
even with abolitionist judges—would find these statistical arguments
compelling enough to determine that capital punishment is one of the badges
and incidents of slavery. The racist application of capital punishment arises out
of the individual interactions of prosecutors, defendants, judges, and juries, with
blame hard to lay at any one party’s feet. However, Congress would be well
within its powers under the Thirteenth Amendment to take notice of the use of
409
See Williams, supra note 353, at 560-65, 564 n.349 (recounting Justices’ positions in
Slaughter-House Cases).
410
See Alexander A. Reinert, Reconceptualizing the Eighth Amendment: Slaves,
Prisoners, and “Cruel and Unusual” Punishment, 94 N.C. L. REV. 817, 835-40 (2016)
(describing state statutes that penalized “cruelly” killing enslaved persons but expressly
permitted killing in certain circumstances, as “punishment ‘for running away or other
offence[s]’”).
411
See, e.g., id. at 835-38; Judith Kelleher Schafer, “Under the Present Mode of Trial,
Improper Verdicts Are Very Often Given”: Criminal Procedure in the Trials of Slaves in
Antebellum Louisiana, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 635, 646-47 (1996) (describing Louisiana capital
offense, specific to enslaved persons, of striking white person with authority over them).
412
See Corinna Barrett Lain, Deciding Death, 57 DUKE L.J. 1, 4-5 (2007) (“[T]hose who
end up on death row tend to be poor, [B]lack, and the recipients of woefully inadequate legal
representation.” (footnotes omitted)); see also NGOZI NDULUE, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
ENDURING INJUSTICE: THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE U.S. DEATH
PENALTY 28 (Robert Dunham ed., 2020) (“The small number of counties that account for the
majority of recent death sentences have shown increasing racial concentration of death
sentencing.”).
413
See NDULUE, supra note 412, at 30-32 (summarizing modern empirical evidence of
salience of victim’s race in capital sentencing); Scott Phillips & Justin Marceau, Whom the
State Kills, 55 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 585, 587 (2020) (demonstrating that defendants
convicted of killing white persons are seventeen times more likely to actually be executed
than defendants convicted of killing Black persons).
414
See Seth Kotch & Robert P. Mosteller, The Racial Justice Act and the Long Struggle
with Race and the Death Penalty in North Carolina, 88 N.C. L. REV. 2031, 2124 n.403 (2010).
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capital punishment as a tool of racial oppression and outlaw it as a badge or
incident of slavery. The Amendment contains the authority for Congress and the
courts to transform criminal justice as we know it.
3.

Reproductive Rights

The Thirteenth Amendment also can be understood as a guarantee of
reproductive autonomy. Recall that when explicit lists of the badges and
incidents of slavery were given in Congress, Senator Harlan included a lack of
control over a person’s marriage and family.415 This lack of control included
forced reproduction, which allowed enslavers to ensure the birth of a new
generation of people to subject to slavery.416 Even without its inclusion in
specific lists, the necessity of controlling the reproduction of enslaved people
should be considered one of the badges and incidents of slavery because of its
necessity to the perpetuation of chattel slavery.
If abolition eliminated not just slavery itself but also the structures that had
perpetuated it and would be necessary to enable its return, it must include the
recognition that free people inherently need control over their own reproductive
decisions. A ban on reasonable methods of maintaining control over one’s own
reproductive decisions removes autonomy, pushing toward the risk of slavery’s
return—whether in its old form or a new one.417
Critics have suggested that there is no support for Roe v. Wade418 and Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey419 in the Constitution’s
text.420 But when the Thirteenth Amendment’s scope is considered to include
the badges and incidents of slavery, a person’s choice not to have a child must
be protected. Bodily autonomy, including reproductive autonomy, is essential in
the life of a free person, and its denial is essential to the institution of slavery.
The Reconstruction Amendments, read in their original abolitionist context,

415
See supra note 338 and accompanying text (describing Senator Harlan’s position that
control over marriage and family constituted incident of slavery).
416
See William Spivey, The Truth About American Slave Breeding Farms, MEDIUM (June
9, 2019), https://medium.com/the-aambc-journal/the-truth-about-american-slave-breedingfarms-ee631e863e2c (“While owners of the breeding farms and plantations in general
fornicated at will with their property, they also utilized selective breeding.”).
417
See also Laurie Penny, The Criminalization of Women’s Bodies Is All About
Conservative
Male
Power,
NEW
REPUBLIC
(May
17,
2019),
https://newrepublic.com/article/153942/criminalization-womens-bodies-conservative-malepower (“These laws are not about whether a fetus is a person. They are about enshrining
maximalist control over the sexual autonomy of women as a foundational principle of
conservative rule. They are about owning women. They are about women as things.”).
418
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
419
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
420
See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time,
78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995 (2003) (attacking Casey and Roe as incompetent, unfounded
interpretations of the Constitution begetting even more far-reaching errors).
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necessarily apply to protect a person’s right to bodily autonomy, including
abortion.
In a limited sense, the critics are correct that the Due Process Clause is not the
source of the right to abortion, for that Clause, properly understood, is only one
part of the legal structure supporting the right to abortion.421 The right originates
in the Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of slavery’s badges and incidents. A
person’s right to make that choice regarding their own body is a matter of natural
rights, and thus is further protected as one of the privileges or immunities of
citizenship.422 The government’s obligation to defend that right against state
regulation resides in the Equal Protection Clause’s requirement that the law
protect people.423 Under the abolitionist scheme, only the privacy of that
decision between a person and their doctor remains for substantive due process.
There is considerable overlap between the protections granted by the various
clauses, of course. That is by design, as the Reconstruction Congress had already
seen Southern states attempt to legislate in the perceived gaps of the Thirteenth
Amendment when they drafted the Fourteenth.424
A similar attempt is underway now, seeking to legislate against reproductive
freedom in the perceived gaps of current jurisprudence.425 In an especially
brazen challenge to federal law, Texas has enacted an abortion ban at six weeks,
using private citizen suits as its enforcement mechanism in an effort to avoid
review of the law as state action.426 Meanwhile, Mississippi has adopted a
421

See id. at 1007.
See D. Scott Broyles, Doubting Thomas: Justice Clarence Thomas’s Effort to Resurrect
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 46 IND. L. REV. 341, 384 (2013) (noting that although
Privileges or Immunities Clause is silent on “fundamental rights issues [including] abortion,”
Reconstruction Congress “did not shy away from arguing that rights were deserving of being
considered fundamental to the extent that they coincided with natural rights”).
423
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; supra text accompanying notes 324-27 (highlighting
abolitionist understanding of government’s affirmative duty of protection).
424
See Roberts, supra note 299, at 62 (“Slavery’s defeat was met immediately by a terrorist
effort to return newly freed [B]lacks to servitude and reinstate white rule.”).
425
See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Roe v. Wade’s 40th Anniversary: A Moment of Truth for the
Anti-Abortion-Rights Movement?, 24 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 245, 246 (2013) (“The
mainstream anti-abortion-rights movement, encouraged by Casey, has pursued legislation
calculated to appeal to a public that generally favors abortion rights, albeit with some
restrictions. In advocating for these incremental measures, the anti-abortion-rights movement
has not always been forthright about its ultimate goal to ban all abortions.”); Lisa R. Pruitt &
Marta R. Vanegas, Urbanormativity, Spatial Privilege, and Judicial Blind Spots in Abortion
Law, 30 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 76, 81-85 (2015) (discussing incremental legislative
attacks on reproductive rights, including targeting abortion providers with additional
regulations, imposing additional requirements on medication-induced abortions, and applying
requirements of ambulatory surgical centers to abortion clinics).
426
See Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 141 S. Ct. 2494, 2496 (2021) (Alito, J., in
chambers) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The statutory scheme before the Court is not only
unusual; it is unprecedented. The legislature has imposed a prohibition on abortions after
roughly six weeks, and then essentially delegated enforcement of that prohibition to the
populace at large. The desired consequence appears to be to insulate the State from
422
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strategy of directly asking the Supreme Court to overrule Roe v. Wade.427 This
litigation strategy is possible in part because of the narrow reasoning
underpinning Roe, whereas a robust, abolitionist interpretation of the
Constitution would be more protective of reproductive rights.
4.

Property Reparations

The impairment of property rights was another of the chief badges and
incidents of slavery recognized by the Reconstruction Congress.428 Following
emancipation, many Black Americans lacked property and faced tremendous
disadvantages in adapting to their new status as citizens.429 Several remedies
were proposed, and some saw limited implementation, often through the
Freedmen’s Bureau.430 Yet Black Americans struggled to obtain real property
and faced numerous discriminatory and bureaucratic regimes that stymied their
attempts to build generational wealth.431
The Thirteenth Amendment was meant to eradicate slavery and prevent its
return. Yet the lack of generational wealth has left Black Americans in a
constantly precarious position, susceptible to repeated attempts to reintroduce
slavery by any other name—for example, peonage,432 convict leasing,433

responsibility for implementing and enforcing the regulatory regime.”); Press Release, Am.
Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Statement on Texas SB8 (Sept. 1, 2021),
https://www.acog.org/news/news-releases/2021/09/statement-on-texas-sb8
[https://perma.cc/3AC8-LLXH] (“By allowing third-party lawsuits against clinicians, by
virtually banning all abortions, and by curtailing the sharing of information and support
related to access to vital women’s health care, Texas’s new law creates a coercive
environment for patients and clinicians . . . .”).
427
See Adam Liptak, Justices Indicate They Will Uphold Curb on Abortion, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 2, 2021, Late Edition, at A1 (“In the state’s petition . . . officials told the justices that
‘the questions presented in this petition do not require the court to overturn [Roe] or
[Casey]’ . . . . Once the court agreed to hear the case, the state shifted its emphasis and began
a sustained assault on those precedents.” (quoting Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5, Dobbs
v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., No. 19-1392 (U.S. June 15, 2020))).
428
See supra note 338 and accompanying text (describing Senator Harlan’s position that
property restraints constituted incidents of slavery).
429
See Pope, supra note 228, at 1511-13.
430
See W.E. Burghardt Du Bois, The Freedmen’s Bureau, ATLANTIC, Mar. 1901,
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1901/03/the-freedmens-bureau/308772/
(recounting history, accomplishments, and limitations of Freedmen’s Bureau).
431
See supra notes 272-78 and accompanying text (describing systems that shut Black
people out of property ownership). See generally Sawers, supra note 227 (highlighting
evolution of postbellum property law and its role in controlling newly freed Black
Americans).
432
See Tamar R. Birckhead, The New Peonage, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1595, 1626-28
(2015) (describing modern form of coerced labor for debt and parallels to post-Civil War
peonage system).
433
See id. at 1598-1601 (describing Georgia program “leasing out convicted men to work
on [a] plantation” and similar instances of convict leasing across state).
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sharecropping,434 and mass incarceration.435 So long as Black people are treated
as a lower caste of Americans, this cycle will persist. If we wish to abolish not
only slavery but “slavery lite” in all its forms, we must remedy the conditions
that keep Black Americans vulnerable—especially their lack of property and the
decades of legal maneuvers to maintain that status quo. That will require
reparations.
This isn’t to claim that the Thirteenth Amendment creates a self-enacting right
to reparations. Nothing that the Reconstruction Congress did indicated that its
members believed that, nor does the main body of abolitionist literature indicate
that the ideas were inherently linked within the movement. To be sure, some
politicians had advocated that enslaved persons would have a right to the land
that they worked following emancipation,436 an idea that had reached the ears of
its intended beneficiaries.437 General Sherman and other military leaders ordered
the redistribution of some land, but this practice was not widespread, because
the general policy of Reconstruction favored wage labor to land ownership.438
However, the inclusion of some land reforms in the Freedmen’s Bureau Bills
indicates that the Reconstruction Congress believed that such reparations were
potentially a necessary and proper method to enforce emancipation. The
Reconstruction Congress meant for its enforcement powers to be evaluated by
the McCulloch test:439 if the legislation was appropriate to achieve legitimate
ends by means that were plainly adapted to the ends and otherwise consistent
with the limits of the Constitution, the legislation would be constitutional.440
Therefore, reparations under the Thirteenth Amendment should be evaluated by
this standard.
First, a court would need to evaluate whether the ends are “legitimate.”441
Reparations are—at their core—a remedy, and a remedy must be aimed at
redressing a particular harm.442 Black Americans have been maintained as a

434

See id. at 1615-16 (“Former slaves were typically paid half in currency, with the other
half to be paid only when the crop was harvested.”).
435
See id. at 1629-35 (“[J]ail time is not prohibited for such noncommercial debts as those
stemming from criminal court involvement and those stemming from failure to pay child
support or alimony, and it is not prohibited for contractual debts stemming from civil
contempt orders.” (footnote omitted)).
436
See Tsesis, supra note 329, at 1812 n.206.
437
See Sarah McCammon, The Story Behind ‘40 Acres and a Mule,’ NPR: CODE SWITCH
(Jan. 12, 2015, 6:02 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2015/01/12
/376781165/the-story-behind-40-acres-and-a-mule [https://perma.cc/9UV9-UY4Y].
438
See Du Bois, supra note 430 (noting that Freedmen’s Bureau “set going a system of
free labor” but failed to make Black persons “landholders in any considerable numbers”).
439
See Balkin, supra note 302, at 1810.
440
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
441
See id.
442
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).

152

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102:87

racially disfavored caste since their forcible introduction to the continent.443
Since the time of emancipation, this has relied in part on their lack of access to
real property. Various legal means have been deployed to relieve Black
Americans of their property and prevent them from obtaining more.444 That
constitutes a very real and ongoing harm, one that reparations could redress, at
least in part. Therefore, redressing the harm of land deprivation would be a
legitimate end within the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment.
Next, the means must be “appropriate” and “plainly adapted” to the legitimate
ends.445 If the end is a remedy for the harm of land deprivation, the means allow
for the acquisition of land. Either large-scale land reforms placing ownership in
the hands of Black Americans or a grant of the financial means to acquire such
lands would clearly accomplish the goal of aiding Black Americans in the
acquisition of land. Such methods would be appropriate means plainly adapted
to the end of remedying land deprivation.
Finally, the means must otherwise “consist with” the Constitution.446
Congress has vast authority with respect to property of the United States447 and
expenditures from its treasury.448 Either a grant of federal lands or funds would
clearly be within Congress’s authority. Redistribution of privately held lands
might be more questionable, but the Takings Clause has been interpreted to
contemplate a wide range of public purposes.449 The federal government’s
condemnation power is not in doubt. The question, then, would be whether any
of these methods of making land available to Black Americans as reparations
would run afoul of some other constitutional provision.
The most obvious candidate, based on the Court’s modern jurisprudence,
would be the Equal Protection Clause. Given the frequent rejection of programs
tailored to provide funds to members of a disadvantaged race,450 the Court’s
current understanding of the Equal Protection Clause would forbid reparations.
But this colorblindness does not comport with the Reconstruction Congress’s
vision of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Reconstruction Amendments were
intended to be color-conscious remedies capable of supporting appropriate
legislation to redress slavery and discriminatory state action. Equal protection
instead imposed a duty on governments to affirmatively protect people within
their jurisdictions and to preserve equality generally. The doctrine should not be

443
See generally, e.g., Elliott & Hughes, supra note 6 (exploring history and legacy of
slavery in United States).
444
See supra notes 272-78 and accompanying text (describing discriminatory practices
that continue to deprive people of color of access to real property).
445
See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (14 Wheat.) at 421.
446
See id.
447
See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
448
See id. art. I, § 8.
449
See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484-85 (2005) (listing precedents
upholding takings and allowing takings for respondent city’s economic benefit).
450
See Kennedy, supra note 137, at 5-6; Reiley, supra note 167, at A19.
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conceived to require a blind application of the law without regard to the needs
and interests of individuals. Therefore, there is no basis under the Constitution—
properly understood—to find a conflict with reparations to enable land
ownership. The Thirteenth Amendment, under the McCulloch test, can support
reparations.451
C.

Ensuring Equality Under Law—and Its Protection

The Reconstruction Congress saw that state governments were all too willing
to attempt to circumvent the abolitionist project on any technicality they could
imagine.452 To prevent that, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments protected
a broad range of civil and political rights through sweeping language and
expansive enforcement powers.453 This Section will explore the scope of these
protections through an abolitionist lens and imagine their potential modern
applications.
1. The Citizenship Clause
Of all the protections granted by the Reconstruction Amendments, the
Citizenship Clause’s guarantee of birthright citizenship is the one modern
application that gets the closest to its abolitionist intent. The main distinction
between the Clause’s promise and current enforcement has to do with birthright
citizenship in U.S. territories. Michael Ramsey accurately described the
Citizenship Clause’s full meaning:
[A]t the time of its enactment the Citizenship Clause’s phrase
“born . . . in the United States” most likely referred to birth in territory
under permanent U.S. sovereignty. The distinction between incorporated
and unincorporated territory was a subsequent policy-driven judicial
invention that lacked foundation in original materials. Rather, the key
distinction at the time of the Amendment’s enactment was . . . formal
cession or annexation, as opposed to temporary occupation.
. . . [T]he original meaning would apply the Citizenship Clause to
persons born in Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands—all of which are under permanent U.S. sovereignty pursuant to
formal acquisitions and thus are “in the United States” under the original
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.454
In other words, the Fourteenth Amendment’s intended effect is to extend
birthright citizenship to the entire United States. That would require only a minor
451

By implication, it could also support more narrowly tailored remedies to redress the
symptomatic harms that hinder Black landownership. See supra text accompanying notes
272-78 (highlighting several discriminatory practices that continue to impede Black property
ownership).
452
See Roberts, supra note 299, at 62.
453
See Amar, supra note 365, at 226-27.
454
Ramsey, supra note 352, at 435-36 (second alteration in original).
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change in enforcement to cover the territories not currently treated as within the
Citizenship Clause’s meaning.
2. The Privileges or Immunities Clause
By contrast, the Privileges or Immunities Clause is furthest from its intended,
abolitionist meaning. Its champion on the Supreme Court, Justice Clarence
Thomas, is unlikely to acknowledge its full original meaning,455 while other
Justices seem content to leave it dormant.456 The Reconstruction Congress
clearly intended for the Privileges or Immunities Clause to encompass both the
Bill of Rights and the sorts of natural law rights understood to fall within the
scope of the Comity Clause.457
To begin, let us consider what Justice Thomas gets right: “the ratifying public
understood the Privileges or Immunities Clause to protect constitutionally
enumerated rights.”458 Shortly before the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification,
President Johnson cemented in the public consciousness the connection of the
phrase “privileges or immunities” to the Bill of Rights when he proclaimed
amnesty for former Confederates.459 Justice Thomas is absolutely correct when
he asserts that “[e]vidence from the political branches in the years leading to the
455
See Broyles, supra note 422, at 364-65 (noting that while Justice Thomas advocates for
use of Privileges or Immunities Clause to incorporate Bill of Rights against states, he “does
not address the numerous references by Bingham and others to the centrality of natural rights
as a critical component of their understanding of privileges and immunities”).
456
See Jeffrey D. Jackson, Be Careful What You Wish For: Why McDonald v. City of
Chicago’s Rejection of the Privileges or Immunities Clause May Not Be Such a Bad Thing for
Rights, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 561, 576 (2011) (noting that in McDonald v. City of Chicago,
561 U.S. 742 (2010), four Justices explicitly rejected using Privileges or Immunities Clause
in general, another rejected it in instant case, and three others made no comment on it, while
Justice Thomas favored it for incorporation).
457
See supra notes 352-56 and accompanying text (comparing scopes of Privileges or
Immunities Clause and Citizenship Clause).
458
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 837 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
459
See Emily Jennings, Note, Let’s All Agree to Disagree, and Move On: Analyzing
Slaughter-House and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause Under
“Sunk Cost” Principles, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1803, 1811 (2013) (“This pardon and amnesty, not
surprisingly, headlined every newspaper, and introduced ‘privileges and immunities’ to the
American voters as a term of art. As Johnson’s pardon was undeniably the most publicized
event in its day, the American voter would likely have viewed this new term of art as
inextricably linked to those rights under the Constitution, as Johnson had done.” (footnote
omitted)); see also Proclamation (Dec. 25, 1868), reprinted in AMNESTY: Important
Proclamation by the President—Pardon and Amnesty Granted to All the Late Rebels, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 25, 1868, at 3 (granting “restoration of rights, privileges and immunities under
the Constitution and the laws which have been made in pursuance thereof”). See generally
Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part I: “Privileges and
Immunities” as an Antebellum Term of Art, 98 GEO. L.J. 1241 (2010) (explaining usage of
“privileges,” “immunities,” and “privileges and immunities” in antebellum and
Reconstruction eras).
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Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption demonstrates broad public understanding
that the privileges and immunities of United States citizenship included rights
set forth in the Constitution, just as Webster and his allies had argued.”460 Any
historically accurate understanding of the Privileges or Immunities Clause must
include the incorporation of the entire Bill of Rights against the states.
But Justice Thomas breaks with the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
regarding natural law rights. He would constrain the Privileges or Immunities
Clause to protect only such rights as could be considered fundamental.461 The
distinction, typically, is that whichever rights Justice Thomas wants to recognize
will fit within that framework, and those he thinks should not be protected will
not.462 Justice Thomas’s objection to reproductive rights is especially illustrative
of this point.463 Bodily autonomy and the right to be free of interference with
one’s family structure are both protected under the Thirteenth Amendment’s
abolition of slavery and its badges and incidents, regardless of what other
provisions might support them.464 The notion that the right to bear arms is
fundamental, while the right not to be enslaved—along with its attendant rights
to liberty—is not, is patently absurd. The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
were savvy to the ability of state governments to discover new means of
oppressing Black Americans—it was the impetus for the Amendment’s
adoption.465 The ratifying public also understood that the Amendment was a
response to such oppression to ensure that the government would remain agile
enough to counteract it. The Fourteenth Amendment was the “find-out”
Amendment in response to the South’s transgressions; the Privileges or
Immunities Clause was intended to be its strongest tool.466 The Privileges or
Immunities Clause must necessarily be understood to allow for the protection of
not just rights that people in 1868 already understood to be fundamental but
those that would later come to be understood as fundamental.

460

McDonald, 561 U.S. at 826-27 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
461
See Broyles, supra note 422, at 365 (“As Justice Thomas points out, the Framers
intended the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV primarily to be a comity
provision that would guarantee citizens of each state the fundamental rights of citizens of
other states should they travel to those other states.”).
462
See, e.g., Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 692 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring in
judgment) (discussing approvingly Court’s treatment of right to bear arms as fundamental
while decrying its protection of right of same-sex partners to marry and right to reproductive
privacy).
463
See id.
464
See supra Section III.B.3 (discussing reproductive autonomy’s centrality to free
personhood).
465
See Graber, supra note 345, at 1528.
466
See supra text accompanying notes 352-56 (arguing that text and history of Privileges
or Immunities Clause indicate it should be understood as strongest tool in Reconstruction
Amendments).
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All the liberty interests and protections against government interference in our
lives that we take for granted today as constitutionally protected fall within the
scope of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. In its full abolitionist glory, the
Privileges or Immunities Clause gives all citizens a powerful tool against
government interference with their fundamental rights—be they speech,
privacy, travel, or bearing arms. The restoration of this Clause to its intended
strength would be a revolution in individual rights.
3.

The Due Process Clause

The modern understanding of the Due Process Clause does much of the work
intended for the Privileges or Immunities Clause—but only a portion of its
own.467 The Due Process Clause can and should protect those procedural rights
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, as well as traditional understandings of fairness
in the application of notice and an opportunity to be heard.468 However, its
substantive components would also provide protection against misconduct by
legislatures, executive officers, and courts. If the Clause met its abolitionist
potential, it would provide powerful recourse for the vindication of rights against
improper government action.
Just as the Administrative Procedure Act provides a means to vacate the
actions of an executive agency taken by some improper procedure,469 the Due
Process Clause, properly conceived, would supply a guarantee that legislatures
conduct their affairs in good faith. Acts of legislatures taken in contravention of
their own rules or state constitutions could be challenged as violating substantive
due process. Self-dealing in legislative redistricting to guarantee a
representative’s own seat or a party’s victory could likewise be challenged.470
The original framers of the Constitution assumed the good faith of elected
officials, but the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, hardened by a war
brought on by the founders’ moral failings, had no such delusions.
An abolitionist reading of the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment could also spell the end of the “good faith” exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s exclusionary rule.471 Rather than haphazardly balancing the needs
467
See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 811 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment) (“[T]he Court has determined that the Due Process Clause
applies rights against the States that are not mentioned in the Constitution at all, even without
seriously arguing that the Clause was originally understood to protect such rights.”); supra
text accompanying notes 357-60 (discussing confusion as to Due Process Clause’s scope).
468
See Williams, supra note 357, at 420-22 (providing overview of procedural due
process).
469
See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D).
470
For a similar discussion regarding the power to redress violations of the states’
assurances that power derives from the people through state constitutions, see Bulman-Pozen
& Seifter, supra note 294, at 913.
471
See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907-08 (1984) (“The substantial social
costs exacted by the exclusionary rule for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights have
long been a source of concern. . . . Particularly when law enforcement officers have acted in
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of the state against the rights of individuals, courts could ask a simpler question:
were the defendant’s rights violated to their detriment? If the answer is yes, the
fact that the government blundered rather than sought to oppress would be
immaterial to the availability of procedural remedies.
At its core, substantive due process would require that any government
decision that could deprive a person of life, liberty, or property be conducted
fairly, within established norms, and without illicit motive. The abolitionist
understanding of due process is a strong limit upon government action and is
significantly broader in scope than the present interpretation of the Due Process
Clause.472
Abolition constitutionalism also requires a reexamination of our concept of
liberty. The abolitionist view is more consistent with a vision of liberty that
embraces positive liberties rather than merely the negative liberties our modern
concept of ordered liberty does.473 “What the post-Civil War reconstruction
amendments were about fundamentally . . . was securing the positive liberties of
citizenship, self-governance, autonomy, and the end of bondage . . . .”474 While
such positive liberties could be construed as protected under the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, the Due Process Clause provides an additional means of
protection.
4.

The Equal Protection Clause

By comparison to the rather positive abolitionist concept of protection,
modern Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence merely analyzes whether the law
has been applied equally—even to dissimilarly situated persons.475 Any
deviation from this colorblind doctrine is subjected to strict scrutiny.476 Yet the
original, abolitionist doctrine of protection asked instead: Does the law protect
all those subject to it? The right to equal protection was not so much a right of
equal protection against the government, but a duty of the government to provide
protection—including against private action—to the people as equals.477
objective good faith or their transgressions have been minor, the magnitude of the benefit
conferred on . . . guilty defendants offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system.”).
472
See Williams, supra note 357, at 476.
473
See WEST, supra note 171, at 125 (“The two limitations that define the modern
conception of ordered liberty and render the Constitution’s promise so empty . . . are flatly
unjustified, given the breadth of political vision that inspired . . . the Fourteenth Amendment,
including its guarantee of liberty.”).
474
Id.
475
See Kennedy, supra note 137, at 4; WEST, supra note 171, at 26-27 (arguing that
colorblind constitutionalism is flawed because it creates possibility that in absence of
Thirteenth Amendment, Equal Protection Clause would permit colorblind slavery).
476
See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 314-15 (2013) (remanding
case with instructions to apply strict scrutiny to college admissions affirmative action
programs to ensure equal protection of white students).
477
See supra notes 361-64 and accompanying text (discussing equal protection as
including affirmative obligation for government to provide protection).
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As with the Privileges or Immunities Clause, restoring the abolitionist
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause would work a significant change in its
application. The Reconstruction Congress understood the Fourteenth
Amendment to not just permit but to support race-conscious remedies.478 So long
as Black people remain disadvantaged in American society, such remedies
would remain appropriate legislation for the legitimate end of remedying the
lingering effects of slavery and its aftermath. The Equal Protection Clause,
therefore, would not provide protection to white people against race-conscious
remedies—the notion is contrary to the entire project of Reconstruction.
Instead, the Equal Protection Clause would be applicable to answer questions
such as: Did the police have a duty to enforce Jessica Gonzales’s restraining
order against her estranged husband?479 Does the EPA have a duty to prevent
carbon dioxide emissions from threatening coastal communities through rising
sea levels?480 Did state and federal governments have a duty to protect prisoners
from COVID-19?481 Did Michigan have a duty to protect the people of Flint
from contaminated drinking water?482 Yes—in all of these instances, the
government has a duty to protect people subject to its laws.483
Under the abolitionists’ Equal Protection Clause, government officials have
the duty to protect people from the environmental ravages of corporate greed
and official neglect. Police have the duty to protect people from known threats.
Courts have a duty to protect people from abusive police. Prisons, psychiatric
treatment centers, and public hospitals have a duty to protect people in their care.
Regulators have a duty to protect employees from hostile work environments
and unsafe conditions. State and federal governments have a duty to protect
478

See Roberts, supra note 299, at 63.
See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 751-54 (2005) (detailing
Gonzales’s attempts to enforce restraining order to protect her daughters, who her estranged
husband murdered sometime during hours she spent pleading for police help).
480
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 515 (2007) (describing projection that rising
sea levels would lead to loss of coastal property in Massachusetts if EPA did not curb
greenhouse gas emissions).
481
See A State-by-State Look at 15 Months of Coronavirus in Prisons, MARSHALL PROJECT
(July 1, 2021, 1:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/05/01/a-state-by-statelook-at-coronavirus-in-prisons [https://perma.cc/38JH-D9S6] (examining nearly 400,000
cases and 2,715 deaths from COVID-19 in U.S. prisons through June 2021).
482
See Flint Water Crisis, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, https://www.nrdc.org/flint
[https://perma.cc/ME96-9CD6] (last visited Jan. 17, 2022) (describing water contamination
in Flint, Michigan, as involving “lead levels well above the ‘action level’ for lead set by the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency”).
483
See Robin West, Is Progressive Constitutionalism Possible?, 4 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1,
10 (1999) (“This abolitionist reading [of the Fourteenth Amendment] has the added
virtue . . . of harmonizing the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, and it does so in a
way which is both logical and historically sensible. The point of the Due Process Clause is to
guarantee the positive liberty that is the antithesis of slavery, and the point of the Equal
Protection Clause, on this approach, is not equality at all (equal is in the clause as a modifier,
not a noun) but protection.”).
479
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voters against campaigns of suppression and disenfranchisement. These duties
cannot be neglected, especially not to the detriment of a subset of the population.
By contrast, the government does not have a duty to protect mediocre people
in a position of privilege from remedies to address systemic racism, sexism,
ableism, or other systemic harms. Like the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the
Equal Protection Clause is agile. If, in some distant future, white people
somehow become a socially, economically, and politically disadvantaged class,
the Equal Protection Clause would be there to protect them against
discrimination. But if that future sounds far-fetched, it’s even more so in light of
the abolitionist interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause; the abolitionist
concept of equal protection is designed so that new groups in need of special
protections do not emerge. The very concept of a disadvantaged class is alien to
a fully realized abolition democracy.
5.

The Right to Vote

The Fifteenth Amendment is not as radical and far-reaching as the other
Reconstruction Amendments.484 The critical change that a color-conscious
application of the Fifteenth Amendment would enable is the analysis of voting
laws based on their actual benefit or harm to communities of color.485 The Equal
Protection Clause and Privileges or Immunities Clause would likely serve as
stronger tools to combat voter suppression. Nevertheless, an abolitionist
understanding of the Fifteenth Amendment would still allow the analysis of
voting restrictions to determine their practical effects and realistically assess the
intention behind them.486

484
See supra text accompanying notes 366-68 (discussing narrower scope of Fifteenth
Amendment as compared to Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments).
485
Cf. Patricia Okonta, Note, Race-Based Political Exclusion and Social Subjugation:
Racial Gerrymandering as a Badge of Slavery, 49 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 254, 255 (2018)
(“While civil rights advocates have relied on non-race-neutral redistricting schemes to enable
disenfranchised minorities to elect their preferred candidates, other schemes have been
utilized for the opposite effect. Such schemes include, for example, the use of racial
gerrymandering in contexts where racially polarized voting does not enhance minorities’
ability to elect their candidate of choice.”).
486
Cf. Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2341 (2021) (applying
modern voting rights jurisprudence and referring to evaluation of voter suppression by its
disparate impacts “a radical project”).
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The waves of gerrymandering,487 polling place closures,488 voter
identification requirements,489 restrictions on ballot submissions,490 and even
bans on aiding people stuck in lengthy voting lines491 would all be subjected to
rigorous analysis of their practical effects and likely intent. No one paying
attention seriously believes that these laws are passed for legitimate, race-neutral
reasons.492 They have a purpose—suppressing the votes of Black and Brown
people—and are effective at doing that within the limits of what the Court has
shown itself to be willing to tolerate.
The Reconstruction Congress realized that voter suppression was a serious
threat to an abolition democracy. Treating the Fifteenth Amendment as a call to

487

See Alex Tausanovitch & Danielle Root, How Partisan Gerrymandering Limits Voting
Rights, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (July 8, 2020), https://www.americanprogress.org
/issues/democracy/reports/2020/07/08/487426/partisan-gerrymandering-limits-voting-rights/
[https://perma.cc/Y82G-2Z6K] (“In recent years, gerrymandered legislatures have pioneered
other tools to stay in power, including making it harder for voters who oppose them to cast a
ballot. It is a power grab on top of a power grab.”).
488
See Matt Vasilogambros, Carrie Levine & Pratheek Rebala, National Data Release
Sheds Light on Past Polling Place Changes, PEW CHARITABLE TRS.: STATELINE (Sept. 29,
2020),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2020/09/29
/national-data-release-sheds-light-on-past-polling-place-changes [https://perma.cc/7NTX4B92] (“Polling place reductions and changes can lower turnout by creating confusion and
barriers for voters, potentially disenfranchising them. There is no national public database of
polling place locations and addresses for past federal elections.” (citation omitted)).
489
See KEESHA GASKINS & SUNDEEP IYER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., THE CHALLENGE OF
OBTAINING VOTER IDENTIFICATION 1 (2012) (“The 11 percent of eligible voters who lack the
required photo ID must travel to a designated government office to obtain one. Yet many
citizens will have trouble making this trip.” (footnote omitted)).
490
See Jamelle Bouie, Opinion, If It’s Not Jim Crow, What Is It?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/06/opinion/georgia-voting-law.html (“The new
law requires each county to provide drop boxes for absentee ballots, but limits their location
and the hours when they are available, as well as the number the most populous counties can
have. This increases access for largely Republican-voting rural counties and decreases it for
the state’s Democratic urban centers.”).
491
See Tim Carman, Aid Groups Alarmed by Ga. Voting Restrictions, WASH. POST, Apr.
12, 2021, at C1 (“Among the provisions in Georgia’s new elections law is one that prohibits
‘any person’ — not just politicians, campaign volunteers or political nonprofits that might try
to influence votes — from passing out food or drink to residents awaiting their turn to vote.”).
492
Yet, the Court has repeatedly found restrictions on the right to vote legitimate and race
neutral. See, e.g., Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2347 (2021) (“Even
if the plaintiffs had shown a disparate burden caused by [the Arizona statute placing
restrictions on vote by mail ballots], the State’s justifications would suffice to avoid [VRA]
liability.”); Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507 (2019) (“We have never struck
down a partisan gerrymander as unconstitutional—despite various requests over the past 45
years. The expansion of judicial authority would not be into just any area of controversy, but
into one of the most intensely partisan aspects of American political life.”); Shelby County v.
Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013) (“Our country has changed, and while any racial
discrimination in voting is too much, Congress must ensure that the legislation it passes to
remedy that problem speaks to current conditions.”).
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make a serious inquiry into the effects of and motivations behind racially
discriminatory (but colorblind) voting restrictions would be a powerful tool for
the Court to become a positive force in promoting American democracy. But
even more than that, an abolitionist reading of the Fifteenth Amendment’s
enabling clause could allow Congress to ban felon disenfranchisement and enact
reparations through voting reforms to redress the legacy of mass racial
disenfranchisement.493 An abolitionist reading of even the least powerful of the
Reconstruction Amendments is still a powerful tool toward the creation of an
abolition democracy.
6.

Congress’s Enforcement Powers

The common thread running through the provisions discussed so far is the
reach of Congress’s enforcement powers under the enabling clauses of the
Reconstruction Amendments. If we look to the original understanding of the
Reconstruction Amendments, Congress’s enforcement powers are considerably
broader than the narrow scope announced by the Supreme Court in City of
Boerne v. Flores.494 Congress drafted the enabling clauses with a deliberate eye
to the McCulloch standard—the lax standard applied to such powers as
Congress’s ability to levy taxes and spend for the general welfare.495
In so many cases, the standard of review is determinative.496 Applying the
abolitionist understanding of the enabling clauses would treat them as sweeping
powers to be reviewed for the legitimacy of their ends and the appropriateness
of their means to meet those ends. Congress would have a free hand to enact
legislation to address abolitionist goals—a power that would only be as good as
the Congress itself. And yet, a Congress able to advance the cause of abolition
democracy even gradually would likely increase the odds of a future Congress
being composed of members better suited to further advancing that cause.

493
See Brandon Hasbrouck, Double-Count All Black Votes, NATION, Dec. 28, 2020-Jan.
4, 2021, at 12, 12 (proposing vote reparations in form of counting votes of Black Americans
twice). Other potential reforms could include minority set-aside seats in legislatures,
proportional representation, and altering the order of state election days in presidential
primaries to reduce the influence of unusually white states.
494
521 U.S. 507, 518-20 (1997) (announcing “congruence and proportionality” test for
review of Congress’s exercise of Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers); see Balkin,
supra note 302, at 1812-15 (arguing that standard Court applied in Boerne to invalidate
Religious Freedom Restoration Act’s application to states is unjustified).
495
See David S. Schwartz, A Question Perpetually Arising: Implied Powers, Capable
Federalism, and the Limits of Enumerationism, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 573, 582 (2017) (“The
enumerationism that has come down to us via the post-New Deal constitutional settlement
and the post-1995 ‘federalism revival’ of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts has been revised
to embrace McCulloch’s understanding of the Necessary and Proper Clause and a muchbroadened understanding of the commerce, taxing, and spending powers.”).
496
See Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial
Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1391 (1995) (“Appellate courts have to decide what the
‘standard of review’ is, and that standard more often than not determines the outcome.”).
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Such a Congress would be empowered to enact sweeping legislation to
undermine the choke hold white supremacy has on this country. It could abolish
policing as we know it, mass incarceration, and the death penalty. It could
protect reproductive rights and pay reparations for slavery. It could end
discriminatory state practices without having to wade through a quagmire of
procedural barriers. It could protect the wide range of rights Americans enjoy
without being limited by centuries-old notions of fundamentality. It could
respond to the emergence of new prejudices to protect Americans whose
interests and vulnerabilities might not have even been imagined a generation
ago. It could meaningfully guarantee that everyone would be able to enjoy clean
air and water; vote on an even playing field with their neighbors; and live, work,
and learn without fear of discrimination. The power to build an abolition
democracy would be truly transformative for this country.
*****
Understanding the depths of the evil the members of the Reconstruction
Congress sought to remedy clarifies their intent and the breadth of the
Reconstruction Amendments. W.E.B. Du Bois summarized it:
Slaves were not considered men. They had no right of petition. They were
“devisable like any other chattel.” They could own nothing; they could
make no contracts; they could hold no property, nor traffic in property; they
could not hire out; they could not legally marry and constitute families;
they could not control their children; they could not appeal from their
master; they could be punished at will. They could not testify in court; they
could be imprisoned by their owners, and the criminal offense of assault
and battery could not be committed on the person of a slave. The “willful,
malicious and deliberate murder” of a slave was punishable by death, but
such a crime was practically impossible of proof. The slave owned [sic] to
his master and all his family a respect “without bounds, and an absolute
obedience.” This authority could be transmitted to others. A slave could
not sue his master; had no right of redemption; no right to education or
religion; a promise made to a slave by his master had no force nor validity.
Children followed the condition of the slave mother. The slave could have
no access to the judiciary. A slave might be condemned to death for striking
any white person.497
Congress sought to tear down a system that legally rendered human beings
nonpersons and replace it with a democracy dedicated to a radical vision of
freedom and equality.498 That vision required not just that the government refrain
497

DU BOIS, supra note 176, at 7-8.
See WOODWARD, supra note 334, at 74 (“The ‘concomitant’ of the second war aim of
freedom was a third—equality. No sooner was the Union officially committed to the second
war aim than the drive was on for commitment to the third.”); see also President Abraham
Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/gettysburgaddress/ext/trans-nicolay-inscribed.html (“It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great
498
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from interfering in the details of citizens’ lives but that it affirmatively protect
them—from mob violence, discrimination, and individually insurmountable
economic and political obstacles.
To enact this radical vision, the Reconstruction Congress provided a new,
systematic approach to freedom and equality in the Constitution. First, slavery
and the legal enforcement of the racial caste undergirding it were removed. Next,
Congress made citizenship a birthright—including all of its accompanying rights
and privileges, like those to state protection and procedural fairness as well as
decidedly positive rights and liberties. Finally, these guarantees were supported
by the political enfranchisement of all American men, irrespective of race.
Congress intended itself to be the arbiter of these new guarantees’ meaning and
empowered itself to enforce them.
A constitutionalism grounded in the Reconstruction Congress’s vision
supports the Supreme Court’s most rights-affirming decisions and demands that
we go further while rejecting the Court’s flirtations with oppression by
government and private actors.499 It empowers us to redress the lingering evils
of slavery and demands that we do so. It establishes a broad vision of citizenship
and its accompanying rights. It protects even those who lack some of those rights
and guarantees that they be treated with fundamental fairness. It is systematic
and recognizes the necessity of the political franchise for protecting such a
system. It is an antiracist, abolition constitutionalism.
CONCLUSION
[W]e have to remember that what we observe is not nature in itself but
nature exposed to our method of questioning.
—Werner Heisenberg500
Nine wise, blind elephants, after arguing for a while about what men are like,
decided to settle the matter by observing one directly. The first wise, blind
elephant felt the man and declared, “men are flat.” The other eight wise, blind
elephants felt the man and agreed.501
Colorblind jurisprudence was developed by men who had never experienced
racism. They applied the standard, observed that the law no longer discriminated
task remaining before us . . . that this nation under God shall have a new birth of freedom, and
that government of the people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth.”).
499
Cf. Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, The Return of Lochner, 100 CORNELL L. REV.
527, 555 (2015) (“The Court’s decision in Roe substantially complicated the task of liberal
scholars who were ‘struggling to rationalize the Warren Court while guarding against
conservative judicial activism.’” (quoting LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL
LIBERALISM 7 (1996))).
500
WERNER HEISENBERG, PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY 58 (1st Harper Torchbook ed. 1962)
(1958).
501
See, e.g., GEOFF TIBBALLS, THE MAMMOTH BOOK OF JOKES 2 loc. 875 (2012) (ebook).
I have been unable to locate the exact origin of this joke but have repurposed it for this
analogy.
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against people on the basis of race, and agreed with each other that this was so.
But in the process, they very much crushed people. For some, this was surely as
knowing as Justice Harlan’s vision of white supremacy; for others, it may well
have been a well-meaning error. Regardless of the motives of individual
Justices, the Constitution will continue to protect white supremacy so long as it
is deprived of the means to see the problem of racial injustice. The Supreme
Court has the power either to act as the custodian of our democracy against the
steady creep of oligarchy or to match antidemocratic ends to its antidemocratic
structure. And when the Court seeks to understand the shape of our society, it
will inevitably be a society already exposed to its methods of questioning.
The constitutional principles that the Court applies today will never be
sufficient to achieve a state of racial justice in America. We could
pessimistically assume that these principles will persist as a necessary
consequence of American history.502 Or, we could take a lesson from the arts,
specifically from the traditions of fantasy and science fiction. Despite its typical
setting in the future, science fiction is about the present.503 Despite its typical
setting in imaginary times and places, fantasy is about the real world.504 Those
genres are often derided as escapist or power fantasies. But the whole point of
power fantasies—and especially superhero power fantasies—is imagining how
great it would be to have the power to help other people.505
When I was imagining what it would be like to see the world as Doctor
Manhattan does, I also speculated as to what I would do with all that power.
Who would I help? How? What would I do to improve the world? It got me
going, and the proposals in this piece are all part of the better world I would
want to shape.
But I’m not powerless; I’m a lawyer. The law, in its way, is a kind of magic.
Not the kind with wands and spells, of course, but (along with art and computer
programming) it’s one of the ways we, as humans, can use language to change
the world. We’re limited by rules, like those contained in the Constitution, and
502

See, e.g., Colker, supra note 153 (manuscript at 55-56) (portraying Constitution as sure
impediment to remedial legislation).
503
See Lisa Allardice, Margaret Atwood: ‘I Am Not a Prophet. Science Fiction Is Really
About Now,’ GUARDIAN (Jan. 20, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com
/books/2018/jan/20/margaret-atwood-i-am-not-a-prophet-science-fiction-is-about-now
[https://perma.cc/4636-XM2Q] (“Prophecies are really about now. In science fiction it’s
always about now. What else could it be about?”).
504
See Anna Bradley, How Fantasy Can Inspire Us to Live in the Real World, GUARDIAN
(Feb.
28,
2016,
4:00
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/childrens-bookssite/2016/feb/28/how-fantasy-can-inspire-us-to-live-in-the-real-world
[https://perma.cc/3BNG-UFGC] (“But fantasy books can [teach us about our everyday lives
or warn us about our possible future] too, even if it’s in a slightly different way [than dystopian
books].”).
505
See Deidre Delpino Dykes, Protagonist as Power Fantasy, MEDIUM (Aug. 15, 2019),
https://medium.com/write-away/protagonist-as-power-fantasy-a6ce3b2165b5 (“[M]ost of all,
Red[, a superhero protagonist,] has the power to help people, which I[, the author,] feel I do
not. That’s right, my true power fantasy is the ability to help others.”).
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some practical considerations, of course, but also by our own imaginations. So,
I invite you—all of you—to exercise your imaginations as to what this world
and this time can become. Envision a better world, because if we do not begin
there, we will never succeed in making it a reality.
The Constitution has been wielded for centuries as a tool of white supremacy,
but it also contains the tools of abolition democracy. We can reclaim them,
through decades of advocacy and organizing, and change the way our laws are
understood. But first, we must believe.

